Aktuelle Trends: Der Rückgang der Exporte nach Russland betrifft alle Bundesländer und ist nur zum Teil durch die Sanktionen der EU gegenüber Russland zu erklären
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
In den vergangenen 20 Jahren waren die deutschen Exporte nach Russland in Relation zur gesamten Wertschöpfung zweimal rückläufig: zunächst im Jahr 2009 und dann wieder seit etwa dem Jahr 2012, also bevor die Europäische Union 2014 erstmals Handelssanktionen gegenüber Russland verhängte. Betroffen sind alle Bundesländer, der Rückgang dauert meist bis in die heutige Zeit an. Die Sanktionen dürften nur einen Teil des Rückgangs erklären. Vielmehr schwächte sich die Nachfrage nach Investitions- und Konsumgütern aus Russland mit dem Ölpreisverfall und der damit verbundenen Abwertung des Rubels Ende 2014 deutlich ab. Dies betraf nicht nur Deutschland, sondern beispielsweise auch China, das an Sanktionen gegenüber Russland nicht beteiligt ist. Erst 2016, als der Ölpreis wieder stieg, setzte eine teilweise Erholung der russischen Importe ein.
Gender Equality & Anti-Discrimination
Equal Opportunities at IWH ...
25.05.2018 • 12/2018
The resistance of employers against works councils
Germany votes. However, this time it’s not about the politicians – instead it’s about the works councils. It’s certainly worthwhile: Many studies have shown that works councils all in all have a positive impact on productivity, wages and profits. Despite this, employers are sometimes very resistant to the idea of staff involvement in company decision-making. A common argument is that such participation limits managerial freedom and that employers are willing to sacrifice the benefits of staff participation in return for greater room for manoeuvre. Steffen Müller from the Halle Institute for Economic Research Halle (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association now provides an alternative economic justification for employer resistance: Employer associations are dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, and in these works councils – in contrast to large firms – often produce no positive economic benefits.
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Direct and Indirect Effects of Economic Sanctions between the EU and Russia on Output and Employment in the German Economy
Followed by the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2014, the European Union and Russia introduced bilateral economic sanctions which accelerated an already existing decline of the German exports to Russia. The article focuses on the effects of the losses in exports to Russia on production and employment in Germany. The analysis makes use of an input-output approach capturing direct as well as indirect effects throughout the supply chain. The results calculated on the base of the actual Input-Output Table for Germany exhibit a cumulated loss in GDP of 0.15% due to sanctions in the years 2014 to 2016. Especially export-oriented German sectors with strong backward linkages, such as motor vehicles and machinery, are affected.
Effects of Sanctions between the EU and Russia on the German Economy
The mutual imposition of economic sanctions strengthened the slow down of German exports to Russia and exposed output as well as jobs inside the value chains to danger. The amount of potential losses is estimated by the the use of input-output-analysis.
The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
IWH Discussion Papers,
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
Paradigm Shift in European Competition Law
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
During the last decade, European competition law went through several procedural changes, which were mainly influenced by US-American law. Economic criteria rather than legal parameters are now used to evaluate the conduct of firms. Such a “more economic approach” is apparent both in legislation and jurisdiction.
The article discusses the reforms that resulted from the paradigm shift by focusing on the legislation perspective as well as their impact in terms of cartels. One of the most important instruments in European competition policy is nowadays the Leniency Regulation, which was implemented in 1996. Another tool are the renewed Fining Guidelines, which in general will lead to higher fines.
Although European competition law adopted some instruments from American law, there are still major differences between the two jurisdictions. The possibility to impose jail sentences does not exist on a European level yet. However, a few European countries included criminal sanctions in their national laws.
Property networks of corporations as cause of abusive behaviour – A stock market analysis based on institutional economics
Applied Financial Economics Letters,
The present study deals with the fact that it seems as if executive boards have developed a self-service-mentality concerning the corporations they are meant to manage. The surprise about this is not the attempt of exploitation (rather the opposite would be surprising from an economic point of view) but the apparent absence of sanctions imposed by the owners. This study shows that this behaviour of corporations’ owners is at least to a main part due to the fact, that the reciprocal property of corporations prevents the exercise of certain property rights by the ‘true’ holders.