The effects of private equity buyouts on employment, productivity, and job reallocation vary tremendously with macroeconomic and credit conditions, across private equity groups, and by type of buyout. We reach this conclusion by examining the most extensive database of U.S. buyouts ever compiled, encompassing thousands of buyout targets from 1980 to 2013 and millions of control firms. Employment shrinks 12% over two years after buyouts of publicly listed firms—on average, and relative to control firms—but expands 15% after buyouts of privately held firms. Postbuyout productivity gains at target firms are large on average and much larger yet for deals executed amid tight credit conditions. A postbuyout tightening of credit conditions or slowing of gross domestic product growth curtails employment growth and intrafirm job reallocation at target firms. We also show that buyout effects differ across the private equity groups that sponsor buyouts, and these differences persist over time at the group level. Rapid upscaling in deal flow at the group level brings lower employment growth at target firms. We relate these findings to theories of private equity that highlight agency problems at portfolio firms and within the private equity industry itself.

This study investigates the impact of inaccurate assumptions on economic forecast precision. We construct a new dataset comprising an unbalanced panel of annual German GDP forecasts from various institutions, taking into account their underlying assumptions. We explicitly control for different forecast horizons to reflect the information available at the time of release. Our analysis reveals that approximately 75% of the variation in squared forecast errors can be attributed to the variation in squared errors of the initial assumptions. This finding emphasizes the importance of accurate assumptions in economic forecasting and suggests that forecasters should transparently disclose their assumptions to enhance the usefulness of their forecasts in shaping effective policy recommendations.

Banks have been operating in a low interest rate environment paired with booming housing markets. For the largest banks in the euro area and the period 2015-2022, we assess whether banks reallocate their foreign loan portfolio backed by real estate as a response to differences in local lending spreads across the home and destination country and conditional on reduced information frictions due to borrowing-country exposures. The main result is that the relative share of foreign real estate backed lending increases in case of return opportunities, and this sensitivity depends on local exposures towards the borrowing country. The result is driven by subsamples for which neither the home nor the borrowing country have implemented macroprudential regulation targeting real estate lending, or for which there is a misalignment in macroprudential policies. Nevertheless, we find limited evidence that the riskiness of real estate backed loans goes up during our sample period, and we discuss potential reasons for this result including the possibility of hidden losses.

We study the granular wage and employment effects of a German place-based policy using a research design that leverages conditionally exogenous EU-wide rules governing program parameters at the regional level. The place-based program subsidizes investments to create jobs with a subsidy rate that varies across labor market regions. The analysis uses matched data on the universe of establishments and their employees, establishment-level panel data on program participation, and regional scores that generate spatial discontinuities in program eligibility and generosity. Spatial spillovers of the program linked to changing commuting patterns can be assessed using information on place of work and place of residence, a unique feature of the data. These rich data enable us to study the incidence of the place-based program on different groups of individuals. We find that the program helps establishments create jobs that disproportionately benefit younger and less-educated workers. Funded establishments increase their wages but, unlike employment, wage gains do not persist in the long run. Employment effects estimated at the local area level are slightly larger than establishment- level estimates, suggesting limited economic spillover effects. On the other hand, spatial spillovers are large as over half of the employment increase comes from commuters. Using subsidy rates as an instrumental variable for actual subsidies indicates that it costs approximately EUR 25,000 to create a new job in the economically disadvantaged areas targeted by the program.