We revisit the employer size wage effect (ESWE) – arguably the most basic and influential departure from the law of one price for labor. Our main result is that this canonical fact disappears completely across establishments within the same firm, even though they operate in different local labor markets. We uncover and dissect this fact by including a firm fixed effect in otherwise standard cross-sectional regressions of wages on establishment size. We implement this demanding specification in population-wide triple-linked firm-establishment-employee data in Germany. This result is new in the ESWE literature (for which our paper also provides the first systematic meta-analysis). This wage-size decoupling is hard to square with the view that employment is determined along a finitely elastic employerspecific labor supply curve – i.e., employers pay exactly the minimum needed for the quantity of labor, but no more – the foundation of the monopsony view. By contrast, large multi-establishment firms (MEF) appear to hire off their labor supply curves (or those curves are very elastic), pay wage premia above the monopsonistic minimum, and leave excess labor supply. We find some evidence for a reemergence of the ESWE within low-premium MEFs. Overall, at least for the 25% of German employment in large firms for which the ESWE disappears, wage setting and employment determination may be better accounted for by alternative models, namely accommodating above-market-clearing wage premia and rationing of labor supply, such as efficiency wage theories.

Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principalagent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find that principals set ethically constrained targets and wages that track fairness benchmarks. Agents, however, do not divert resources to stakeholders: transfers are negative on average, and prosocial traits do not increase giving. Instead, contract terms, though unenforceable, systematically shape effort, transfers, and returns. Notably, prosocial agents generate higher total returns. Prosociality appears to mitigate rather than create efficiency losses, suggesting that discretion channels norm-sensitive loyalty rather than stakeholder redistribution.

We examine the effects of the big five personalities of CEOs (openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) on their annual compensation. We hand-collect the tweets of S&P 1500 CEOs and use IBM's Watson Personality Insights to measure their personalities. CEOs with high ratings of agreeableness and conscientiousness get more compensation. We further find that the firms with these CEOs outperform their peers due to better investment efficiency. Firms are willing to pay higher compensation for talent, especially for firms with better operations, located in states with higher labor unionization, or facing higher competition in the product market. Overall, CEO personality is a valid predictor of CEOs' compensation.

We examine the survival prospects, employment profiles, and patient outcomes at private equity (PE)-acquired hospitals. Target hospitals maintain their survival rates while significantly reducing employment and wage expenditures. The number of core medical workers drops temporarily, but returns to its pre-acquisition level in the long run. However, administrative job and wage cuts persist over the long term, particularly at previously nonprofit hospitals. Using proprietary insurance claims data, we find no significant changes in patient demographics or inpatient prices at PE-acquired hospitals. While patient satisfaction declines, there is no evidence of increased patient mortality or readmission rates at PE-acquired hospitals.

This paper examines the impact of complex yet precise language, particularly financial jargon, on information dissemination and ultimately market efficiency. As a natural laboratory, we analyze the information exchanged during earnings conference calls, where we instrument jargon with the Plain Writing Act of 2010. Our findings suggest that the Act‘s promotion of plain language usage results in a reduction in complex financial jargon for US firms. However, in contrast to the presumed benefits of accessible language, this reduction in jargon is associated with a decrease in market efficiency, implying that the Act may inadvertently hinder information flow. This finding is particularly important at the juncture where human-generated information is received by machines, which are known to be vunerable to ambiguous inputs.