Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
European Journal of Law and Economics,
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
Bank Market Discipline
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
IWH Discussion Papers,
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
New labor market results: More transparency of labor market policy measures
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
The article describes the modified labour-market statement as produced by The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) on the example of East Germany. There are included different new measures of labour-market policy which allow to reflect the extent of underemployment (including job creation measures) more completely and transparentely as before.
Climate protection policy in the housing sector: Lacking impact and need for action
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Energy savings in the rental housing sector may contribute to the reduction of global greenhouse gas emission. However, emissions have gone up since the early nineties despite of large energy saving potentials. In general the effects of energy saving regulations and support programmes were overestimated. Unfortunately, these programmes ignore market specific restraints.
Markets do not provide optimal incentives to prevent emissions since the costs of greenhouse gas emissions are not fully internalised in fuel prices. Special characteristics of rental housing market in Germany enhance this deficit. Consequently profitable measures of saving energy are neglected. Overall the effectiveness of regulations and support programmes suffers.
Therefore it is necessary to strengthen energy saving incentives. Suitable instruments would include a gradual rise in fuel taxes (Öko-Steuer), a reduction of rental housing market control and measures to improve the transparency of energy consumption.