The Role of Rating Agencies in Financial Crises: Event Studies from the Asian Flu
Makram El-Shagi
Cambridge Journal of Economics,
2010
Abstract
Based on case studies from countries that have been hit hardest by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the present paper shows that the accusation that sovereign ratings led to a severe acceleration of the crisis is unconvincing and that the empirical method often used to support accusations against rating agencies is inappropriate for the problem under analysis. Rather, it must be emphasised that ratings were downgraded in most countries very shortly before the end of the crisis. In some countries, the ratings were even further downgraded after the end of the crisis as countries started to recover. This is not in line with the thesis that the crisis was accelerated by rating agencies.
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Russia: Overcoming the Effects of Economic Crisis Takes Time
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2010
Abstract
The last year's decline of Gross Domestic Product in Russia was harder than in most big economies of the world. The financial crisis has revealed specific circumstances of growth in Russia: The situation deteriorated not only by the downfall of crude oil prices, but especially by the Russian banking sector not being able to satisfy financing demand of the private sector enterprises. So foreign liabilities of enterprises had increased and the dependence of the enterprises on the international financial markets had strengthened. In that way impacts of the global financial crisis affected Russia harder. Although external conditions for the Russian economy improved in the last months due to the rise of world oil prices and global demand for commodities, domestic demand still suffers from small revenues and bad financing conditions for enterprises. Because of its structural weakness it will take Russia longer than other transformation countries to overcome the crisis. Economic growth in the near future will expand much smaller than on last years’ average.
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The Extreme Risk Problem for Monetary Policies of the Euro-Candidates
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Abstract
We argue that monetary policies in euro-candidate countries should also aim at mitigating excessive instability of the key target and instrument variables of monetary policy during turbulent market periods. Our empirical tests show a significant degree of leptokurtosis, thus prevalence of tail-risks, in the conditional volatility series of such variables in the euro-candidate countries. Their central banks will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy to mitigate such extreme risks while steering their economies out of the crisis and through the euroconvergence process. Such policies provide flexibility that is not embedded in the Taylor-type instrument rules, or in the Maastricht convergence criteria.
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Stages of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis: Is there a Wandering Asset-Price Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
One-off Publications,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global savings. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are identified: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Assessing Alternative Schemes in a Banking Model of Debt Overhang
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Abstract
We evaluate policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalize risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance granted without reference to new activities, like establishing a bad bank, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
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Im Fokus: Polen in der globalen Finanz- und Konjunkturkrise – Realwirtschaft trotzt mit IWF-Unterstützung den Finanzmarktturbulenzen
Tobias Knedlik
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
Poland’s economy resists turbulences on financial markets
Poland has been affected by the global financial crisis. However, developments in Poland deviated considerably from developments in other middle and eastern European countries. Risk premiums, as measured by credit default swaps, increased by less but more suddenly as compared with other countries of the region. The Polish currency crisis started earlier and lasted longer as in other countries of the region. The developments on financial markets did, however, not result in a recession.
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Should We Trust in Leading Indicators? Evidence from the Recent Recession
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Abstract
The paper analyzes leading indicators for GDP and industrial production in Germany. We focus on the performance of single and pooled leading indicators during the pre-crisis and crisis period using various weighting schemes. Pairwise and joint significant tests are used to evaluate single indicator as well as forecast combination methods. In addition, we use an end-of-sample instability test to investigate the stability of forecasting models during the recent financial crisis. We find in general that only a small number of single indicator models were performing well before the crisis. Pooling can substantially increase the reliability of leading indicator forecasts. During the crisis the relative performance of many leading indicator models increased. At short horizons, survey indicators perform best, while at longer horizons financial indicators, such as term spreads and risk spreads, improve relative to the benchmark.
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