Market Feedback Effect on CEO Pay: Evidence from Peers’ Say-on-Pay Voting Failures
Agnes Cheng, Iftekhar Hasan, Feng Tang, Jing Xie
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
We find that a firm’s stock price drops when its compensation peer firm announces a severe say-on-pay voting failure. This price drop causes a reduction in the focal firm CEO’s pay in the following period. The effect on CEO pay is stronger when the board of directors is more powerful, when the proxy advisor holds a negative view of the CEO’s pay, and when the hired compensation consultant is less reputable. Directors who cut their CEO’s pay following the price drop receive more voting support from investors than other directors. Our findings show that the peer firm’s voting failure induces a market-feedback effect for focal firm directors.
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Social Connections and Information Leakage: Evidence from Target Stock Price Run-up in Takeovers
Iftekhar Hasan, Lin Tong, An Yan
Journal of Financial Research,
forthcoming
Abstract
Does information leakage in a target's social networks increase its stock price prior to a merger announcement? Evidence reveals that a target with more social connections indeed experiences a higher pre-announcement price run-up. This effect does not exist during or after the merger announcement, or in windows ending two months before the announcement. It is more pronounced among targets with severe asymmetric information, and weaker when the information about the upcoming merger is publicly available prior to the announcement. It is also weaker in expedited deals such as tender offers.
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The Effects of Antitrust Laws on Horizontal Mergers: International Evidence
Chune Young Chung, Iftekhar Hasan, JiHoon Hwang, Incheol Kim
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 7,
2024
Abstract
This study examines how antitrust law adoptions affect horizontal merger and acquisition (M&A) outcomes. Using the staggered introduction of competition laws in 20 countries, we find antitrust regulation decreases acquirers’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding horizontal merger announcements. A decrease in deal value, target book assets, and industry peers' announcement returns are consistent with the market power hypothesis. Exploiting antitrust law adoptions addresses a downward bias to an estimated effect of antitrust enforcement (Baker (2003)). The potential bias from heterogeneous treatment effects does not nullify our results. Overall, antitrust policies seem to deter post-merger monopolistic gains, potentially improving customer welfare.
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IWH Bankruptcy Research
IWH Bankruptcy Research The Bankruptcy Research Unit of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) presents the Institute’s research on the topics of corporate bankruptcy,…
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Economic Outlook
Joint Economic Forecast Spring 2025 Geopolitical turn intensifies crisis – structural reforms even more urgent April 10, 2025 The German economy will continue to tread water in…
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Wage and Employment Effects of Insolvencies
Wage and employment effects of bankruptcies Although the consequences of bankruptcies for affected employees are frequently debated in the public (e.g. due to the bankruptcy of…
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ENTRANCES
ENTRANCES aims at examining the effects of the coal phase-out in Europe. How does the phase-out transform society – and what can politics do about it? The EU-funded,…
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IWH-Tarif-Check
IWH-Tarif-Check The IWH-Tarif-Check (IWH Wage Rate Check) analyses the real income effects of recent wage agreements in Germany. It removes effects of inflation, taxation and…
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Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department The seminar series "Brown Bag Seminar" was offered on a regular basis by members of the Financial Markets department and their…
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The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections
Ester Faia, Maximilian Mayer, Vincenzo Pezone
SAFE Working Papers,
No. 269,
2022
Abstract
We present causal evidence on the effect of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies as exogenous variation and show that firms that lose centrality in the network experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement date. The key driver of our results is the role of boardroom connections in reducing asymmetric information. The complementarities with the input-output and cross-ownership networks are consistent with this channel. Using hand-collected data, we also show that network centrality has a positive effect on directors’ compensation, providing evidence of rent sharing.
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