Regional economic conditions are well-established determinants of the geography of political resentment. However, regions are not homogeneous, and the mechanisms through which local economies affect individual political attitudes are unclear. We argue that feelings of relative deprivation are shaped by how personal prospects are tied to regional conditions, and that the interaction between subjective individual and regional deprivation affects perceptions of shared struggle and systemic unfairness. Through a large-scale survey experiment in Britain addressing geographical self-selection, we provide causal evidence that poor individuals in poor regions express political resentment, whereas in affluent regions the political attitudes of poor and wealthy individuals are indistinguishable. Our findings stress 1) the importance of egocentric mechanisms whereby local economies shape individual prospects; 2) the significance of subjective beliefs over objective information on deprivation; 3) the mobilization potential of highlighting regional deprivation by political entrepreneurs; 4) the relevance of place-based policies to mitigate political discontent.

This paper examines how political networks influence insider trading in China. Using biographical data to construct chairman–politician social networks, we find that firms with stronger political networks engage in significantly less insider trading. The effect is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and for long-standing or high-ranking connections. The muted trading persists during periods when insiders possess valuable private information, including prior to M&A announcements and major policy events. The evidence suggests that personal political networks function as informal governance mechanisms that discipline managerial opportunism when formal governance through state ownership is absent.

We focus on listed non-financial companies from the largest European economies to explore the impact of rising stakeholders’ attention towards climate risk on firms’ probability to delist. An aggregate analysis shows that, despite growing awareness about the climate problem, enhanced scrutiny over more polluting firms and improved access to information about corporate sustainability over the last two decades, the share of carbon-intensive industries has not significantly declined in the listed sector relative to the whole economy. Also at the micro-level, firms in carbon-intensive sectors have not become more likely to delist, even in periods of enhanced stakeholders’ concern about climate risk, potentially because they experienced a shift towards lower emissions over the same period. We confirm this result by means of a quasi-natural experiment centered around the enhanced disclosure requirements introduced by the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive of 2014.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist seit Ende 2025 im Aufschwung. Die Erholung fällt stärker aus als noch im Frühjahr erwartet, bleibt aber schwach. Die führenden Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute erwarten für das laufende Jahr ein BIP-Plus von 1,3% und für die beiden folgenden Jahre von 1,1% bzw. 0,4%. Gegenüber dem Frühjahr wurde die Prognose für 2026 um 0,7 und für 2027 um 0,2 Prozentpunkte angehoben. Die Wirtschaft hat sich robuster entwickelt als erwartet. Der Aufschwung steht jedoch auf einem schmalen Fundament, denn hohe Energiepreise und Strukturprobleme belasten. Im laufenden Quartal bremst zudem Niedrigwasser die Aktivität vorübergehend. Das staatliche Defizit nimmt weiter zu, sodass sich ein wachsender Konsolidierungsbedarf aufstaut.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich trotz höherer Energiepreise und anhaltender Risiken durch den Golfkonflikt auf Erholungskurs. Eine steigende Auslandsnachfrage und zusätzliche staatliche Investitionen stützen die Konjunktur, während die Beschäftigung insbesondere im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe weiter rückläufig ist. Die Produktion dürfte in diesem Jahr um 1,4% und im kommenden Jahr um 0,8% zunehmen; in Ostdeutschland fällt die wirtschaftliche Erholung etwas schwächer aus.

Vietnam, a low middle-income economy, grapples with considerable climate impacts, primarily driven by heat waves, sea level rise, and tropical cyclones. Under ongoing global warming, these extreme weather events are projected to further intensify. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model to study economic transition dynamics from 2015 to 2100, accounting for heat-induced labor productivity losses, agricultural land loss from sea level rise, and residential property damage from tropical cyclones. We compare a Paris-compatible strong mitigation scenario where global warming is limited to well below 2 °C above preindustrial levels to a strong emission scenario where warming reaches 4–5 °C. We find that the impacts of climate change on output and investment are highly uncertain, with differences between the two emission scenarios remaining statistically insignificant until the end of the century, despite substantially higher climate forcing in the latter. By contrast, consumption losses are significantly larger under the high emission scenario. These negative impacts are primarily driven by heat-induced labor productivity losses, while TCs are the main source of uncertainty. Our findings highlight the need for analytical frameworks to capture the different channels through which climate and climate change affect economic development, rather than focusing mainly on output-related damage, as done in many existing studies.