We study how individuals' perceptions of current and future levels of income inequality change during periods of expansionary fiscal policy. In a randomized controlled trial (RCT), we provide information on fiscal expansion to a representative sample of the German population. Our findings reveal that combining a fact-based (numerical) information treatment with a narrative treatment about fiscal expansion plans reduces inequality expectations among respondents who are ex-ante dissatisfied with the government's economic policy. These effects are more pronounced among respondents without a college degree or with low political interest, highlighting the importance of narrative information for individuals who are likely to benefit most from it. We explore potential mechanisms by examining revisions in macro- and micro-level assessments of future economic conditions and find that respondents primarily update their expectations regarding economic growth and individual layoff risk.

We study how individuals’ views on current and future levels of income inequality change during periods of expansionary fiscal policy. In a randomized controlled trial (RCT), we provide information on fiscal expansion to a representative sample of the German population. Our findings reveal that combining a fact-based (numerical) information treatment with a narrative treatment about fiscal expansion plans reduces inequality expectations among respondents who are ex-ante dissatisfied with the government’s economic policy. These effects are more pronounced among respondents without a college degree or with low political interest, highlighting the importance of narrative information for individuals who are likely to benefit most from it. We explore potential mechanisms by examining revisions in macro- and micro-level assessments of future economic conditions and find that respondents primarily update their expectations regarding economic growth and individual layoff risk.

Based on the Competing Values Framework (CVF), we score 10-K text to measure company culture in four types (collaborative, controlling, competitive, and creative) and examine its role in firm stability. We find that firms with higher controlling culture fared significantly better during the 2008–09 crisis. Firms with stronger controlling culture experienced fewer layoffs, less negative asset growth, greater debt issuance, and increased access to credit-line facilities during the crisis. The positive effect of the controlling culture is stronger among the financially-constrained firms. Overall, the controlling culture improves firm stability through greater support from capital providers.

Die Insolvenzzahlen sind trotz Corona-Krise stark gesunken. Aufgrund zahlreicher Großinsolvenzen wie etwa von Esprit, Hallhuber oder Wirecard war das Jahr 2020 bezogen auf die Zahl der betroffenen Beschäftigten trotzdem ein schwieriges Jahr. Eine Insolvenzwelle mit vielen gefährdeten Jobs ab Sommer 2021 ist aufgrund staatlicher Unterstützungsmaßnahmen und abwartendem Verhalten der Unternehmen eher unwahrscheinlich. Soweit es die Pandemielage zulässt, sollten Stützungsmaßnahmen bereits im Jahr 2021 auf den Prüfstand, um eine „Zombifizierung“ der Wirtschaft zu verhindern.

Productivity developments have been rather divergent across EU countries and particularly between Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and elsewhere in the continent (non-CEE). How is such phenomenon related to wage bargaining institutions? Starting from the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) shock, we analyse whether the specific set-up of wage bargaining prevailing in non-CEE may have helped their respective firms to sustain productivity in the aftermath of the crisis. To tackle the issue, we merge the CompNet dataset – of firm-level based productivity indicators – with the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey on wage bargaining institutions. We show that there is a substantial difference in the institutional set-up between the two above groups of countries. First, in CEE countries the bulk of the wage bargaining (some 60%) takes place outside collective bargaining schemes. Second, when a collective bargaining system is adopted in CEE countries, it is prevalently in the form of firm-level bargaining (i. e. the strongest form of decentralisation), while in non-CEE countries is mostly subject to multi-level bargaining (i. e. an intermediate regime, only moderately decentralised). On productivity impacts, we show that firms’ TFP in the non-CEE region appears to have benefitted from the chosen form of decentralisation, while no such effects are detectable in CEE countries. On the channels of transmission, we show that decentralisation in non-CEE countries is also negatively correlated with dismissals and with unit labour costs, suggesting that such collective bargaining structure may have helped to better match workers with firms’ needs.

We conduct a field experiment to study how worker productivity is affected if employers act adversely towards their co-workers. Our employees work for two shifts in a call centre. In our main treatment, we lay off some workers before the second shift. Compared to two control treatments, we find that the lay-off reduces the productivity of unaffected workers by 12%. We find suggestive evidence that this result is not driven by altered beliefs about the job or the management’s competence, but caused by the workers’ perception of unfair employer behaviour. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a prediction experiment with professional HR managers. Our results suggest that the price for adverse employer behaviour goes well beyond the potential tit for tat of directly affected workers.