Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Journal of Monetary Economics,
forthcoming
Abstract
A natural experiment and matched bank/firm data are used to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms receive larger loans, invest more, and maintain higher rates of sales and wage growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks’ portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks’ portfolios are less profitable and productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long.
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Wage Delegation in the Field
Sabrina Jeworrek, Vanessa Mertins
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
forthcoming
Abstract
By conducting a natural field experiment, we analyze the managerial policy of delegating the wage choice to employees. We find that this policy enhances performance significantly, which is remarkable since allocated wage premiums of the same size have no effect at all. Observed self‐imposed wage restraints and absence of negative peer effects speak in favor of wage delegation, although the chosen wage premium levels severely dampen its net value. Additional experimental and survey data provide important insights into employees' underlying motivations.
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Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining: A Path to Productivity?
Daniele Aglio, Filippo di Mauro
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Productivity developments have been rather divergent across EU countries and particularly between Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and elsewhere in the continent (non-CEE). How is such phenomenon related to wage bargaining institutions? Starting from the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) shock, we analyse whether the specific set-up of wage bargaining prevailing in non-CEE may have helped their respective firms to sustain productivity in the aftermath of the crisis. To tackle the issue, we merge the CompNet dataset – of firm-level based productivity indicators – with the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey on wage bargaining institutions. We show that there is a substantial difference in the institutional set-up between the two above groups of countries. First, in CEE countries the bulk of the wage bargaining (some 60%) takes place outside collective bargaining schemes. Second, when a collective bargaining system is adopted in CEE countries, it is prevalently in the form of firm-level bargaining (i. e. the strongest form of decentralisation), while in non-CEE countries is mostly subject to multi-level bargaining (i. e. an intermediate regime, only moderately decentralised). On productivity impacts, we show that firms’ TFP in the non-CEE region appears to have benefitted from the chosen form of decentralisation, while no such effects are detectable in CEE countries. On the channels of transmission, we show that decentralisation in non-CEE countries is also negatively correlated with dismissals and with unit labour costs, suggesting that such collective bargaining structure may have helped to better match workers with firms’ needs.
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Competition, Cost Structure, and Labour Leverage: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry
Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 21,
2020
Abstract
I study the effect of increasing competition on financial performance through labour leverage. To capture competition, I exploit variation in product market contestability in the U.S. airline industry. First, I find that increasing competitive pressure leads to increasing labour leverage, proxied by labour share. This explains the decrease in operating profitability through labour rigidities. Second, by exploiting variation in human capital specificity, I show that contestability of product markets induces labour market contestability. Whereas affected firms might experience more stress through higher wages or loss of skilled human capital, more mobile employee groups benefit from competitions through higher labour shares.
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IWH-Tarif-Check: Kräftige reale Netto-Tariflohnzuwächse für Beschäftigte im Öffentlichen Dienst
Oliver Holtemöller, Birgit Schultz
IWH Tarif-Check,
No. 1,
2020
Abstract
Steuerfreie „Corona-Sonderzahlung“ und Abbau des Solidaritätszuschlags bringen Beschäftigten bei Bund und Kommunen kräftiges Gehalts-Plus.
Die Tarifvertragsparteien des Öffentlichen Dienstes von Bund und Kommunen haben sich auf einen neuen Tariflohnabschluss mit einer Laufzeit bis Ende 2022 geeinigt: Im Dezember 2020 gibt es eine steuerfreie „Corona-Sonderzahlung“, die je nach Entgeltgruppe bis zu 600 Euro beträgt. Ab April 2021 steigt dann das Gehalt um 1,4%, jedoch mindestens um 50 Euro je Monat, ein Jahr später um weitere 1,8%. Zudem gibt es noch eine Reihe von Zusatzvereinbarungen wie beispielsweise die Reduzierung der wöchentlichen Arbeitszeit in Ostdeutschland auf das Westniveau, die Erhöhung der Jahressonder-zahlung oder die Einführung einer Pflegezulage.
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Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany
Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller
ILR Review,
No. 5,
2020
Abstract
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Labour Market Power and Between-Firm Wage (In)Equality
Matthias Mertens
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2020
Abstract
This study investigates how labour market power shapes between-firm wage differences using German manufacturing sector data from 1995 to 2016. Over time, firm- and employee-side labour market power, defined as the difference between wages and marginal revenue products of labour (MRPL), increasingly moderated rising between-firm wage inequality. This is because small, low-wage, low-MRPL firms possess no labour market power and pay wages equal to or even above their MRPL, whereas large, high-wage, high-MRPL firms possess high labour market power and pay wages below their MRPL. These wage-MRPL differences grow over time and compress the firm wage distribution compared to the counterfactual competitive labour market scenario. Particularly for the largest, highest-paying, and highest-MRPL firms, wage-MRPL differences strongly increase over time. This allows these firms to generate increasingly large labour market rents while being active on competitive product markets, providing novel insights on why such “superstar firms” are profitable and successful.
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Labour Market Power and Between-Firm Wage (In)Equality
Matthias Mertens
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2020
Abstract
This study investigates how labour market power shapes between-firm wage differences using German manufacturing sector data from 1995 to 2016. Over time, firm- and employee-side labour market power, defined as the difference between wages and marginal revenue products of labour (MRPL), increasingly moderated rising between-firm wage inequality. This is because small, low-wage, low-MRPL firms possess no labour market power and pay wages equal to or even above their MRPL, whereas large, high-wage, high-MRPL firms possess high labour market power and pay wages below their MRPL. These wage-MRPL differences grow over time and compress the firm wage distribution compared to the counterfactual competitive labour market scenario. Particularly for the largest, highest-paying, and highest-MRPL firms, wage-MRPL differences strongly increase over time. This allows these firms to generate increasingly large labour market rents while being active on competitive product markets, providing novel insights on why such “superstar firms” are profitable and successful.
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Zwischenbetriebliche Lohnunterschiede, Mitbestimmung und Tarifverträge
Steffen Müller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2020
Abstract
Niedriglohnsektor und steigende Lohnungleichheit sind seit langem dominierende Themen am Arbeitsmarkt. Dieser Artikel legt nahe, dass die Verhandlungsmacht der Arbeitnehmer von der Existenz von Betriebsräten und Tarifverträgen abhängt und dass sich vor allem betriebliche Mitbestimmung positiv auf Löhne auswirkt. Während Mitbestimmung die zwischenbetriebliche Lohnungleichheit erhöht, wird sie durch Tarifverträge reduziert.
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The Effects of German Regional Policy – Evidence at the Establishment Level
Matthias Brachert, Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Eva Dettmann, Alexander Giebler, Lutz Schneider, Mirko Titze
IWH Online,
No. 5,
2020
Abstract
The “Joint Task ‘Improving Regional Economic Structures’ (GRW)” represents the most important regional policy scheme in Germany. The program provides non-repayable grants as a share of total investment costs to establishments (and municipalities) in structurally weak regions. The definition of eligible areas is based on i) a composite indicator measuring regional structural weakness and ii) a threshold determined by the European Union consisting of the population share of the respective country that lives in assisted regions. Responsible for the selection of the supported projects is the respective Federal State in which the GRW project is applied for.
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