How does immigration affect support for redistribution? While most research focuses on overall tax and spending levels, we investigate how immigration influences preferences conditional on tax structures. Using two original survey experiments in the UK, we find that low- and middle-income respondents are more likely to support redistribution to immigrants under progressive systems shielding them from fiscal costs, but oppose redistribution when immigrants are identified as beneficiaries and the tax structure increases their fiscal burden. In contrast, high-income respondents' preferences are largely unaffected by either tax structure or immigrant inclusion. These findings suggest that progressive taxation (1) is a viable revenue-generating strategy without provoking major political backlash; (2) reduces native resistance to immigrant welfare inclusion; (3) helps explain puzzling variation in immigration's effects on welfare attitudes; and (4) clarifies why low- and middle-income groups sometimes reject generous welfare programs despite standing to benefit. Our results highlight the importance of institutional design in shaping how economic self-interest and immigration concerns interact.

Exploiting the executive compensation reform for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China that enforce strict pay restrictions, this study examines whether and how pay restrictions affect firms’ labor investment inefficiency. We find that SOEs experience a decrease in abnormal labor investment following the reform relative to non-SOEs, particularly in over-investment in labor. Our results show that the reform is associated with lower labor investment inefficiency through strengthened internal governance and mitigated internal social comparison. In addition, pay restrictions specifically curb firms’ tendency to over-hire. Further analysis reveals that imposing pay restrictions on executives enhances labor quality and also promotes employee well-being. This study offers novel policy insights by showing how pay restrictions to SOE executives can reduce vertical agency costs and investment inefficiency and enhance workforce quality and well-being in weak institutional environments.

We study how and why local biodiversity affects residential property values. Leveraging remotely sensed greenness indicators and a novel dataset of granular property listings, we examine how changes in vegetation load on real estate prices. Hikes in greenness are associated with higher listing prices, fewer properties listed, and reduced liquidity in housing markets. These results suggest that price hikes in housing markets are driven by supply-side constraints instead of a “greenium” that buyers might be willing to pay due to innate preferences. Exogenous zoning shocks to foster biodiversity corroborate the presence of supply side constraints as price drivers in residential housing markets. Our findings emphasize the need to calibrate biodiversity and (social) housing policy objectives more explicitly.

We investigate whether a change in political leadership affects health outcomes. To do so, we exploit turnover elections that move partisan individuals into and out of alignment with the party of the President. We document that the lack of political alignment has a negative, immediate, and long-lasting effect on health. We do not find any evidence that our results can be explained by other confounding trends or by changes in economic outcomes or other economic policies. Further results suggest that political sentiments and social isolation are important potential mechanisms in this setting and that lack of political representation affects the mental health of individuals.

Climate policy design must balance emissions mitigation with concerns for fairness, particularly as climate change disproportionately affects the poorest households within and across countries. Integrated Assessment Models used for global climate policy evaluation have so far typically not considered inequality effects within countries. To fill this gap, we develop a global Integrated Assessment Model representing national economies and subnational income, mitigation cost, and climate damage distribution and assess a range of climate policy schemes with varying levels of effort sharing across countries and households. The schemes are consistent with limiting temperature increases to 2 °C and account for the possibility to use carbon tax revenues to address distributional effects within and between countries. We find that carbon taxation with redistribution improves global welfare and reduces inequality, with the most substantial gains achieved under uniform taxation paired with global per capita transfers. A Loss and Damage mechanism offers significant welfare improvements in vulnerable countries while requiring only a modest share of global carbon revenues in the medium term. The poorest households within all countries may benefit from the transfer scheme, in particular when some redistribution is made at the country level. Our findings underscore the potential for climate policy to advance both environmental and social goals, provided revenue recycling mechanisms are effectively implemented. In particular, they demonstrate the feasibility of a welfare improving global climate policy involving limited international redistribution.

Research using historical data from Northern Ireland indicates that house prices are higher in more diverse neighbourhoods. Housing policy should focus on regenerating neighbourhoods, improving public services and fostering social integration.