Cross-border Transmission of Emergency Liquidity
Journal of Banking & Finance,
We show that emergency liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve transmitted to non-U.S. banking markets. Based on manually collected holding company structures, we identify banks in Germany with access to U.S. facilities. Using detailed interest rate data reported to the German central bank, we compare lending and borrowing rates of banks with and without such access. U.S. liquidity shocks cause a significant decrease in the short-term funding costs of the average German bank with access. This reduction is mitigated for banks with more vulnerable balance sheets prior to the inception of emergency liquidity. We also find a significant pass-through in terms of lower corporate credit rates charged for banks with the lowest pre-crisis leverage, US-dollar funding needs, and liquidity buffers. Spillover effects from U.S. emergency liquidity provision are generally confined to short-term rates.
Banking Globalization, Local Lending, and Labor Market Effects: Micro-level Evidence from Brazil
IWH Discussion Papers,
This paper estimates the effect of a foreign funding shock to banks in Brazil after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Our robust results show that bank-specific shocks to Brazilian parent banks negatively affected lending by their individual branches and trigger real economic consequences in Brazilian municipalities: More affected regions face restrictions in aggregated credit and show weaker labor market performance in the aftermath which documents the transmission mechanism of the global financial crisis to local labor markets in emerging countries. The results represent relevant information for regulators concerned with the real effects of cross-border liquidity shocks.
The New EU Members on the Verge of Disaster: What to Do?
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
The long lasting, but externally financed boom in the new EU countries has collapsed under the impacts of the global financial crisis. The countries’ fiscal and monetary authorizes do not seem to be able to effectively resist – a deep crisis is under way. The situation is particularly dramatic in the Baltic countries, where the hands of the monetary authority are institutionally tied, and an expansionary fiscal policy would trigger off speculative attacks on the exchange rate. Neither the maintaining of the currency board arrangement nor an ‘emergency access’ to the Euro zone would help. The other non-Euro members of the Union still aim to adopt the Euro in the next future and, thus, are reluctant to give up the Maastricht criteria. The Euro countries Slovakia and Slovenia might face a major deterioration of their credit rating if governments would attempt to increase fiscal deficits. All in all, two problems are to be solved: first, the external provision of liquidity to their economies and, second, an approach that anchors policies in the countries against economic nationalism, which is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. We propose a combination of a reformed exchange rate mechanism with a stability and solidarity fund for all countries. The former would help to avoid too strong depreciations and the latter would provide liquidity to stabilize the exchange rate and the entire economy.
Banking Regulation: Minimum Capital Requirements of Basel II Intensify Transmission from Currency Crises to Banking Crises
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Emerging market currency crises are often followed by banking crises. One reason for the transmission is the increased value of foreign debt measured in local currency. Equity capital is often insufficient to ensure liquidity. This problem is addressed by Basel II, in particular by its minimum capital requirements. In difference to the current regulation (Basel I), Basel II employs a differentiated risk weighing on base of credit ratings. This contribution calculates the hypothetic effects of the new regulation on minimum capital requirements for the example of the South Korea currency and banking crises of 1997. The results are compared to current regulation. It can be shown that minimum capital requirements in the case of Basel II would have been lower than in the case of Basel I. Additionally, minimum capital requirements would have increased dramatically. The transmission from currency to banking crises would not have been prevented, but would have been accelerated. Thereby, minimum capital requirements under Basel I have been relatively low because of South Korea’s OECD membership. It can therefore be concluded that in other emerging market economies, which are not OECD members, the ratio of minimum capital requirements of Basel II to the minimum capital requirements of Basel I prior the crises would have been even lower. Therefore, the new instrument of banking regulation would have intensified the transmission from currency to banking crises.
Will new IMF-Instrument prevent currency crises?
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
The resent experience with currency crises shows that not only economies with weak fundamentals are hit by crises. After long-lasting discussions of appropriate instruments to reduce the risk for currency crises in emerging market economies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) presented a new proposal of an instrument: the Reserve Augmentation Line (RAL). This new proposal shows that at the current state such an instrument is not available.
This contribution confronts the RAL proposal with theoretically derived requirements on preventive liquidity instruments. It shows that only limited preventive effects can be expected. The limitation of the instrument to 300 percent of the quota and the unsolved problem of sending negative signals to the market if countries apply for the instrument are the main drawbacks. However, the RAL would enable the IMF for the first time to provide liquidity immediately in the case of the crisis after pre-qualification. Thus, the instrument fulfills one important request from the academic discussions.
Financial Stability Dossier ...
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10.08.2015 • 30/2015
Germany Benefited Substantially from the Greek Crisis
The balanced budget in Germany is largely the result of lower interest payments due to the European debt crisis. Research from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association shows that the debt crisis resulted in a reduction in German bund rates of about 300 basis points (BP), yielding interest savings of more than EUR 100 billion (or more than 3% of gross domestic product, GDP) during the period 2010 to 2015. A significant part of this reduction is directly attributable to the Greek crisis. When discussing the costs to the German tax payer of saving Greece, these benefits should not be overlooked, as they tend to be larger than the expenses, even in a scenario where Greece does not repay any of its debts.
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