Completing the European Banking Union: Capital Cost Consequences for Credit Providers and Corporate Borrowers
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Eleonora Sfrappini, Lena Tonzer
European Economic Review,
September
2022
Abstract
The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks in the European Union (EU). Using the staggered BRRD implementation across 15 member states, we identify banks’ capital cost responses and subsequent pass-through to borrowers towards surprise elements due to national transposition details. Average bank capital costs increase heterogeneously across countries with strongest funding cost hikes observed for banks located in GIIPS and non-EMU countries. Only banks in core E(M)U countries that exhibit higher funding costs increase credit spreads for corporate borrowers and contract credit supply. Tighter credit conditions are only passed on to more levered and less profitable firms. On balance, the national implementation of BRRD appears to have strengthened financial system resilience without a pervasive hike in borrowing costs.
Read article
Das Potenzial von Bankkreditspreads für die Konjunkturprognose
Daniel Streitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2022
Abstract
Prognosemodelle für die zukünftige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung verwenden häufig marktbasierte Indikatoren wie Spreads von Unternehmensanleihen, die den Risikoaufschlag gegenüber einem Referenzzins angeben. Anleihespreads bilden jedoch nur die Entwicklung von Risiken für Unternehmen ab, die regelmäßig Anleihen emittieren – im Durchschnitt größere, sichere Firmen. Neuartige Daten zu Bankkrediten, die im Sekundärmarkt gehandelt werden, erlauben auch die Konstruktion von Kreditspreads. Kreditmarktdaten umfassen ein breiteres Spektrum an Firmen, inklusive kleinerer Firmen, die stärker von Finanzmarktfriktionen betroffen sind. Tests zeigen, dass Kreditspreads tatsächlich mehr Informationen über wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen beinhalten als Anleihespreads und daher das Potenzial haben, Prognosemodelle zu verbessern.
Read article
Centre for Evidence-based Policy Advice
Centre for Evidence-based Policy Advice (IWH-CEP) ...
See page
Corporate Loan Spreads and Economic Activity
Anthony Saunders, Alessandro Spina, Sascha Steffen, Daniel Streitz
SSRN Working Paper,
2021
Abstract
We use secondary corporate loan-market prices to construct a novel loan-market-based credit spread. This measure has considerable predictive power for economic activity across macroeconomic outcomes in both the U.S. and Europe and captures unique information not contained in public market credit spreads. Loan-market borrowers are compositionally different and particularly sensitive to supply-side frictions as well as financial frictions that emanate from their own balance sheets. This evidence highlights the joint role of financial intermediary and borrower balance-sheet frictions in understanding macroeconomic developments and enriches our understanding of which type of financial frictions matter for the economy.
Read article
Corona
Corona The pandemic has posed unprecedented challenges to society and the economy. What is...
See page
Financial Stability
Financial Systems: The Anatomy of the Market Economy How the financial system is...
See page
Koetter ref
Completing the European Banking Union: Capital Cost Consequences for Credit Providers and Corporate Borrowers ...
See page
Agency Cost of CEO Perquisites in Bank Loan Contracts
Chia-Ying Chan, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,
May
2021
Abstract
This study investigates the association between CEO perquisites and bank loan spreads. We collect detailed data on CEO perquisites from the proxy statements of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 2015 to study this issue. The empirical evidence supports the agency cost view that the lending banks demand significantly higher returns (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with higher CEO perquisites. We further confirm that the effect of these perquisites remains after we control for various corporate governance and agency cost factors. We conclude that banks consider CEO perquisites as a type of agency cost when they make lending decisions.
Read article
Loan Syndication under Basel II: How Do Firm Credit Ratings Affect the Cost of Credit?
Iftekhar Hasan, Suk-Joong Kim, Panagiotis Politsidis, Eliza Wu
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money,
May
2021
Abstract
This paper investigates how syndicated lenders react to borrowers’ rating changes under heterogeneous conditions and different regulatory regimes. Our findings suggest that corporate downgrades that increase capital requirements for lending banks under the Basel II framework are associated with increased loan spreads and deteriorating non-price loan terms relative to downgrades that do not affect capital requirements. Ratings exert an asymmetric impact on loan spreads, as these remain unresponsive to rating upgrades, even when the latter are associated with a reduction in risk weights for corporate loans. The increase in firm borrowing costs is mitigated in the presence of previous bank-firm lending relationships and for borrowers with relatively strong performance, high cash flows and low leverage.
Read article
Credit Allocation when Borrowers are Economically Linked: An Empirical Analysis of Bank Loans to Corporate Customers
Iftekhar Hasan, Kristina Minnick, Kartik Raman
Journal of Corporate Finance,
June
2020
Abstract
Using detailed loan level data, we examine bank lending to corporate customers relying on principal suppliers. Customers experience larger loan spreads, higher intensity of covenants and greater likelihood of requiring collateral when they depend more on the principal supplier for inputs. The positive association between the customer’s loan spread and its dependence on the principal supplier is less pronounced when the bank has a prior loan outstanding with the principal supplier, and when the bank has higher market share in the industry. Longer relationships between the customer and its principal supplier, and between the bank and the principal supplier, mitigate lending constraints. The evidence is consistent with corporate suppliers serving as an informational bridge between the lender and the customer.
Read article
