Market Feedback Effect on CEO Pay: Evidence from Peers’ Say-on-Pay Voting Failures
Agnes Cheng, Iftekhar Hasan, Feng Tang, Jing Xie
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
We find that a firm’s stock price drops when its compensation peer firm announces a severe say-on-pay voting failure. This price drop causes a reduction in the focal firm CEO’s pay in the following period. The effect on CEO pay is stronger when the board of directors is more powerful, when the proxy advisor holds a negative view of the CEO’s pay, and when the hired compensation consultant is less reputable. Directors who cut their CEO’s pay following the price drop receive more voting support from investors than other directors. Our findings show that the peer firm’s voting failure induces a market-feedback effect for focal firm directors.
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Box 3.6.: Place-based industrial policies and credit markets: Evidence from the former East and West
Aleksandr Kazakov, Michael Koetter
EBRD Transition Report 2024-25,
December
2024
Abstract
The Transition Report 2024-25 focuses on industrial policies in the EBRD regions and beyond. Such policies have seen a resurgence, seeking to address market failures such as environmental degradation. However, their track record is mixed. Their growing popularity is shaped primarily by domestic political economy considerations and rising geopolitical tensions. While industrial policies are typically employed by higher-income economies, they are also now used more frequently in economies with less administrative and fiscal capacity to implement them.
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Media Response
Media Response May 2025 IWH: Es gibt keinen optimalen Mindestlohn in: Handelsblatt, 02.05.2025 April 2025 Reint Gropp: Tarif nur im Westen: Kampf um Lohngleichheit im KEB…
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Research Clusters
Three Research Clusters Research Cluster "Economic Dynamics and Stability" Research Questions This cluster focuses on empirical analyses of macroeconomic dynamics and stability.…
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Wage and Employment Effects of Insolvencies
Wage and employment effects of bankruptcies Although the consequences of bankruptcies for affected employees are frequently debated in the public (e.g. due to the bankruptcy of…
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Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department The seminar series "Brown Bag Seminar" was offered on a regular basis by members of the Financial Markets department and their…
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Projects
Our Projects 07.2022 ‐ 12.2026 Evaluation of the InvKG and the federal STARK programme On behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection, the IWH and the RWI…
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The Impact of Delay: Evidence from Formal out-of-Court Restructuring
Stjepan Srhoj, Dejan Kovač, Jacob N. Shapiro, Randall K. Filer
Journal of Corporate Finance,
February
2023
Abstract
Different types of bankruptcy restructuring procedures are used in most legal systems to decide the fate of businesses facing financial hardship. We study how bargaining failures in an under-researched type of restructuring procedure, a formal out-of-the court procedure impacts the economic performance of participating firms. Croatia introduced a “pre-bankruptcy settlement” (PBS) process in the wake of the Great Recession of 2007–2009. A novel dataset provides us with annual financial statements for both sides of more than 180,000 debtor–creditor pairs, enabling us to address selection into failed negotiations by matching a rich set of creditor and debtor characteristics. Failures to settle at the PBS stage due to idiosyncratic bargaining problems, which effectively delay entry into the standard bankruptcy procedure, lead to a lower rate of survival among debtors as well as reduced employment, revenue, and profits. We are the first study to track how bargaining failures diffuse through the network of creditors, finding a significant negative effect on small creditors, but not others. Our results highlight the impact of delay and the importance of structuring bankruptcy procedures, to rapidly resolve uncertainty about firms’ future prospects.
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The Effect of Bank Failures on Small Business Loans and Income Inequality
Salvador Contreras, Amit Ghosh, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
January
2023
Abstract
Using variation in the timing and location of branches of failed banks we analyze its effect on income inequality. Employing a difference-in-differences specification we find that bank failures increased the GINI by 0.3 units (or 0.7%). We show that the rise in inequality is due to a decrease in the incomes of the poor that outpaces declines of the rest. We further show that individuals with lower levels of education exhibit a relatively greater decline in real wages and weekly hours worked. Exploring channels of transmission, we find income inequality is explained by a general decline in small business loans. This in turn reduces net new small business formation and their job creation capacity, a sector that hires a substantial share of low-income earners.
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Commitment or Constraint? The Effect of Loan Covenants on Merger and Acquisition Activity
Gene Ambrocio, Gonul Colak, Iftekhar Hasan
Finance Research Letters,
June
2022
Abstract
We investigate how loan covenants associated with potential target firms affect takeover deals. We propose two possible channels. Under a discipline channel, the target firm becomes an attractive candidate for takeovers and merger deals are facilitated. Under a constraint channel, covenants hinder merger activity. We find support for the latter channel. Takeover likelihood is lower, deal failures are more common, the likelihood of price renegotiation is higher, and acquisition premium is lower when the target is bound by covenants. Covenant tightness exacerbates this effect.
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