Social Mobility Equal opportunities for everyone Dossier ...
European Firms after the Crisis – New Insights from the 5th Vintage of the CompNet Firm-level-based Database ...
Does Social Capital Matter in Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Corporate Tax Avoidance ...
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers The IWH-CompNet Discussion Paper series presents research...
Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Fragility: Empirical Evidence from the OECD ...
Firm Surveys Since 1993, IWH has conducted regular surveys among a fixed group of...
Joint Economic Forecast
Joint Economic Forecast The joint economic forecast is an instrument for evaluating...
Living with Lower Productivity Growth: Impact on Exports
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
This paper investigates the impact of sustained lower productivity growth on exports, by looking at the role of the productivity distribution and allocative efficiency as drivers of export performance. It follows and goes beyond the work of Barba Navaretti et al. (2017), analysing the effects of productivity on exports depending on the dynamics of allocative efficiency. Low productivity growth is a well-documented stylised fact in Western countries – and possibly a reality likely to persist for some time. What could be the impact of persistent sluggish growth of productivity on exports? To shed light on this question, this paper examines the relationship between the productivity distribution of firms and sectoral export performance. The structure of firms within countries or even sectors matters tremendously for the nexus between productivity and exports at the macroeconomic level, as the theoretical and empirical literature documents. For instance, whether too few firms at the top (lack of innovation) or too many firms at the bottom (weak market selection) drives slow average productivity at the macro level has very different implications and therefore demands different policy responses.
Selection Versus Incentives in Incentive Pay: Evidence from a Matching Model
SSRN Working Papers,
Higher incentive pay is associated with better firm performance. I introduce a model of CEO-firm matching to disentangle the two confounding effects that drive this result. On one hand, higher incentive pay directly induces more effort; on the other hand, higher incentive pay indirectly attracts more talented CEOs. I find both effects are essential to explain the result, with the selection effect accounting for 12.7% of the total effect. The relative importance of the selection effect is the largest in industries with high talent mobility and in more recent years.