Long-term Effects of Business Incubators: What Happens to Incubated Firms after they Have Graduated from the BIs?
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Many cities and municipalities devote considerable public resources to the establishment and operation of business incubators (BIs) to promote the survivability and the positive development of newly founded firms. In the context of incubator evaluations, survival is one of the most important performance indicators, and survival rates of incubated firms are frequently communicated to the public by local authorities to demonstrate the success of those policy initiatives. However, in most cases, these data refers to the initial incubation period. Little is known about survival or exit dynamics of incubated firms after they have graduated from the BIs. On the basis of a comprehensive research project concerned with the development of graduate firms from incubators in Dresden, Halle (Saale), Jena, Neubrandenburg and Rostock, this article not only investigates how many firms survive after leaving the incubator facilities, but also investigates if graduation causes an immediate negative effect on subsequent survivability. The results show that about one third of all graduate firms fail after leaving the incubator. Furthermore, it can be found that graduate firms from the BIs in Halle (Saale) and Neubrandenburg face a relatively high risk of business closure especially in the first years after the completion of the incubation period.
The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
A revised theory of contestable markets : applied on the German telecommunication sector
Despite the scepticism raised by the German Monopoly Commission our analysis shows that the revised theory of contestable markets can be applied to the telecommunications market better than expected. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit is possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeds the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are satisfied for potential competition to exist. We applied the ‘revised’ contestable market theory to the German telecommunication market and have been able to clearly identify the value added stages in which regulation is required. Under the present conditions local loops - which can be determined as natural monopolies - are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. Local loops can be identified as monopolistic bottlenecks therefore. Regional and local connection networks should also be regulated because a high entry lag and a low price adjustment lag have to be expected as well as current competition does not exist today. The national connection network shows current competition between several network providers; hence regulation can be abolished in this field. Assumed that network access is regulated, services can be supplied by several competing firms.