The previous literature finds a positive effect of institutional (relative to other investors’) ownership on firms’ innovation output . We study the impact of increases in the concentration of institutional investors’ ownership on firms’ decisions to invest in innovation and their innovation output. By reducing short-term earnings pressure, concentrated institutional investors’ ownership increases managers’ incentives to invest in R&D. However, it decreases firms’ acquisitions of external innovation due to empire-building and dilution concerns. Overall, firms’ future patents and citations decrease. Our results indicate that the previously found positive effect of institutional investors on innovation declines as the ownership of these investors becomes more concentrated. Despite that, we find that blockholder institutional ownership increases firm value. Hence, large institutional investors take measures to preserve the value of their ownership interests, even if they result in reduced innovation.

This paper provides new causal evidence on how patent allowances affect firms and their employees based on quasi-random assignment of patent applications to examiners. Exploiting employer-employee records with newly linked German firm data and web-scraped patent documents, we show that patent-induced shocks reduce firm exit, improve productivity, and increase wages, with rent-sharing elasticities between 0.10 and 0.21. Wage gains are broadly observed across occupational tasks, with high heterogeneity: managers benefit disproportionately in publicly traded firms, whereas broader wage increases accrue to workers in non-traded firms. Our findings highlight the role of institutional features and firm organization in shaping how rents are shared.

Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.

Climate policies do not operate in isolation but propagate through global production networks, affecting industries beyond national borders. This paper combines international input-output data with a granular instrumental variable approach to capture how foreign regulations transmit through upstream and downstream linkages. Distinguishing between market-based policies, non-market regulations, and technology support, the analysis shows that foreign climate policies can enhance domestic productivity, with effects shaped by industry characteristics and operating through technological adjustment along supply chains. The results underscore the importance of accounting for international spillovers when evaluating the economic impact of environmental regulation.