How does immigration affect support for redistribution? While most research focuses on overall tax and spending levels, we investigate how immigration influences preferences conditional on tax structures. Using two original survey experiments in the UK, we find that low- and middle-income respondents are more likely to support redistribution to immigrants under progressive systems shielding them from fiscal costs, but oppose redistribution when immigrants are identified as beneficiaries and the tax structure increases their fiscal burden. In contrast, high-income respondents' preferences are largely unaffected by either tax structure or immigrant inclusion. These findings suggest that progressive taxation (1) is a viable revenue-generating strategy without provoking major political backlash; (2) reduces native resistance to immigrant welfare inclusion; (3) helps explain puzzling variation in immigration's effects on welfare attitudes; and (4) clarifies why low- and middle-income groups sometimes reject generous welfare programs despite standing to benefit. Our results highlight the importance of institutional design in shaping how economic self-interest and immigration concerns interact.

We document a global reallocation of pollutive assets as a response to investor pressure: large firms facing increased investor pressure divest foreign-located pollutive assets to firms that are less in the limelight. There is no evidence of increased engagement in any other emission reduction activities. We estimate that 369 million metric tons (mt) of CO2e are reallocated via divestments in the post-Paris Agreement period. Our results indicate that investor pressure to decarbonize reshapes the global conglomerate structure of large firms.

The previous literature finds a positive effect of institutional (relative to other investors’) ownership on firms’ innovation output . We study the impact of increases in the concentration of institutional investors’ ownership on firms’ decisions to invest in innovation and their innovation output. By reducing short-term earnings pressure, concentrated institutional investors’ ownership increases managers’ incentives to invest in R&D. However, it decreases firms’ acquisitions of external innovation due to empire-building and dilution concerns. Overall, firms’ future patents and citations decrease. Our results indicate that the previously found positive effect of institutional investors on innovation declines as the ownership of these investors becomes more concentrated. Despite that, we find that blockholder institutional ownership increases firm value. Hence, large institutional investors take measures to preserve the value of their ownership interests, even if they result in reduced innovation.