Structural Stability of the Research & Development Sector in European Economies Despite the Economic Crisis
Jutta Günther, Maria Kristalova, Udo Ludwig
Journal of Evolutionary Economics,
No. 5,
2019
Abstract
When an external shock such as the economic crisis in 2008/2009 occurs, the interconnectedness of sectors can be affected. This paper investigates whether the R&D sector experienced changes in its sectoral integration through the recession. Based on an input-output analysis, it can be shown that the linkages of the R&D sector with other sectors remain stable. In some countries, the inter-sectoral integration becomes even stronger. Policy makers can be encouraged to use public R&D spending as a means of fiscal policy against an economic crisis.
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Industry in Recession — Growth Forces Dwindle
Claus Michelsen, Oliver Holtemöller, Torsten Schmidt, Stefan Kooths, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 10,
2019
Abstract
The leading German economic research institutes have revised their economic forecast for Germany significantly downwards. The reasons for the weak development are the declining global demand for capital goods, which the German economy specialises in exporting, political uncertainty and structural changes in the automotive industry. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, is supporting macroeconomic expansion. Future development depends to a large extent on whether the trade conflicts can be resolved and how Brexit is structured.
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Fiscal Stimulus and Consumer Debt
Yuliya Demyanyk, Elena Loutskina, Daniel Murphy
Review of Economics and Statistics,
No. 4,
2019
Abstract
In the aftermath of the consumer debt–induced recession, policymakers have questioned whether fiscal stimulus is effective during periods of high consumer indebtedness. This study empirically investigates this question. Using detailed data on Department of Defense spending for the 2007–2009 period, we document that the open-economy relative fiscal multiplier is higher in geographies with higher consumer debt. The results suggest that in the short term (2007–2009), fiscal policy can mitigate the adverse effect of consumer (over)leverage on real economic output during a recession. We then exploit detailed microdata to show that both heterogeneous marginal propensities to consume and slack-driven economic mechanisms contribute to the debt-dependent multiplier.
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02.10.2019 • 20/2019
Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2019: Economy Cools Further – Industry in Recession
Berlin, October 2, 2019 – Germany’s leading economics research institutes have revised their economic forecast for Germany significantly downward. Whereas in the spring they still expected gross domestic product (GDP) to grow by 0.8% in 2019, they now expect GDP growth to be only 0.5%. Reasons for the poor performance are the falling worldwide demand for capital goods – in the exporting of which the Germany economy is specialised – as well as political uncertainty and structural changes in the automotive industry. By contrast, monetary policy is shoring up macroeconomic expansion. For the coming year, the economic researchers have also reduced their forecast of GDP growth to 1.1%, having predicted 1.8% in the spring.
Oliver Holtemöller
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05.09.2019 • 18/2019
Downturn in Germany continues
Trade disputes are causing international trade in goods to decline this year. The manufacturing industry in Germany is particularly affected by this. However, a robust labour market is supporting the economy. According to IWH autumn economic forecast, German gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by 0.5% in 2019. At 1%, output growth in East Germany is likely to be significantly higher than in West Germany.
Oliver Holtemöller
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What Drives Discretion in Bank Lending? Some Evidence and a Link to Private Information
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2019
Abstract
We assess the extent to which discretion, unexplained variations in the terms of a loan contract, has varied across time and lending institutions and show that part of this discretion is due to private information that lenders have on their borrowers. We find that discretion is lower for secured loans and loans granted by a larger group of lenders, and is larger when the lenders are larger and more profitable. Over time, discretion is also lower around recessions although the private information content is higher. The results suggest that bank discretionary and private information acquisition behavior may be important features of the credit cycle.
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Resolving the Missing Deflation Puzzle
Jesper Lindé, Mathias Trabandt
Abstract
We propose a resolution of the missing deflation puzzle. Our resolution stresses the importance of nonlinearities in price- and wage-setting when the economy is exposed to large shocks. We show that a nonlinear macroeconomic model with real rigidities resolves the missing deflation puzzle, while a linearized version of the same underlying nonlinear model fails to do so. In addition, our nonlinear model reproduces the skewness of inflation and other macroeconomic variables observed in post-war U.S. data. All told, our results caution against the common practice of using linearized models to study inflation and output dynamics.
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04.04.2019 • 9/2019
Joint Economic Forecast Spring 2019: Significant cooling of the economy – Political risks high
Berlin, April 4 – Germany’s leading economics research institutes have revised their forecasts for economic growth in 2019 significantly downward. They expect Germany’s gross domestic product to increase by 0.8%. This is more than one percentage point less than in autumn 2018, when the forecast was still for 1.9% growth. In contrast, the institutes confirm their previous forecast for the year 2020: gross domestic product is expected to increase by 1.8%. These are the results of the Joint Economic Forecast for spring 2019, which will be presented in Berlin on Thursday.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Significant Cooling of the Economy – Political Risks High: Joint Economic Forecast Spring 2019
Dienstleistungsauftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
The German economy has cooled noticeably since mid-2018, and the long-term upswing has thus apparently come to an end. This weaker momentum was triggered both by the international environment and by industry-specific events. The global economic environment has deteriorated – due in part to political risks – and the manufacturing sector is struggling with obstacles to production. Germany’s economy is currently going through a cooling-off phase in which capacity shortages in the economy as a whole are declining. The institutes expect economic growth of only 0.8% in 2019, which is more than one percentage point less than in autumn 2018. However, so far they consider the chance of a pronounced recession with negative rates of change to gross domestic product (GDP) over several quarters to be slight – at least as long as the political risks do not intensify further. For the year 2020, the institutes confirm their forecast from last autumn: gross domestic product is expected to increase by 1.8%.
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On DSGE Models
Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin S. Eichenbaum, Mathias Trabandt
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
No. 3,
2018
Abstract
The outcome of any important macroeconomic policy change is the net effect of forces operating on different parts of the economy. A central challenge facing policymakers is how to assess the relative strength of those forces. Economists have a range of tools that can be used to make such assessments. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are the leading tool for making such assessments in an open and transparent manner. We review the state of mainstream DSGE models before the financial crisis and the Great Recession. We then describe how DSGE models are estimated and evaluated. We address the question of why DSGE modelers—like most other economists and policymakers—failed to predict the financial crisis and the Great Recession, and how DSGE modelers responded to the financial crisis and its aftermath. We discuss how current DSGE models are actually used by policymakers. We then provide a brief response to some criticisms of DSGE models, with special emphasis on criticism by Joseph Stiglitz, and offer some concluding remarks.
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