Energy Markets and Global Economic Conditions
Christiane Baumeister, Dimitris Korobilis, Thomas K. Lee
Review of Economics and Statistics,
forthcoming
Abstract
We evaluate alternative indicators of global economic activity and other market funda-mentals in terms of their usefulness for forecasting real oil prices and global petroleum consumption. World industrial production is one of the most useful indicators. However, by combining measures from several different sources we can do even better. Our analysis results in a new index of global economic conditions and measures for assessing future energy demand and oil price pressures. We illustrate their usefulness for quantifying the main factors behind the severe contraction of the global economy and the price risks faced by shale oil producers in early 2020.
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Micro-mechanisms behind Declining Labor Shares: Rising Market Power and Changing Modes of Production
Matthias Mertens
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
March
2022
Abstract
I derive a micro-founded framework showing how rising firm market power on product and labor markets and falling aggregate labor output elasticities provide three competing explanations for falling labor shares. I apply my framework to 20 years of German manufacturing sector micro data containing firm-specific price information to study these three distinct drivers of declining labor shares. I document a severe increase in firms’ labor market power, whereas firms’ product market power stayed comparably low. Changes in firm market power and a falling aggregate labor output elasticity each account for one half of the decline in labor's share.
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Kommentar: Weniger Krisenmodus und wieder mehr Wettbewerb, bitte!
Steffen Müller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
Ende November kam die frohe Kunde aus Nürnberg: Die Arbeitslosenzahlen sind weiter gesunken, sogar den zehnten Monat in Folge. Was auf der einen Seite erfreulich ist, zeigt auf der anderen Seite, dass Arbeitskräftemangel eines der größten Probleme der deutschen Wirtschaft ist.
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14.12.2021 • 29/2021
German economy not yet immune to COVID 19 ‒ outlook clouded again
The current pandemic wave and supply bottlenecks cause the German economy to stagnate in winter. When infection rates go down in spring, private consumption will increase significantly. In addition, supply restrictions will be gradually reduced. As a result, the economy will regain momentum. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) forecasts that German gross domestic product will increase by 3.5% (East Germany: 2.7%) in 2022, after 2.7% (East Germany: 2.1%) in the current year. Inflation is expected to decline only slowly.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Investment, output gap, and public finances in the medium term: Implications of the Second Supplementary Budget 2021
Andrej Drygalla, Katja Heinisch, Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner, Götz Zeddies
Konjunktur aktuell,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
Die Bundesregierung plant, mit dem Zweiten Nachtragshaushalt 2021 dem Energie- und Klimafonds eine Rücklage in Höhe von 60 Mrd. Euro zuzuführen. Die Mittel sollen in den Folgejahren in Investitionen in den Klimaschutz und die Transformation der Wirtschaft fließen und zugleich gesamtwirtschaftliche Folgekosten der Pandemie verringern. Diese pandemiebedingten Einbußen sind auch in der mittleren Frist erheblich. Zwar dürften Nachholeffekte beim privaten Konsum die im Jahr 2021 noch deutliche Unterauslastung bis zum Jahr 2024 vollständig verschwinden lassen. Jedoch liegt das Produktionspotenzial in den kommenden Jahren mehr als 1,5% unter dem Ende 2019 vom IWH prognostizierten Wert, vor allem wegen eines geringeren Arbeitsangebots, unter anderem aufgrund deutlich niedrigerer Zuwanderung von Arbeitskräften. Die Investitionen sind gemäß aktueller Mittelfristprojektion im Jahr 2024 ebenfalls noch deutlich niedriger. Die Effekte des Nachtragshaushalts auf Investitionstätigkeit und Produktion lassen sich mit Hilfe des finanzpolitischen Simulationsmodells des IWH abschätzen. Die beabsichtigten Mehrausgaben dürften auf dem Höhepunkt ihrer Wirksamkeit im Jahr 2024 die gesamtwirtschaftliche Aktivität um etwa 0,5% steigern. Allerdings werden die zusätzlichen Investitionen die seit Pandemiebeginn ausgebliebene Investitionstätigkeit bei Weitem nicht kompensieren können. Eine Bewertung des Nachtragshaushals hat die positiven gesamtwirtschaftlichen Effekte zusätzlicher Investitionen und die negativen Effekte auf die Glaubwürdigkeit der Schuldenbremse gegeneinander abzuwägen.
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09.11.2021 • 27/2021
IWH Bankruptcy Update: Still No Indication of Impending Bankruptcy Wave
The number of corporate bankruptcies in Germany edged slightly upward in October following several months of historic lows. The number of jobs impacted by bankruptcy also remained unusually depressed. These are the headline figures from this month’s IWH Bankruptcy Update, a report on German bankruptcy statistics published by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
Steffen Müller
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Bank Concentration and Product Market Competition
Farzad Saidi, Daniel Streitz
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 10,
2021
Abstract
This paper documents a link between bank concentration and markups in nonfinancial sectors. We exploit concentration-increasing bank mergers and variation in banks’ market shares across industries and show that higher credit concentration is associated with higher markups and that high-market-share lenders charge lower loan rates. We argue that this is due to the greater incidence of competing firms sharing common lenders that induce less aggressive product market behavior among their borrowers, thereby internalizing potential adverse effects of higher rates. Consistent with our conjecture, the effect is stronger in industries with competition in strategic substitutes where negative product market externalities are greatest.
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Worker Participation in Decision-making, Worker Sorting, and Firm Performance
Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
Industrial Relations,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
Worker participation in decision-making is often associated with high-wage and high-productivity firm strategies. Using linked employer–employee data for Germany and worker fixed effects from a two-way fixed-effects model of wages capturing observed and unobserved worker quality, we find that plants with formal worker participation via works councils indeed employ higher quality workers. We show that worker quality is already higher in plants before council introduction and further increases after the introduction. Importantly, we corroborate previous studies by showing positive productivity and profitability effects even after taking into account worker sorting.
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Explaining Wage Losses After Job Displacement: Employer Size and Lost Firm Wage Premiums
Daniel Fackler, Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Journal of the European Economic Association,
No. 5,
2021
Abstract
This paper investigates whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums, the latter being measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects wage decomposition. Using new German administrative data on displacements from small and large employers, we find that wage losses are to a large extent explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses strongly increase with pre-displacement employer size. This provides an explanation for large and persistent wage losses reported in previous displacement studies typically focusing on large employers, only.
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14.10.2021 • 26/2021
East German economy less affected by supply bottlenecks than German economy as a whole, but lower vaccination rates pose risks – Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2021 and of Länder data from recent publications of the Federal Statisti
Supply bottlenecks affect production in the manufacturing sector in East Germany somewhat less than in Germany as a whole. With 1.8%, the increase in Gross Domestic Product in eastern Germany in 2021 therefore is likely to be lower than in Germany as a whole (2.4%); this gap is likely to enlarge in 2022, when supply bottlenecks hamper less (East Germany: 3.6%, Germany 4.8%).
Oliver Holtemöller
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