Employment Protection and Firm-level Job Reallocation:Adjusting for Coverage
Benedicta Marzinotto, Ladislav Wintr
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2019
Abstract
This paper finds that employment protection legislation (EPL) had a significant impact on employment adjustment in Europe over 2001-2013, once we account for firm-size related exemptions to EPL. We construct a novel coverage-adjusted EPL indicator and find that EPL hinders employment growth at the firm level and increases the share of firms that remain in the same size class. This suggests that stricter EPL restrains job creation because firms fear the costs of shedding jobs during downturns. We do not find evidence that EPL has positive effects on employment by limiting job losses after adverse shocks. In addition to standard controls for the share of credit-constrained firms and the position in the business cycle, we also control for sizerelated corporate tax exemptions and find that these also significantly constrain job creation among incumbent firms.
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Do Start-ups Provide Employment Opportunities for Disadvantaged Workers?
Daniel Fackler, Michaela Fuchs, Lisa Hölscher, Claus Schnabel
ILR Review,
No. 5,
2019
Abstract
This article compares the hiring patterns of start-ups and incumbent firms to analyze whether start-ups offer relatively more job opportunities to disadvantaged workers. Using administrative linked employer–employee data for Germany that provide the complete employment biographies of newly hired workers, the authors show that young firms are more likely than incumbents to hire applicants who are older, foreign, or unemployed, or who have unstable employment histories, arrive from outside the labor force, or were affected by a plant closure. Analysis of entry wages shows that penalties for these disadvantaged workers, however, are higher in start-ups than in incumbent firms. Therefore, even if start-ups provide employment opportunities for certain groups of disadvantaged workers, the quality of these jobs in terms of initial remuneration appears to be low.
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Innovation and Top Income Inequality
Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Antonin Bergeaud, Richard Blundell, David Hemous
Review of Economic Studies,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
In this article, we use cross-state panel and cross-U.S. commuting-zone data to look at the relationship between innovation, top income inequality and social mobility. We find positive correlations between measures of innovation and top income inequality. We also show that the correlations between innovation and broad measures of inequality are not significant. Next, using instrumental variable analysis, we argue that these correlations at least partly reflect a causality from innovation to top income shares. Finally, we show that innovation, particularly by new entrants, is positively associated with social mobility, but less so in local areas with more intense lobbying activities.
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Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth
Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, Nicholas Bloom, William R. Kerr
American Economic Review,
No. 11,
2018
Abstract
We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth, and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A new and central economic force is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using US Census microdata on firm-level output, R&D, and patenting. The model provides a good fit to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output, and R&D. Taxing the continued operation of incumbents can lead to sizable gains (of the order of 1.4 percent improvement in welfare) by encouraging exit of less productive firms and freeing up skilled labor to be used for R&D by high-type incumbents. Subsidies to the R&D of incumbents do not achieve this objective because they encourage the survival and expansion of low-type firms.
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Lame-Duck CEOs
Marc Gabarro, Sebastian Gryglewicz, Shuo Xia
SSRN Working Papers,
2018
Abstract
We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.
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Growth through Heterogeneous Innovations
Ufuk Akcigit, William R. Kerr
Journal of Political Economy,
No. 4,
2018
Abstract
We build a tractable growth model in which multiproduct incumbents invest in internal innovations to improve their existing products, while new entrants and incumbents invest in external innovations to acquire new product lines. External and internal innovations generate heterogeneous innovation qualities, and firm size affects innovation incentives. We analyze how different types of innovation contribute to economic growth and the role of the firm size distribution. Our model aligns with many observed empirical regularities, and we quantify our framework with Census Bureau and patent data for US firms. Internal innovation scales moderately faster with firm size than external innovation.
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Do Startups Provide Employment Opportunities for Disadvantaged Workers?
Daniel Fackler, Michaela Fuchs, Lisa Hölscher, Claus Schnabel
IZA Discussion Paper Series,
forthcoming
Abstract
This paper analyzes whether startups offer job opportunities to workers potentially facing labor market problems. It compares the hiring patterns of startups and incumbents in the period 2003 to 2014 using administrative linked employer-employee data for Germany that allow to take the complete employment biographies of newly hired workers into account. The results indicate that young plants are more likely than incumbents to hire older and foreign applicants as well as workers who have instable employment biographies, come from unemployment or outside the labor force, or were affected by a plant closure. However, an analysis of entry wages reveals that disadvantageous worker characteristics come along with higher wage penalties in startups than in incumbents. Therefore, even if startups provide employment opportunities for certain groups of disadvantaged workers, the quality of these jobs in terms of initial remuneration seems to be low.
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Big Fish in Small Banking Ponds? Cost Advantages and Foreign Affiliate Presences
Michael Koetter, Rients Galema
Journal of International Money and Finance,
2018
Abstract
We distinguish cost advantage at home from cost advantage vis-à-vis incumbent banks in destination markets to explain the probability of foreign bank affiliate lending. We combine detailed affiliate lending data of all German banks with public bank micro data from 59 destination markets. The likelihood to operate foreign affiliates depends positively on both types of cost advantage. Only cost advantage at home is economically significant. Generally, risk, return, and unobservable bank traits explain a larger share of the variation in foreign affiliate operations. Less profitable, more risky, and larger banks are more likely to operate affiliates abroad.
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Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests
Vyacheslav Fos, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
This paper shows that proxy contests have a significant adverse effect on careers of incumbent directors. Following a proxy contest, directors experience a significant decline in the number of directorships not only in the targeted company, but also in other nontargeted companies. The results are established using the universe of all proxy contests during 1996–2010. To isolate the effect of the proxy contest, our empirical strategy uses within-firm variation in directors׳ exposure to the possibility of being voted out and exploits the predetermined schedule of staggered boards that allows only a fraction of directors to be nominated for election every year. We find that nominated directors relative to non-nominated ones lose 58% more seats on other boards. The evidence suggests the proxy-contest mechanism imposes a significant career cost on incumbent directors.
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Smuggling Illegal Goods Across the US–Mexico Border: A Political-economy Perspective
A. Buehn, Stefan Eichler
Applied Economics Letters,
No. 12,
2012
Abstract
We analyse the impact that political business cycles and party preferences have on smuggling illegal goods across the US–Mexico border during the years 1980–2004. We find that smuggling is significantly reduced prior to Congressional elections – but only if the incumbent President is Republican.
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