We show an equivalence result in the representative-agent New-Keynesian model after demand, wage-markup and correlated price-markup and TFP shocks: assuming sticky prices and flexible wages yields identical allocations for GDP, consumption, labor, inflation and interest rates to the opposite case—flexible prices and sticky wages. This equivalence arises with identical price and wage Phillips-curve slopes and generalizes to any slopes' pair whose sum and product are identical. Equilibrium profits and wages are, however, substantially different; equivalence breaks when these factor-distributional implications matter for aggregate allocations, e.g. in New-Keynesian models with heterogeneous agents, endogenous firm entry, and non-constant returns to scale.

Vietnam, a low middle-income economy, grapples with considerable climate impacts, primarily driven by heat waves, sea level rise, and tropical cyclones. Under ongoing global warming, these extreme weather events are projected to further intensify. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model to study economic transition dynamics from 2015 to 2100, accounting for heat-induced labor productivity losses, agricultural land loss from sea level rise, and residential property damage from tropical cyclones. We compare a Paris-compatible strong mitigation scenario where global warming is limited to well below 2 °C above preindustrial levels to a strong emission scenario where warming reaches 4–5 °C. We find that the impacts of climate change on output and investment are highly uncertain, with differences between the two emission scenarios remaining statistically insignificant until the end of the century, despite substantially higher climate forcing in the latter. By contrast, consumption losses are significantly larger under the high emission scenario. These negative impacts are primarily driven by heat-induced labor productivity losses, while TCs are the main source of uncertainty. Our findings highlight the need for analytical frameworks to capture the different channels through which climate and climate change affect economic development, rather than focusing mainly on output-related damage, as done in many existing studies.

This paper provides theory and evidence on micro-level pricing behavior needed to model an aggregate New Keynesian Phillips Curve. We start with individual firms that are heterogeneous in their production technology and in the demand curves they face. We estimate the parameters of supply and demand curves by utilizing prices and quantities of outputs and factor inputs of firms along with exogenous downstream demand instruments from global input-output and trade data. The research addresses model heterogeneity using a clustering method to classify firms according to their production technology and observed price pass-through. The results show that more productive firms exhibit a lower price response to changes in demand. We find that the aggregate price response to demand shocks will be smaller when more productive firms absorb a larger portion of demand shocks, which generally is the case. At the same time, our results imply that idiosyncratic shifts in demand to clusters of firms with more rapidly rising marginal cost curves, or cost shocks to clusters of firms with high pass-through, will result in a higher aggregate price response. Finally, this paper provides a framework to incorporate heterogeneous pricing behavior into an estimate of the slope of the aggregate Phillips Curve.

We revisit the employer size wage effect (ESWE) – arguably the most basic and influential departure from the law of one price for labor. Our main result is that this canonical fact disappears completely across establishments within the same firm, even though they operate in different local labor markets. We uncover and dissect this fact by including a firm fixed effect in otherwise standard cross-sectional regressions of wages on establishment size. We implement this demanding specification in population-wide triple-linked firm-establishment-employee data in Germany. This result is new in the ESWE literature (for which our paper also provides the first systematic meta-analysis). This wage-size decoupling is hard to square with the view that employment is determined along a finitely elastic employerspecific labor supply curve – i.e., employers pay exactly the minimum needed for the quantity of labor, but no more – the foundation of the monopsony view. By contrast, large multi-establishment firms (MEF) appear to hire off their labor supply curves (or those curves are very elastic), pay wage premia above the monopsonistic minimum, and leave excess labor supply. We find some evidence for a reemergence of the ESWE within low-premium MEFs. Overall, at least for the 25% of German employment in large firms for which the ESWE disappears, wage setting and employment determination may be better accounted for by alternative models, namely accommodating above-market-clearing wage premia and rationing of labor supply, such as efficiency wage theories.

We study how idiosyncratic income risk shapes the aggregate and distributional effects of labor and capital income taxation in dynamic general equilibrium models. To this end, we compare a heterogeneous-agent (HA) model with uninsurable idiosyncratic labor productivity risk and a ten-representative-agent (TE) model in which households correspond to fixed wealth deciles without such risk. At the aggregate level, both models generate qualitatively similar responses; however, the HA model exhibits a smaller recessionary impact driven by precautionary savings behavior, which stabilizes investment. At the distributional level, the models differ sharply. In the HA framework, tax shocks trigger endogenous mobility across wealth deciles. These inter-decile transition dynamics tend to benefit lower deciles. In contrast, the TA model features fixed household positions. Our findings highlight that while simpler multi-representative-agent models can approximate aggregate dynamics well, they may miss important distributional adjustment channels. The relevance of these mechanisms ultimately depends on the empirical importance of mobility across the wealth distribution, pointing to a key trade-off between model simplicity and accuracy.

This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing. Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.

Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.

We study how deposit competition affects a bank's decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as a source of competition, we find a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize mortgage loans. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in deposit costs and corresponding reductions in banks' deposit holdings. Our results are strongest among banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight a hitherto undocumented and unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate-to-distribute model.

Der Klimawandel wirkt sich zunehmend auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in aller Welt aus. Ärmere Haushalte sind dabei den Auswirkungen des Klimawandels stärker ausgesetzt und verletzlicher, sodass der Klimawandel die Ungleichheit wahrscheinlich noch verstärken wird. Politische Maßnahmen zur Verringerung der Treibhausgasemissionen können eine Verschärfung des Klimawandels verhindern, schaffen aber auch ökonomische Gewinner und Verlierer. In diesem Beitrag werden die kombinierten Auswirkungen des Klimawandels und ausgewählter politischer Maßnahmen zur Verringerung der Treibhausgasemissionen auf die wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit untersucht. Die Bewertung erfolgt anhand von acht Modellen für die integrierte Analyse von Klimawandel und wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung, die von verschiedenen Forscherteams unter Verwendung unterschiedlicher Annahmen und Methoden entwickelt wurden. Die Ergebnisse basieren auf historischen Daten und Zukunftsszenarien für zehn Länder in unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsstadien. Die Umsetzung einer ehrgeizigen Klimapolitik im Einklang mit dem Pariser Abkommen führt demnach zu einer geringeren Ungleichheit in der Zukunft als der Verzicht auf Maßnahmen zur Milderung des Klimawandels, auch wenn die Ungleichheit aufgrund der Kosten für die Reduzierung der Treibhausgasemissionen kurzfristig zunimmt. Die Verwendung der Einnahmen aus der Kohlenstoffbepreisung kann dazu beitragen, die Verteilungseffekte der Klimapolitik zu dämpfen und die Ungleichheit kurzfristig sogar zu verringern. Diese Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Rolle von Ausgleichsmechanismen bei der Gestaltung einer fairen und politisch durchsetzbaren Klimapolitik.

The three articles in this special issue on “Monopsonistic Labour Markets” provide novel insights on how to model the reasons for employers’ monopsony power, how to measure it, and how much of it materialises in lower wages. We are confident that the studies published in this issue will be of high interest to specialists and a broader audience of economists alike. They definitely deserve a wide readership, and our not unwarranted hope is that they will provide new impulses to those partaking in the monopsony literature.