We estimate the effects of worker voice on productivity, job quality, and separations. We study the 1991 introduction of a right to worker representation on boards or advisory councils in Finnish firms with at least 150 employees, designed primarily to facilitate workforce-management communication. Consistent with information sharing theories, our difference-in-differences design reveals that worker voice slightly raised labor productivity, firm survival, and capital intensity. In contrast to the exit-voice theory, we find no effects on voluntary job separations, and at most small positive effects on other measures of job quality. A 2008 introduction of shop-floor representation had similarly limited effects.

The effects of private equity buyouts on employment, productivity, and job reallocation vary tremendously with macroeconomic and credit conditions, across private equity groups, and by type of buyout. We reach this conclusion by examining the most extensive database of U.S. buyouts ever compiled, encompassing thousands of buyout targets from 1980 to 2013 and millions of control firms. Employment shrinks 12% over two years after buyouts of publicly listed firms—on average, and relative to control firms—but expands 15% after buyouts of privately held firms. Postbuyout productivity gains at target firms are large on average and much larger yet for deals executed amid tight credit conditions. A postbuyout tightening of credit conditions or slowing of gross domestic product growth curtails employment growth and intrafirm job reallocation at target firms. We also show that buyout effects differ across the private equity groups that sponsor buyouts, and these differences persist over time at the group level. Rapid upscaling in deal flow at the group level brings lower employment growth at target firms. We relate these findings to theories of private equity that highlight agency problems at portfolio firms and within the private equity industry itself.

We examine the effects of the big five personalities of CEOs (openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) on their annual compensation. We hand-collect the tweets of S&P 1500 CEOs and use IBM's Watson Personality Insights to measure their personalities. CEOs with high ratings of agreeableness and conscientiousness get more compensation. We further find that the firms with these CEOs outperform their peers due to better investment efficiency. Firms are willing to pay higher compensation for talent, especially for firms with better operations, located in states with higher labor unionization, or facing higher competition in the product market. Overall, CEO personality is a valid predictor of CEOs' compensation.

We show an equivalence result in the standard representative agent New Keynesian model after demand, wage markup and correlated price markup and TFP shocks: assuming sticky prices and flexible wages yields identical allocations for GDP, consumption, labor, inflation and interest rates to the opposite case- flexible prices and sticky wages. This equivalence result arises if the price and wage Phillips curves' slopes are identical and generalizes to any pair of price and wage Phillips curve slopes such that their sum and product are identical. Nevertheless, the cyclical implications for profits and wages are substantially different. We discuss how the equivalence breaks when these factor-distributional implications matter for aggregate allocations, e.g. in New Keynesian models with heterogeneous agents, endogenous firm entry, and non-constant returns to scale in production. Lastly, we point to an econometric identification problem raised by our equivalence result and discuss possible solutions thereof.

The economic transformation is visibly reshaping the world of work. At the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), the Structural Change and Productivity Department will intensify its analysis of these developments – and is evolving in the process. A high-profile conference with an unusual format recently provided important momentum.

Wie es mit der internationalen Konjunktur in diesem und im kommenden Jahr weitergeht, hängt im Wesentlichen vom Fortgang der Handelskonflikte zwischen den USA und dem Rest der Welt ab. Alles in allem steigt die Weltproduktion in den Jahren 2025 und 2026 um jeweils 2,3%. Das größte weltwirtschaftliche Risiko besteht darin, dass die Handelskonflikte der USA mit der EU und insbesondere mit China weiter eskalieren. Für die deutsche Wirtschaft gibt es mehr und mehr Anzeichen für eine konjunkturelle Erholung, die jedoch ebenfalls erheblich von der möglichen Eskalation der US-Handelskonflikte gefährdet ist. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt dürfte im Jahr 2025 mit 0,4% erstmals seit zwei Jahren wieder etwas zunehmen.

Institutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms’ hiring events and detailed information on CEO biographies. In addition, for peer firms, gaining a CEO connection from a hiring firm’s CEO appointment correlates with higher returns on assets, stock market returns, and decreasing product similarity between companies. We find evidence consistent with common owners allocating CEO connections to shape managerial decisionmaking and increase portfolio firms’ performance.