Why Is there Resistance to Works Councils In Germany? An Economic Perspective
Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Economic and Industrial Democracy,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Recent empirical research generally finds evidence of positive economic effects for works councils, for example with regard to productivity and – with some limitations – to profits. This makes it necessary to explain why employers’ associations have reservations about works councils. On the basis of an in-depth literature analysis, this article shows that beyond the generally positive findings, there are important heterogeneities in the impact of works councils. The authors argue that those groups of employers that tend to benefit little from employee participation in terms of productivity and profits may well be important enough to shape the agenda of their employers’ organization and have even gained in importance within their organizations in recent years. The authors also discuss the role of deviations from profit-maximizing behavior like risk aversion, short-term profit-maximization and other non-pecuniary motives, as possible reasons for employer resistance.
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Zwischenbetriebliche Lohnunterschiede, Mitbestimmung und Tarifverträge
Steffen Müller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2020
Abstract
Niedriglohnsektor und steigende Lohnungleichheit sind seit langem dominierende Themen am Arbeitsmarkt. Dieser Artikel legt nahe, dass die Verhandlungsmacht der Arbeitnehmer von der Existenz von Betriebsräten und Tarifverträgen abhängt und dass sich vor allem betriebliche Mitbestimmung positiv auf Löhne auswirkt. Während Mitbestimmung die zwischenbetriebliche Lohnungleichheit erhöht, wird sie durch Tarifverträge reduziert.
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Worker Participation in Decision-making, Worker Sorting, and Firm Performance
Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
Abstract
Worker participation in decision-making is often associated with high-wage and high-productivity firm strategies. Using linked-employer-employee data for Germany and worker fixed effects from a two-way fixed effects model of wages capturing observed and unobserved worker quality, we find that establishments with formal worker participation via works councils indeed employ higher-quality workers. We show that worker quality is already higher in plants before council introduction and further increases after the introduction. Importantly, we corroborate previous studies by showing positive productivity and profitability effects even after taking into account worker sorting.
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Industrial Relations: Worker Codetermination and Collective Wage Bargaining
Steffen Müller, Claus Schnabel
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
Trade unions and employers’ associations, collective bargaining, and employee representation at the workplace are the cornerstones of industrial relations systems in many developed countries. Germany stands out as a country with powerful works councils and a high coverage rate of collective bargaining agreements, supported by encompassing interest groups of employees and employers and by the state. The German case and the perceived stability of its industrial relations regime have attracted considerable attention among researchers and politicians, which also has to do with the country’s high productivity, comparably few strikes, and relatively minor employment problems. However, in recent years industrial relations in many countries including Germany have come under pressure and the fact that there is no obvious and clearly superior alternative to the current regime of industrial and labour relations may not be sufficient to guarantee the survival of the present system.
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25.05.2018 • 12/2018
The resistance of employers against works councils
Germany votes. However, this time it’s not about the politicians – instead it’s about the works councils. It’s certainly worthwhile: Many studies have shown that works councils all in all have a positive impact on productivity, wages and profits. Despite this, employers are sometimes very resistant to the idea of staff involvement in company decision-making. A common argument is that such participation limits managerial freedom and that employers are willing to sacrifice the benefits of staff participation in return for greater room for manoeuvre. Steffen Müller from the Halle Institute for Economic Research Halle (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association now provides an alternative economic justification for employer resistance: Employer associations are dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, and in these works councils – in contrast to large firms – often produce no positive economic benefits.
Steffen Müller
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Warum gibt es Widerstand gegen Betriebsräte?
Steffen Müller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2018
Abstract
Die jüngere ökonomische Forschung stellt der betrieblichen Mitbestimmung z. B. im Hinblick auf ihre Effekte auf Produktivität, Löhne und Gewinne insgesamt ein positives Zeugnis aus. Dies macht den Widerstand von Arbeitgebern gegen Betriebsräte erklärungsbedürftig. Da Mitbestimmung die unternehmerische Freiheit einschränkt, wird vielfach vermutet, dass Arbeitgeber bereit sein könnten, positive Effekte der Mitbestimmung im Gegenzug für größere Handlungsspielräume zu opfern. Unser Beitrag zeigt auf Basis einer Literaturauswertung, dass, jenseits der durchschnittlich positiven Beurteilung durch die Forschung, Mitbestimmung in vielen Betrieben keine positiven ökonomischen Folgen hat. Da das Gewicht solcher Betriebe in den Arbeitgeberverbänden stark ist, kann die ablehnende Haltung der Arbeitgeberverbände auch aus profitmaximierendem Kalkül seiner Mitglieder erklärt werden.
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Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany
Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2018
published in: ILR Review
Abstract
This paper investigates the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in Germany. OLS regressions for the firm effects from a two-way fixed effects decomposition of workers’ wages by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) document that average premia are larger in firms bound by collective agreements and in firms with a works council, holding constant firm performance. RIF regressions show that premia are less dispersed among covered firms but more dispersed among firms with a works council. Hence, deunionisation is the only among the suspects investigated that contributes to explaining the marked rise in the premia dispersion over time.
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Why is there Resistance to Works Councils in Germany? An Economic Perspective
Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Abstract
Recent empirical research generally finds evidence of positive economic effects of works councils, for example with regard to productivity and – with some limitations – to profits. This makes it necessary to explain why employers’ associations have reservations against works councils. On the basis of an in-depth literature analysis, we show that beyond the generally positive findings, there are important heterogeneities in the impact of works councils. We argue that those groups of employers that tend to benefit little from employee participation in terms of productivity and profits may well be important enough to shape the agenda of their employers’ organisation and even gained in importance within their organisations in recent years. We also discuss the role of deviations from profit-maximising behaviour like risk aversion, short-term profit maximisation, and other non-pecuniary motives, as possible reasons for employer resistance.
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Works Councils and Other Plant-specific Forms of Employee Participation – Substitutes or Complements?
Stefan Ertelt, Boris Hirsch, Claus Schnabel
Industrielle Beziehungen,
No. 3,
2017
Abstract
Der Beitrag untersucht anhand des IAB-Betriebspanels (2004-2013) die Verbreitung, Entwicklung und Interdependenz von Betriebsräten und anderen, meist betriebsinitiierten Formen der Mitarbeitervertretung (wie z.B. Runde Tische). In der Privatwirtschaft sind Betriebsräte gleich häufig zu finden wie andere Mitarbeitervertretungen, doch kommt eine gleichzeitige Existenz beider Gremien in einem Betrieb kaum vor. Ökonometrische Analysen mit rekursiven Probit-Modellen verdeutlichen, dass z.T. unterschiedliche Faktoren das Vorhandensein dieser alternativen Formen der Mitarbeitervertretung erklären und dass bezüglich ihrer Existenz, Gründung und Auflösung Betriebsräte und andere Mitarbeitervertretungen negativ miteinander korrelieren. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass zwischen beiden Formen der Arbeitnehmerpartizipation eine überwiegend substitutive Beziehung besteht.
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The Dynamic Effects of Works Councils on Plant Productivity: First Evidence from Panel Data
Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
British Journal of Industrial Relations,
No. 2,
2017
Abstract
We estimate dynamic effects of works councils on labour productivity using newly available information from West German establishment panel data. Conditioning on plant fixed effects and control variables, we find negative productivity effects during the first five years after council introduction but a steady and substantial increase in the councils’ productivity effect thereafter. Our findings support a causal interpretation for the positive correlation between council existence and plant productivity that has been frequently reported in previous studies.
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