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Trading away Incentives
Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Shuo Xia
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 23,
2022
Abstract
Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity pay. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted crucial role of diversification motives in managers’ portfolio choices.
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Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt
Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
Journal of Corporate Finance,
August
2017
Abstract
We develop a model of compensation structure and asset risk choice, where a risk-averse manager is compensated with salary, equity and inside debt. We seek to understand the joint implications of this compensation package for managerial risk-taking incentives and credit spreads. We show that the size and seniority of inside debt not only are crucial for the relation between inside debt and credit spreads but also play an important role in shaping the relation between equity compensation and credit spreads. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions.
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24.06.2016 • 26/2016
UK’s “No” to EU will be costly for both sides
On Thursday 23rd, the British people have decided to leave the European Union (EU) Their vote not to remain in the European community was surprisingly clear. UK’s exit will have both political and economic consequences which are far-reaching for the country itself as well as the rest of Europe. “The reactions of the remaining member states are the crucial key now, especially France’s and Germany’s” says Reint E. Gropp, President of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association.
Reint E. Gropp
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Legal Insider Trading and Stock Market Liquidity
Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong, Jérémie Lefebvre
De Economist,
No. 1,
2016
Abstract
This paper assesses the impact of legal trades by corporate insiders on the liquidity of the firm’s stock. For this purpose, we analyze two liquidity measures and one information asymmetry measure. The analysis allows us to study as well the effect of a change in insider trading regulation, namely the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC) on the Dutch stock market. The first set of results shows that, in accordance with theories of asymmetric information, the intensity of legal insider trading in a given company is positively related to the bid-ask spread and to the information asymmetry measure. We also find that the Market Abuse Directive did not reduce significantly this effect. Secondly, analyzing liquidity and information asymmetry around the days of legal insider trading, we find that small and large capitalization stocks see their bid-ask spread and the permanent price impact increase when insiders trade. For mid-cap stocks, only the permanent price impact increases. Finally, we could not detect a significant improvement of these results following the change in regulation.
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Executive Compensation Structure and Credit Spreads
Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
Abstract
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
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An Empirical Analysis of Legal Insider Trading in The Netherlands
Frank de Jong, Jérémie Lefebvre, Hans Degryse
De Economist,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
In this paper, we employ a registry of legal insider trading for Dutch listed firms to investigate the information content of trades by corporate insiders. Using a standard event-study methodology, we examine short-term stock price behavior around trades. We find that purchases are followed by economically large abnormal returns. This result is strongest for purchases by top executives and for small market capitalization firms, which is consistent with the hypothesis that legal insider trading is an important channel through which information flows to the market. We analyze also the impact of the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC), which strengthens the existing regulation in the Netherlands. We show that the new regulation reduced the information content of sales by top executives.
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Prediction Markets: Prognosemärkte in Praxis und Theorie - Ein Überblick
Marian Berneburg
External Publications,
2008
Abstract
A common joke among economist is: Why has god created meteorologists? To make the forecasts of economist look less bad! At the heart of this joke stands the critique that economic forecasts are notoriously inaccurate. Prediction Markets are an attempt to improve these forecasts by aggregating the knowledge of many. The present article takes a closer look at these Prediction Markets. By analysing the existing literature in terms of the relevant theoretical as well as empirical basis, it is shown that an adapted version of the model by Kyle (1985) with noise and insider traders is able to explain the high degree of predictive accuracy, i. e. informational efficiency, of prediction markets. At the same time such a model is able to cope with the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox (1976) or the No-Trade Theorem (Milgrom & Stokey, 1982), both are common theoretical arguments against informational efficiency. This allows the interpretation of market prices as event probabilities. Even though some empirical artefacts (e. g. the favorite-longshot bias) exist and more research, especially in terms of prediction markets covering economic events, is needed, the overall verdict on these forecasting tools has to be that they are roughly semi-strong efficient. They hence provide an interesting, very accurate and additional tool in forecasting.
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Long term appointment of central bankers: Costs and benefits
Axel Lindner
European Journal of Political Economy,
No. 4,
2000
Abstract
Why do independent central bank boards have a reputation for more moderate policy than do elected governments, even if the board's members have been appointed by the current or former government? This paper gives an explanation for the case of a political world with ‘zeitgeist shocks’ on the electorate's preferences. If the median position of preferences inside the board determines the monetary policy, a trade-off concerning member term length arises: a longer term entails more moderation, while enhancing the likelihood of detachment from contact to the electorate's current preferences.
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