IWH Bankruptcy Research
IWH Bankruptcy Research The Bankruptcy Research Unit of the Halle Institute for...
Internship at Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) Interested in gaining an...
Does Extended Unemployment Benefit Duration Ameliorate the Negative Employment Effects of Job Loss? ...
Data Protection Policy ...
Children, Career, and Compromises: To what Extent does Offspring Affect Labour Force Participation and Career Opportunities of Women in Germany?
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Germany faces a substantial challenge from demographic change in the forthcoming decades. While large cohorts reach retirement age, the working-age population shrinks. One option to curtail economic effects of this imbalance is to increase female labour force participation. The study uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to analyze the impact of children on careers of women in East and West Germany, respectively in terms of participation and realized wages or occupational prestige. Results indicate strong regional differences, with East German mothers returning much faster to the labour market than their western peers. Participation rates – especially full-time employment – of the latter group remain permanently below levels of childless women. Careers of East German mothers are hampered by a higher risk of unemployment. The mother wage gap is relatively large among western mothers and remains so even after taking into account previous experience and unobserved heterogeneity. The study documents a negative and statistically significant relationship between children and occupational prestige only for West Germany. The observed career differences between mothers in both parts of the country may be rooted in a larger supply of institutionalized child-care arrangements in East Germany.
Working time arrangement in the EU from the viewpoint of the employees: Results from the ad hoc labour market surveys
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Despite the general improvement in the EU’s labour market performance, there are still large differences between individual countries. And there are differences in some fields between the pre-enlargement EU Member States and the recently acceded Member States. One explanation for these differences may be the predominance of former socialist countries with centrally planned economies among new member states. The article deals with the results of the ad hoc labour market survey of the European Commission. One of its subjects is the flexible use of labour. The main findings are: A working week of between 35 and 40 hours, distributed more or less evenly over the five working days, is the rule for the majority of employees. Part-time work is still dominated by women. Overtime is relatively common for most of the full-time employed. When asked if they would be prepared to accept more flexible working time, the interviewees do not favour all possible types of flexibility to the same extent. The most favoured model is either lengthening or shortening the regular working day. In the former socialist countries people work longer hours and they are more flexible with respect to how far they have to travel and the hours they have to work in order to keep their job.
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conditions of Knowledge Transfer by New Employees in Companies
IWH Discussion Papers,
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia. Based on a model by HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees to act in favour of the company by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an innovation
(before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is
that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere.