12.03.2024 • 8/2024
Risk in the banking sector: four out of ten top supervisors come from the financial industry
Europe's banks realise excess returns on the stock market when their alumni join the boards of national supervisory authorities. A study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) shows that this happens more frequently than previously recognised. The findings indicate a risk to financial stability and call for a more merit-based, transparent appointment of senior regulators.
Michael Koetter
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The Reverse Revolving Door in the Supervision of European Banks
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Alex Sclip, Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2023
Abstract
We show that around one third of executive directors on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking have an employment history in the financial industry. The appointment of executives without a finance background associates with negative valuation effects. Appointments of former bankers, in turn, spark positive stock market reactions. This „proximity premium“ of supervised banks is a more likely driver of positive valuation effects than superior financial expertise or intrinsic skills of former executives from the financial industry. Prior to the inception of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism, the presence of former financial industry executives on the board of NSA associates with lower regulatory capital and faster growth of banks, pointing to a more lenient supervisory style.
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Compensation Regulation in Banking: Executive Director Behavior and Bank Performance after the EU Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
No. 1,
2023
Abstract
The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.
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Gender Pay Gap in American CFOs: Theory and Evidence
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Gayane Hovakimian, Zenu Sharma
Journal of Corporate Finance,
June
2023
Abstract
Studies document persistent unexplained gender-based wage gap in labor markets. At the executive level, where skill and education are similar, career interruptions and differences in risk preferences primarily explain the extant gender-based pay gap. This study focuses on CFO compensation contracts of Execucomp firms (1992–2020) and finds no gender-based pay gap. This paper offers several explanations for this phenomenon, such as novel evidence on the risk preferences of females with financial expertise and changes in the social and regulatory climate.
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23.05.2023 • 14/2023
Analysis of earnings calls: Blathering managers harm their company
If a senior executive refuses to give information to professional investors, the company's stock market value drops afterwards. This is shown in a study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) after evaluating
1.2 million answers from tele-phone conferences.
Fabian Wöbbeking
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