The Effects of Antitrust Laws on Horizontal Mergers: International Evidence
Chune Young Chung, Iftekhar Hasan, JiHoon Hwang, Incheol Kim
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
This study examines how antitrust law adoptions affect horizontal merger and acquisition (M&A) outcomes. Using the staggered introduction of competition laws in 20 countries, we find antitrust regulation decreases acquirers’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding horizontal merger announcements. A decrease in deal value, target book assets, and industry peers' announcement returns are consistent with the market power hypothesis. Exploiting antitrust law adoptions addresses a downward bias to an estimated effect of antitrust enforcement (Baker (2003)). The potential bias from heterogeneous treatment effects does not nullify our results. Overall, antitrust policies seem to deter post-merger monopolistic gains, potentially improving customer welfare.
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Compensation Regulation in Banking: Executive Director Behavior and Bank Performance after the EU Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
forthcoming
Abstract
The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.
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Committing to Grow: Privatizations and Firm Dynamics in East Germany
Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, André Diegmann, Nicolas Serrano-Velarde
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2023
Abstract
This paper investigates a unique policy designed to maintain employment during the privatization of East German firms after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The policy required new owners of the firms to commit to employment targets, with penalties for non-compliance. Using a dynamic model, we highlight three channels through which employment targets impact firms: distorted employment decisions, increased productivity, and higher exit rates. Our empirical analysis, using a novel dataset and instrumental variable approach, confirms these findings. We estimate a 22% points higher annual employment growth rate, a 14% points higher annual productivity growth, and a 3.6% points higher probability of exit for firms with binding employment targets. Our calibrated model further demonstrates that without these targets, aggregate employment would have been 15% lower after 10 years. Additionally, an alternative policy of productivity investment subsidies proved costly and less effective in the short term.
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Loan Securitisation during the Transition to a Low-carbon Economy
Isabella Müller, Huyen Nguyen, Trang Nguyen
VoxEU CEPR,
May
2023
Abstract
Banks play a crucial role in the transition to a low-carbon economy, but they also expose themselves to climate transition risk. This column shows that banks use corporate loan securitisation to shift climate transition risk to less-regulated shadow banking entities. This behaviour affects carbon premia in loan contracts. When banks can use securitisation to manage transition risk, their climate policies that target only activities reflected in their books may not be as effective as bank regulators hope for.
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Short-Selling Threats and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Financial Crisis
Dien Giau Bui, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin, Hong Thoa Nguyen
Journal of Banking and Finance,
May
2023
Abstract
The focus of this paper is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation SHO strengthens or weakens the effect of short-selling threats on banks’ risk-taking. The evidence shows that pilot banks with looser constraints on short-selling increased their risk-taking during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The reason is that short-selling threats improved the information environment and mitigated the agency problems of banks during the pilot program that led to greater risk-taking by pilot banks. Additionally, this effect is mainly driven by pilot banks with poor corporate governance, or high information asymmetry. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence that the disciplinary role of short-sellers had a positive effect on bank risk-taking during the financial crisis.
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14.02.2023 • 4/2023
Study on Europe's top bankers: Risky business despite bonus cap
Ten years ago, the EU Parliament decided to cap the flexible remuneration of bank managers. But the cap on bonuses misses its target: Managers of systemically important European banks take high risks without changes, shows a study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
Michael Koetter
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Sources of Large Firms’ Market Power and Why It Matters
Filippo di Mauro, Matthias Mertens, Bernardo Mottironi
VOXEU COLUMN,
January
2023
Abstract
Excessive market power has detrimental effects on the functioning of the economy, raising consumer prices, distorting the allocation of resources, and creating welfare losses. The existing literature has largely focussed on competition in product markets. This column argues that it is important to differentiate between various sources of firm market power on output and input (most notably labour) markets. European firm-level data reveals that large firms charge lower markups in product markets but exert their market power significantly in labour markets. Competition authorities can and must distinguish between the sources of market power when attempting to regulate it.
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The Disciplining Effect of Supervisory Scrutiny in the EU-wide Stress Test
Christoffer Kok, Carola Müller, Steven Ongena, Cosimo Pancaro
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
January
2023
Abstract
Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.
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Capital Markets Union: Database of Directives and Regulations
Moritz Emlein, Eleonora Sfrappini, Lena Tonzer, Cristina Zgherea
IWH Technical Reports,
No. 2,
2022
Abstract
In 2015, the European Commission adopted the Capital Markets Union (CMU) action plan. The plan aims to deepen financial integration and harmonize international standards for investments within the European Union (EU) and it outlines several actions to be implemented in order to address twelve key priority areas. We assemble a database of the legislative acts that implement the CMU. The dataset includes a list of directives and regulations at the EU level with information on publication, entry into force, and transposition dates as well as brief descriptions. This information might be useful in empirical analyses assessing the effectiveness of components of the CMU.
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