The Role of Uncertainty in the Euro Crisis - A Reconsideration of Liquidity Preference Theory
Toralf Pusch
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,
2013
Abstract
With the world financial crisis came the rediscovery of the active role fiscal policy could play in remedying the situation. More recently, the Euro Crisis, with its mounting funding costs facing governments of a number of Southern EU member states and Ireland, has called this strategy into question. Opposing this view, the main point of this contribution is to elaborate on the link between rising sovereign risk premia in the Eurozone and a major feature of the financial crisis - elevated uncertainty after the Lehman collapse. Theoretically, this link is developed with reference to Keynes' liquidity preference theory. The high explanatory power of rising uncertainty in financial markets and the detrimental effects of fiscal austerity on the evolution of sovereign risk spreads are demonstrated empirically by means of panel regressions and supplementary correlation analyses.
Read article
Exchange Rate Expectations and the Pricing of Chinese Cross-listed Stocks
Stefan Eichler
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
I show that the price discounts of Chinese cross-listed stocks (American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and H-shares) to their underlying A-shares indicate the expected yuan/US dollar exchange rate. The forecasting models reveal that ADR and H-share discounts predict exchange rate changes more accurately than the random walk and forward exchange rates, particularly at long forecast horizons. Using panel estimations, I find that ADR and H-share investors form their exchange rate expectations according to standard exchange rate theories such as the Harrod–Balassa–Samuelson effect, the risk of competitive devaluations, relative purchasing power parity, uncovered interest rate parity, and the risk of currency crisis.
Read article
Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power-Risk Nexus
Claudia M. Buch, C. T. Koch, Michael Koetter
Abstract
Recent developments on international financial markets have called the benefits of
bank globalization into question. Large, internationally active banks have
acquired substantial market power, and international activities have not
necessarily made banks less risky. Yet, surprisingly little is known about the
actual link between bank internationalization, bank risk, and market power.
Analyzing this link is the purpose of this paper. We jointly estimate the
determinants of risk and market power of banks, and we analyze the effects of
changes in terms of the number of foreign countries (the extensive margin) and
the volume of foreign assets (the intensive margin). Our paper has four main
findings. First, there is a strong negative feedback effect between risk and market
power. Second, banks with higher shares of foreign assets, in particular those held
through foreign branches, have higher market power at home. Third, holding
assets in a large number of foreign countries tends to increase bank risk. Fourth,
the impact of internationalization differs across banks from different banking
groups and of different size.
Read article
Reform of IMF Lending Facilities Increases Stability in Emerging Market Economies
J. John, Tobias Knedlik
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2010
Abstract
Following the current international financial and economic crisis the IMF reformed its lending facilities. Two new instruments are of particular importance: the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the High Access Precautionary Arrangements (HAPA). The major innovation of the new facilities is that the traditional ex-post conditionality is replaced by an ex-ante qualification process. An ex-ante qualification process leads to a short-term availability of funds during the emergence of crises and avoids long negotiation processes during a crisis. Additionally, the FCL is high powered, amounting to 900 to 1000% of the quota. It can therefore be expected that the programs have preventive effects. In difference to previous attempts to implement precautionary credit lines, the FCL and HAPA successfully created demand. First empirical observations show, that a stigmatization, which could have been expected from experience, did not take place. Countries who qualified for the FCL did rather well during the current crisis and did not face shrinking confidence due to expected crises. To be more efficient, the new lending facilities should be complemented be an international regulatory framework, which limits moral-hazard-induced higher risk taking. Additionally more members should be encouraged to demand the new instruments to increase its systemic importance.
Read article
The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
Read article
Growth, Volatility, and Credit Market Imperfections: Evidence from German Firms
Claudia M. Buch, Jörg Döpke
Journal of Economic Studies,
2008
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it studies whether output volatility and growth are linked at the firm-level, using data for German firms. Second, it explores whether the link between volatility and growth depends on the degree of credit market imperfections.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors use a novel firm-level dataset provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the so-called Financial Statements Data Pool. The dataset has time series observations for German firms for the period 1997-2004, and the authors use information on the debt-to-assets or leverage ratio of firms to proxy for credit-constraints at the firm-level. As additional proxies for the importance of credit market imperfections, we use information on the size and on the legal status of firms.
Findings – The authors find that higher volatility has a negative impact on growth for small and a positive impact for larger firms. Higher leverage is associated with higher growth. At the same time, there is heterogeneity in the determinants of growth across firms from different sectors and across firms with a different legal status.
Practical implications – While most traditional macroeconomic models assume that growth and volatility are uncorrelated, a number of microeconomic models suggest that the two may be linked. However, it is unclear whether the link is positive or negative. The paper presents additional evidence regarding this question. Moreover, understanding whether credit market conditions affect the link between volatility and growth is of importance for policy makers since it suggests a channel through which the credit market can have long-run welfare implications. The results stress the importance of firm-level heterogeneity for the effects and effectiveness of economic policy measures.
Originality/value – The paper has two main novel features. First, it uses a novel firm-level dataset to analyze the determinants of firm-level growth. Second, it analyzes the growth-volatility nexus using firm-level data. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper, which addresses the link between volatility, growth, and credit market imperfections using firm-level data.
Read article
Business Cycle Forecast, Summer 2008: Price Hikes and Financial Crisis Cloud Growth Prospects
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2008
Abstract
In the summer of 2008 the turmoil on financial markets and that on the markets for energy dim the prospects for the world economy. The acceleration of the oil price hike during the first half of the year has led to an increase in expected inflation and to higher interest rates on capital markets, while stock prices are going down. At the same time, the financial crisis is far from over, and banks in the US and in Western Europe continue in their efforts to consolidate their balance sheets. Thus, the expansion of credit supply will be scarcer in the next quarters. All this means that demand will slow in the developed economies during the next quarters. However, the massive fiscal stimulus will help the US economy to stabilize, and the world economy still benefits from the high growth dynamics in the emerging markets economies. All in all, the developed economies will not reach their potential growth rate before the second half of 2009. In Germany, the upswing comes to a temporary halt during summer of this year. Slowing foreign demand and the oil price hike induce firms to postpone investments, and private consumption, the soft spot of the upswing in Germany, is still sluggish due to high inflation rates that impair purchasing power. For the end of 2008, chances are good that growth in Germany accelerates again, because German exporters are still penetrating emerging markets as competitiveness does not diminish. All in all, the German economy will grow by 2.3% in 2008 (mainly due to the very high dynamics at the beginning of the year) and by 1.3% in 2009. A main risk of this forecast is that monetary policy fails in easing the high inflationary pressures. As to fiscal policy, efforts to reach sustainable public finances should not weaken.
Read article
Business cycle forecast 2008: German upswing takes a break
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2008
Abstract
Economic growth in the industrial countries will be much more muted in 2008 than in the past year. One cause is the prolonged oil price hike during 2007. The second and more important cause is the intensification of tensions on world financial markets. Due to problems in the financial sector, credit expansion will slow next year in the euro area as well as in the US. This will dampen demand in the real economy. A significant downswing in the industrial countries, however, is not the most likely scenario: in the US, expansive economic policy and a weak dollar that gives production in the US a competitive edge will prevent the economy from sliding into recession. In the euro area, high profitability of firms and structural improvements in the working of labour markets will help the economy cope with the stronger euro and with higher costs of external financing due to the turmoil in the financial sector. In Germany, the upswing has still not reached the demand of private households. The main reason is that real wages were stagnating in 2007 and will not rise by much in 2008, since inflation has accelerated considerably at the end of last year. In addition, weaker dynamics of external demand will dampen export growth. This and the end of tax incentives for investment at the end of 2007 will dampen investment activity. All in all, the economy will slow down in the first half of 2008. However, chances are good that the upswing will only have taken a break: when the dampening external shocks have ceased, the driving powers of the upswing will prevail; dynamic employment growth is a reflection of the strong confidence of firms. A major risk for employment and for the German economy in general is, however, the possibility that the policy concerning the labour markets changes course; bad omens are the recent the introduction of minimum wages for postal services and the announced extension of unemployment benefits for persons older than 50.
Read article
East German Economy: Demand Push Stronger than Structural Deficiencies
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2007
Abstract
In 2006, growth of production was surprisingly strong in Eastern Germany. The structural deficiencies there would have suggested a slower pace. In particular, linkages with national and international business cycles have been underestimated. To a large part, the reason why output grew by 3 per cent did not come from Eastern Germany itself, but from the Old Länder and from abroad. In the New Länder, the strong upward swing in investment activity stimulated the economy. However, owing to a small increase in total income of private households, their purchasing power lagged behind.
The improved ability of East German firms to absorb cyclical impulses from exports and from Germany’s general investment activity proved to be a crucial factor. In particular, the endowment of workplaces with modern production facilities as well as the continued reduction in the disadvantages with respect to cost-competitiveness in the tradable goods sector were beneficial. The labour cost advantage compared to West German competitors increased further while the disadvantage compared to those from Central and Eastern Europe decreased.
Benefiting from these factors, economic activity in Eastern Germany will grow faster than in the Old Länder as long as the upswing in Germany and abroad remains strong. In 2007 and 2008, investments – especially in equipment – and exports will be the driving forces again. For exports, the strongly expanding markets in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Russia will gain in importance. As income and employment prospects improve, private consumption will support the growth in production. Registered unemployment should decrease below the 1-million threshold.
Manufacturing will remain the primary force of the upswing; its advantages in production costs will not vanish as long as, even in presence of scarcity of skilled labour, salaries and wages do not increase more than in Western Germany. In the wake of robust economic growth, the New Länder will make further progress in catching up with respect to production and income.
Companies will regain support from the banking industry. Yet, investment capital still stems from public funding programmes to a non-negligible extent. In the medium run, access to credit will ease as a result of further improvements in the firms’ net worth position. However, dependency on internal funds remains high and exposes companies to comparatively strong cyclical risks. In an economic downturn, the structural deficiencies of the East German economy will impair economic expansion.
Read article
Do House Prices Drive Aggregate Consumption?
Marian Berneburg, Axel Lindner
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2006
Abstract
In recent times increasing house prices have been credited with a stong positive influence on aggre-gate consumption. But it is questionable in how far higher prices are at all able to lift the purchasing power of the economy as whole: The seller’s profit of a high price, equals the buyer’s loss. But while a positive correlation between house prices and consumption is evident, it is not a sign of irra-tional behaviour by market participants. In fact it seems that both factors are driven by other pa-rameters: the interest rate and expectations about future interest rates and economic activity. For a selection of four developed countries, the follow-ing article tries to give an explanation for the house price developments of the past 15 years. While disregarding country specific risk as well as institutional aspects and demographic factors, a present value caluclation forms the basis for esti-mating a fundamentally justified price movement. Expectations for future rents and discount rates are being proxied by a moving average of past values. It can be observed how interest rate changes and long-run economic growth, two as-pects that clearly also drive private consumption, play a key role here.
Read article
