Do economic incentives govern information diffusion in markets? Using international banks’ advisory activities in corporate takeovers as their source of private information, we show in supervisory data that banks with closer ties to the target, but not the acquirer, advisor trade profitably in the target’s stock prior to the deal announcement. This trading behavior is associated with a higher premium paid by the acquirer without compromising the deal success. As the incentives of informed traders are aligned only with those of the target shareholders, which are represented by the target advisor, our evidence suggests strategic information transmission among these banks.

We study how deposit competition affects a bank's decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as a source of competition, we find a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize mortgage loans. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in deposit costs and corresponding reductions in banks' deposit holdings. Our results are strongest among banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight a hitherto undocumented and unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate-to-distribute model.

Syndicated loan data provided by DealScan is an essential input in banking research to answer urging questions on bank lending, e.g., in the presence of financial or geopolitical shocks or climate change. However, many data options raise the question of how to choose the estimation sample. We employ a standard regression framework analyzing bank lending during the financial crisis of 2007/08 to study how conventional but varying usages of DealScan affect the estimates. The key finding is that the direction of coefficients remains relatively robust. However, statistical significance depends on the data and sampling choice, and we provide guidelines for applied research.

This paper examines how supplier IPO events affect their key customers’ cost of debt. The evidence reveals that average loan spreads for customers increase by roughly 20% (23.7 basis points) following suppliers’ IPO events. This negative spillover effect is more pronounced when suppliers make significant relationship-specific investments (high switching cost), when suppliers face less concentrated customer bases, or when customers face more concentrated supplier bases. Our results show that customers receive less favourable trade terms and are forced to pay more for inputs after their suppliers go public, all of which increase customers’ operational costs, risk and subsequent borrowing costs. Furthermore, we document that customer loan contracts become significantly more restrictive after a supplier's IPO. Finally, we find that the observed negative spillover effect is also present in customers’ access to the public bond market.

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon transition risk, we find that banks engage in regulatory arbitrage and use brown loan securitization to manage their exposure to carbon transition risk. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon transition risk is high but keep these loans on their balance sheets when the risk is reduced. In addition, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among banks with low levels of capitalization, domestic banks, and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies.

DThe interactions between supply chains and sustainable finance have become a key area of research in financial markets, driven by growing global awareness of environmental and social challenges. Article 1 examines how lenders use sustainability clauses to monitor borrowers with negative environmental incidents and compares the use of this unique loan agreement design with conventional loan terms, financial and balance sheet-related clauses. We show that lenders are less inclined to include sustainability clauses in the loan agreement if a borrower has a history of negative environmental incidents. In contrast, lenders use sustainability clauses to attract institutional investors to participate in syndication rather than as monitoring tools for borrowers' environmental performance. Article 2 examines whether banks associated with biodiversity loss in the Amazon region experience a withdrawal of deposits when depositors become aware of their financing activities. I find empirical evidence that so-called ‘Amazon carbon banks’ experience slower growth in deposits once depositors learn about their financing activities. This effect is particularly pronounced when Amazon carbon banks have branches in counties that experience greater biodiversity loss compared to other branches. Article 3, how European companies that are heavily integrated into global supply chains (GSC) are affected by a supply chain disruption (Covid-19). We show that Covid-19 negatively affects the revenue growth of companies that are heavily dependent on GSC in their home country. Crucially, we uncover the role of banking relationships in mitigating the disruptive effects.

We investigate how global banks’ macroeconomic expectations for borrower countries influence their credit supply. Utilizing granular data on varying expectations among banks lending to the same firm at the same time, combined with an instrumental variable approach, we find that more optimistic GDP growth expectations for a borrower country are strongly linked to increased credit supply. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in a lender’s GDP growth expectation for the borrower’s country corresponds to an increase of 8.46 percentage points in the loan share, equivalent to approximately 0.75 standard deviations of the loan share and $75.35 million in loan amount. In contrast, global banks’ short-term inflation expectations do not show a significant impact on their credit supply.

We study the corporate-loan pricing decisions of a major, systemic bank during the Greek financial crisis. A unique aspect of our data set is that we observe both the actual interest rate and the “break-even rate” (BE rate) of each loan, as computed by the bank’s own loan-pricing department (in effect, the loan’s marginal cost). We document that low-BE-rate (safer) borrowers are charged significant markups, whereas high-BE-rate (riskier) borrowers are charged smaller and even negative markups. We rationalize this de facto cross-subsidization through the lens of a dynamic model featuring depressed collateral values, impaired capital-market access, and limit pricing.