Stages of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis: Is there a Wandering Asset Price Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Economics E-Journal 43. Munich Personal RePEc Archive 2008,
2009
Abstract
This study identifies five distinctive stages of the current global financial crisis: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market; spillovers into broader credit market; the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers with counterparty risk effects on other financial institutions; the commodity price bubble, and the ultimate demise of investment banking in the U.S. The study argues that the severity of the crisis is influenced strongly by changeable allocations of global savings coupled with excessive credit creation, which lead to over-pricing of varied types of assets. The study calls such process a “wandering asset-price bubble“. Unstable allocations elevate market, credit, and liquidity risks. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Cross-Border Bank Contagion in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, M. Lo Duca, Jukka M. Vesala
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
We analyze cross-border contagion among European banks in the period from January 1994 to January 2003. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate, in a given country, the number of banks that experience a large shock on the same day (“coexceedances”) as a function of common shocks and lagged coexceedances in other countries. Large shocks are measured by the bottom 95th percentile of the distribution of the daily percentage change in distance to default of banks.We find evidence of significant cross-border contagion among large European banks, which is consistent with a tiered cross-border interbank structure. The results also suggest that contagion increased after the introduction of the euro.
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Banking Integration, Bank Stability, and Regulation: Introduction to a Special Issue of the International Journal of Central Banking
Reint E. Gropp, H. Shin
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
The link between banking integration and financial stability has taken center stage in the wake of the current financial crisis. To what extent is the banking system in Europe integrated? What role has the introduction of the common currency played in this context? Are integrated banking markets more vulnerable to contagion and financial instability? Does the fragmented regulatory framework in Europe pose special problems in resolving bank failures? What policy reforms may become necessary? These questions are of considerable policy interest as evidenced by the extensive discussions surrounding the design and implementation of a new regulatory regime and by the increasing attention coming from academia.
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A Lesson Learned? Pre- and Post-Crisis Entry Decisions in Turkish Banking
H. Evren Damar
Contemporary Economic Policy,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
This study looks at the determinants of entry by Turkish banks into local markets during the periods before and after the crisis of 2000–2001. Motivated by a theoretical model of entry, results of fixed-effects logit regressions suggest that there has been a change in the geographical diversification strategies of Turkish banks. It appears that the dominance of strategic concerns, such as competing with banks of similar size, has diminished, while economic concerns, such as incumbent characteristics and cost considerations, have become more important. Overall, the postcrisis restructuring policies seem to have led to improved decision making in the sector.
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Contestability, Technology and Banking
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 09-007,
No. 7,
2009
Abstract
We estimate the effect of internet penetration on retail bank margins in the euro area. Based on an adapted Baumol [1982] type contestability model, we argue that the internet has reduced sunk costs and therefore increased contestability in retail banking. We test this conjecture by estimating the model using semi-aggregated data for a panel of euro area countries. We utilise time series and cross-sectional variation in internet penetration. We find support for an increase in contestability in deposit markets, and no effect for loan markets. The paper suggests that for time and savings deposits, the presence of brick and mortar bank branches may no longer be of first order importance for the assessment of the competitive structure of the market.
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Financial Crisis Burdens Economic Activity in Poland
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2008
Abstract
In the first half of the year 2008, domestic demand –the main force behind growth – only marginally declined. Still extraordinarily high was the demand for the output of construction firms. Although demand from Western European countries declined since spring, the foreign trade was not much behind its level of the previous year because of high export activity to Asian and Eastern European countries. In the second half of the year, both, the finance and banking system as well as the real economy, were impacted by the consequences of global financial crisis. Indications of that are the temporary collapse of the polish stock market, the rapid fall of the Złoty and the weakening of domestic demand and exports. Against this background, expansion of economic activity in 2009 will continue at a markedly lower level.
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Crisis Contagion in Central and Eastern Europe
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2008
Abstract
The global financial crisis reached the Central and Eastern European region. Fears of a recession are spreading among investors in Russia and the Ukraine due to the heavy decline of oil and steel prices and provoked a first wave of short-term capital withdrawals. The export sector of all countries in the region is affected by weakening global demand. Finally, the financial sector, which is dominated by international banks in almost all countries, appears as the contagion channel for risk adjustments of mother banks. The combined impact of all these causes and channels lead to a proliferation of restrictions in credit and money supply and an outflow of investment capital. A strong weakening of economic growth is on the way in the region, and a long-lasting recession seems possible in some countries, in first line in the Baltic countries. It becomes a superior task of governments to ease the length and depth of the approaching recession by a strong fiscal stimulus. A continuation of the present policy of fiscal consolidation or of nominal convergence toward a quick adoption of the Euro does not seem very advisable. If governments decided to support domestic demand, measures should be taken to strengthening of a genuinely domestic banking sector in order to maintain credit availability.
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German Economy on the Brink of Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
2. Sonderausgabe
2008
Abstract
In autumn 2008, the word economy is in a downswing, caused by the commodity and energy price hike of the first half of the year, housing crises in the US and some other important countries, and in particular by the financial crisis that has recently intensified. The downswing will continue this year and for some time during 2009, and will only come to an end later next year if governments and central banks succeed in stabilizing financial markets in the coming months. In this case, lower prices of commodities and still high growth dynamics in important emerging markets countries will lead to a tentative revival of the world economy.
The German economy is on the brink of a recession. It is particularly vulnerable to a global downswing because exports of investment goods are of upmost importance for the overall economy. Because the uncertainty about the worldwide effects of the financial crisis is very high, the forecast is split. A more probable scenario is based on the assumption of a stabilizing world economy. In this scenario, the growth rate of the German economy in 2009 is 0.2%. The second scenario is based on the assumption of a worldwide recession next year and forecasts that German GDP will shrink by 0.8% in 2009.
Concerning policy, the institutes recommend a strengthening of the capital base of banks via injection of government money. This should be done in a way that gives incentives to banks for attracting additional capital from private sources.
A special chapter of the report analyzes the nature and causes of the price hikes of energy and commodities in the first half of 2008.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets: A Correction
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, Miguel García-Cestona
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Bouckaert and Degryse [2004] (denoted B&D) present a model in which banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. In this note, we point out an error in B&D and show that, although banks' information disclosure may indeed arise in equilibrium, it only does so if adverse selection is not too harsh.
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Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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