How does immigration affect support for redistribution? While most research focuses on overall tax and spending levels, we investigate how immigration influences preferences conditional on tax structures. Using two original survey experiments in the UK, we find that low- and middle-income respondents are more likely to support redistribution to immigrants under progressive systems shielding them from fiscal costs, but oppose redistribution when immigrants are identified as beneficiaries and the tax structure increases their fiscal burden. In contrast, high-income respondents' preferences are largely unaffected by either tax structure or immigrant inclusion. These findings suggest that progressive taxation (1) is a viable revenue-generating strategy without provoking major political backlash; (2) reduces native resistance to immigrant welfare inclusion; (3) helps explain puzzling variation in immigration's effects on welfare attitudes; and (4) clarifies why low- and middle-income groups sometimes reject generous welfare programs despite standing to benefit. Our results highlight the importance of institutional design in shaping how economic self-interest and immigration concerns interact.

We study the interaction of expansionary rate-based monetary policy and quantitative easing, despite their concurrent implementation, by exploiting heterogeneous banks and the introduction of negative monetary-policy rates in a fragmented euro area. Quantitative easing increases credit supply less, translating into weaker employment growth, when banks’ funding costs do not decrease. Using administrative data from Germany, we uncover that among banks selling their securities, central-bank reserves remain disproportionately with high-deposit banks that are constrained due to sticky customer deposits at the zero lower bound. Affected German banks lend relatively less to firms while increasing their interbank exposure in the euro area.

We develop a theory in which a lower cost of job loss reduces the compensating wage premium workers require to join risky young firms. Lower labor costs encourage high-upside experimentation and raise productivity. Because experimentation is not directly observable, we exploit its life-cycle structure: experimentation risk is concentrated among young firms and resolved as firms mature. Using Danish matched employer-employee data and labor-market variation, we show that higher job-finding rates are associated with a lower young-mature wage differential. A randomized survey experiment supports the mechanism: worsening unemployment prospects increases the premium workers require to accept employment at higher-failure-risk young firms.

This paper provides theory and evidence on micro-level pricing behavior needed to model an aggregate New Keynesian Phillips Curve. We start with individual firms that are heterogeneous in their production technology and in the demand curves they face. We estimate the parameters of supply and demand curves by utilizing prices and quantities of outputs and factor inputs of firms along with exogenous downstream demand instruments from global input-output and trade data. The research addresses model heterogeneity using a clustering method to classify firms according to their production technology and observed price pass-through. The results show that more productive firms exhibit a lower price response to changes in demand. We find that the aggregate price response to demand shocks will be smaller when more productive firms absorb a larger portion of demand shocks, which generally is the case. At the same time, our results imply that idiosyncratic shifts in demand to clusters of firms with more rapidly rising marginal cost curves, or cost shocks to clusters of firms with high pass-through, will result in a higher aggregate price response. Finally, this paper provides a framework to incorporate heterogeneous pricing behavior into an estimate of the slope of the aggregate Phillips Curve.

Promoting green (usually more costly) product consumption is one essential element in building a sustainable society. In times of high inflation, not only budget constraints but also the fear that prices will continue to rise might limit the effectiveness of exerted efforts to promote sustainable behaviors. To test this suggestion, we conducted a Germany-wide survey with almost 1200 respondents, followed by a framed field experiment to confirm causality. Our proxy for green consumption is organic food purchases. Survey respondents’ stated organic purchasing behavior is positively correlated with concerns about climate change but negatively correlated with concerns about inflation. The latter result is driven by individuals with a below-median environmental attitude. In the framed field experiment, we use the priming method to manipulate the saliency of inflation concerns. Whereas sizably relaxing the budget constraint has no impact on the share of organic products in participants’ baskets, the priming significantly decreases the share of organic products for individuals with below-median environmental attitude. Using the same inflation priming in a subsequent survey experiment with around 1800 respondents, we find that high inflationary environments affect both the perception of organic being luxury products and the social norm of buying organic. Both effects are more pronounced for individuals with below-median environmental attitude and, hence, they are the likely mechanisms driving the negative effects on organic product consumption.

Exploiting the executive compensation reform for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China that enforce strict pay restrictions, this study examines whether and how pay restrictions affect firms’ labor investment inefficiency. We find that SOEs experience a decrease in abnormal labor investment following the reform relative to non-SOEs, particularly in over-investment in labor. Our results show that the reform is associated with lower labor investment inefficiency through strengthened internal governance and mitigated internal social comparison. In addition, pay restrictions specifically curb firms’ tendency to over-hire. Further analysis reveals that imposing pay restrictions on executives enhances labor quality and also promotes employee well-being. This study offers novel policy insights by showing how pay restrictions to SOE executives can reduce vertical agency costs and investment inefficiency and enhance workforce quality and well-being in weak institutional environments.

This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing. Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.