Flight Patterns and Yields of European Government Bonds
Gregor von Schweinitz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2013
Abstract
The current European Debt Crisis has led to a reinforced effort to identify the sources of risk and their influence on yields of European Government Bonds. Until now, the potentially nonlinear influence and the theoretical need for interactions reflecting flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity has been widely disregarded. I estimate government bond yields of the Euro-12 countries without Luxembourg from May 2003 until December 2011. Using penalized spline regression, I find that the effect of most explanatory variables is highly nonlinear. These nonlinearities, together with flight patterns of flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity, can explain the co-movement of bond yields until September 2008 and the huge amount of differentiation during the financial and the European debt crisis without the unnecessary assumption of a structural break. The main effects are credit risk and flight-to-liquidity, while the evidence for the existence of flight-to-quality and liquidity risk (the latter measured by the bid-ask spread and total turnover of bonds) is comparably weak.
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The Role of Uncertainty in the Euro Crisis - A Reconsideration of Liquidity Preference Theory
Toralf Pusch
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,
2013
Abstract
With the world financial crisis came the rediscovery of the active role fiscal policy could play in remedying the situation. More recently, the Euro Crisis, with its mounting funding costs facing governments of a number of Southern EU member states and Ireland, has called this strategy into question. Opposing this view, the main point of this contribution is to elaborate on the link between rising sovereign risk premia in the Eurozone and a major feature of the financial crisis - elevated uncertainty after the Lehman collapse. Theoretically, this link is developed with reference to Keynes' liquidity preference theory. The high explanatory power of rising uncertainty in financial markets and the detrimental effects of fiscal austerity on the evolution of sovereign risk spreads are demonstrated empirically by means of panel regressions and supplementary correlation analyses.
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Stages of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis: Is there a Wandering Asset Price Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Economics E-Journal 43. Munich Personal RePEc Archive 2008,
2009
Abstract
This study identifies five distinctive stages of the current global financial crisis: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market; spillovers into broader credit market; the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers with counterparty risk effects on other financial institutions; the commodity price bubble, and the ultimate demise of investment banking in the U.S. The study argues that the severity of the crisis is influenced strongly by changeable allocations of global savings coupled with excessive credit creation, which lead to over-pricing of varied types of assets. The study calls such process a “wandering asset-price bubble“. Unstable allocations elevate market, credit, and liquidity risks. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Stages of the Ongoing Global Financial Crisis: Is There a Wandering Asset Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global savings. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are identified: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Banking Regulation: Minimum Capital Requirements of Basel II Intensify Transmission from Currency Crises to Banking Crises
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2007
Abstract
Emerging market currency crises are often followed by banking crises. One reason for the transmission is the increased value of foreign debt measured in local currency. Equity capital is often insufficient to ensure liquidity. This problem is addressed by Basel II, in particular by its minimum capital requirements. In difference to the current regulation (Basel I), Basel II employs a differentiated risk weighing on base of credit ratings. This contribution calculates the hypothetic effects of the new regulation on minimum capital requirements for the example of the South Korea currency and banking crises of 1997. The results are compared to current regulation. It can be shown that minimum capital requirements in the case of Basel II would have been lower than in the case of Basel I. Additionally, minimum capital requirements would have increased dramatically. The transmission from currency to banking crises would not have been prevented, but would have been accelerated. Thereby, minimum capital requirements under Basel I have been relatively low because of South Korea’s OECD membership. It can therefore be concluded that in other emerging market economies, which are not OECD members, the ratio of minimum capital requirements of Basel II to the minimum capital requirements of Basel I prior the crises would have been even lower. Therefore, the new instrument of banking regulation would have intensified the transmission from currency to banking crises.
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Will new IMF-Instrument prevent currency crises?
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2007
Abstract
The resent experience with currency crises shows that not only economies with weak fundamentals are hit by crises. After long-lasting discussions of appropriate instruments to reduce the risk for currency crises in emerging market economies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) presented a new proposal of an instrument: the Reserve Augmentation Line (RAL). This new proposal shows that at the current state such an instrument is not available.
This contribution confronts the RAL proposal with theoretically derived requirements on preventive liquidity instruments. It shows that only limited preventive effects can be expected. The limitation of the instrument to 300 percent of the quota and the unsolved problem of sending negative signals to the market if countries apply for the instrument are the main drawbacks. However, the RAL would enable the IMF for the first time to provide liquidity immediately in the case of the crisis after pre-qualification. Thus, the instrument fulfills one important request from the academic discussions.
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The Loss Distribution of the Entrepreneurial Bad Debt Risk – a Simulation-based Model
Henry Dannenberg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2006
Abstract
The risk of bad debt losses evolves for companies which grant payment targets. Possible losses have to be covered by these companies equity and liquidity reserves. The question of how to quantify the level of risk of bad debt losses will be discussed in this paper. Input values of this risk are the probability of default, exposure at default and loss given default. It is shown how companies can derive probability functions to describe uncertainty and variability for each input value. Based on these probability functions a simulation model is developed to quantify the risk of bad debt losses. Based on an empirical study probability functions for probability of default and loss given default are presented.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?
Reint E. Gropp, A. J. Richards
Economic Notes,
No. 3,
2001
Abstract
The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks’ assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks’ risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
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