Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
Read article
Stability and Growth Pact: No appropriate Strategy for Consolidation
Kristina vanDeuverden
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
In the last years public budgets in the EU worsened more an more. Especially when considering the demographic development in western industrial countries and, thus, increasing pressures on public spending, these findings are distressing. Consolidation can either be achieved by a sequence of discretionary policy decisions or be the result of a fiscal rule – whereas the last seems to be predominant. Creating the Stability and Growth Pact the EU decided to establish a fiscal rule. This rule, which apparently has failed to reign in public deficits. So a reforming debate has recently started. The superiority of a rule crucially depends on whether it is well defined and whether it satisfies certain criteria. According to these criteria the Stability and Growth Pact clearly shows weak points. Moreover the proposals now discussed not only show the same weaknesses – they even create new ones and mainly work by reducing requirements. Against this background the IWH again proposes the implementation of a spending path that is superior to the Stability and Growth Path.
Read article
Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Finance,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
Read article
The Impact of Technology and Regulation on the Geographical Scope of Banking
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.
Read article
Flexible utilization of labor strengthens industrial enterprises´ ability to adapt to fluctuations in business - an empirical east-west comparison based on the IAB company panel
Brigitte Loose, Udo Ludwig
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2004
Abstract
Based on an individual data set, this article investigates the question of which conventional methods and new instruments companies use to adapt to fluctuations in business and what distinguishes these companies from other ones which have not implemented such instruments. In particular, the role of the technical equipment as well as the personnel policy and tariff policy are analyzed. An empirical comparison between the East and West German manufacturing industries demonstrates whether East German firms have competitive advantages. While the technological conditions for firms´ flexibility are somewhat less pronounced in East German, the proportion of “standardized“ and flexible employment is nearly the same in the East-West comparison. Differences exist among small, middle-sized and large firms as well as among types of yield. The weak orientation with respect to agreed wages and hours worked as well as the mainly gratuitous reduction of unpaid overtime which can be implemented over the whole year, prove to be an advantage. The investigation is based on a data set from the IAB company panel of manufacturing industries in 2003.
Read article
Cross-border bank mergers: What lures the rare animal?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 9,
2004
Abstract
Although domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the financial services industry have increased steadily over the past two decades, international M&As were until recently relatively rare. Moreover, the share of cross-border mergers in the banking industry is low compared with other industries. This paper uses a novel dataset of over 3000 mergers that took place between 1985 and 2001 to analyze the determinants of international bank mergers. We test the extent to which information costs and regulations hold back merger activity. Our results suggest that information costs significantly impede cross-border bank mergers. Regulations also influence cross-border bank merger activity. Hence, policy makers can create environments that encourage cross-border activity, but information cost barriers must be overcome even in (legally) integrated markets.
Read article
The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
Read article
The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
Read article
Deregulation and liberalization in European electricity industry
Constanze Kreis
Schriften des IWH,
No. 17,
2004
Abstract
Seit Ende der 80er Jahre ist weltweit eine zunehmende Liberalisierung und Deregulierung von Wirtschaftsbereichen zu verzeichnen, in denen der Ausschluss von Wettbewerb durch das Vorherrschen von Monopolstrukturen und deren Regulierung kennzeichnend war. Im Zuge dieser Entwicklung wurde mit der Verabschiedung der EU-Richtlinie zur Schaffung eines Binnenmarktes für Elektrizität im Jahre 1996 auch in Europa ein neuer energiepolitischer Ordnungsrahmen geschaffen, nachdem hier zunächst kontroverse Debatten für eine zögerliche Herangehensweise an Strukturreformen auf diesem Gebiet geführt haben. Die Umsetzung der Richtlinie hat seither, wenn auch in unterschiedlichem Maße, in den nationalen Strommärkten zu tiefgreifenden strukturellen Umbrüchen geführt. Die Reorganisation dieses Wirtschaftszweigs ist aber im europäischen Maßstab bisher keineswegs abgeschlossen und der transnationale Handel mit Strom noch eingeschränkt. Die vorliegende Arbeit wendet sich angesichts der dynamischen Situation auf diesem noch jungen Wettbewerbsmarkt einer Reihe interessanter wissenschaftlicher Fragestellungen zu, die sich aus dem Prozess der Deregulierung und Liberalisierung der Stromwirtschaft ergeben. Wegen der Besonderheiten des Gutes „Elektrizität“ sind die Erkenntnisse, die über Marktvorgänge in anderen Wirtschaftsbereichen gewonnen wurden, nicht uneingeschränkt auf die Elektrizitätswirtschaft zu übertragen. Die Thematik weist damit eine große Heterogenität und Komplexität auf. Die Autorin trägt diesem Umstand Rechnung, indem sie mehrere Kapitel aus jeweils unterschiedlicher Perspektive mit verschiedenen Methoden den Deregulierungsprozess analysiert. Im Ergebnis lässt sich festhalten, dass der Bereich der Elektrizitätswirtschaft ein Sektor bleiben wird, der nicht nur während seiner Umbruchphase, sondern grundsätzlich auch weiterhin besonderer wettbewerbspolitischer Aufmerksamkeit bedarf, da trotz bereits zu verzeichnender Effizienzgewinne nicht davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass im Zuge der Deregulierung und Liberalisierung eine erhöhte Effizienz allein durch Regulierungsabbau erzielt wird.
Read article
Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
Read article