Zehn Jahre nach der Lehman-Pleite werden die Finanzmärkte besser kontrolliert denn je. Das kann böse Folgen haben.

We use mortgage loan application data of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to shed light on the role of banks’ market power on their presumably insufficient risk screening activities in the U.S. mortgage market in the pre-crisis era. We find that banks with higher market power protect their charter value. The effect is stronger for banks that have more information about local markets.

Finding the proper balance between state and market is challenging. Especially in banking (Stiglitz, 1993). Banks in their function as financial intermediaries are risky and inherently prone to failure (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond, 1984). But they provide services of vital importance to the economy in the form of payment services, credit supply for investments, inter-temporal liquidity transformation, or management of savings accounts. Consequently, the stability of the banking and financial sector is of public interest. In the least, the financial crisis was an unpleasant reminder to the industrialized world about the severe repercussions of unstable banking systems.

Since the global financial crisis, economic literature has highlighted banks’ inclination to bolster up their liquid asset positions once the aggregate interbank funding market experiences a dry-up. To this regard, we show that liquidity hoarding and its detrimental effects on credit can also be triggered by idiosyncratic, i.e. bankspecific, interbank funding shocks with implications for monetary policy. Combining a unique data set of the Brazilian banking sector with a novel identification strategy enables us to overcome previous limitations for studying this phenomenon as a bankspecific event. This strategy further helps us to analyse how disruptions in the bank headquarters’ interbank market can lead to liquidity and lending adjustments at the regional bank branch level. From the perspective of the policy maker, understanding this market-to-market spillover effect is important as local bank branch markets are characterised by market concentration and relationship lending.

The adverse macroeconomic consequences of the Great Recession in 2009 spread well beyond the United States, highlighting the importance of financial stability and the housing market for real economic activity. Moreover, the vicious bank-sovereign cycle and the resulting sovereign-debt crisis of 2010-2012 posed a big threat to the survival of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as a whole. While there is widespread consensus about the underlying causes of these crises, policy makers are still debating about what can be done to prevent future crises and, especially in the Euro area, deeply disagree on the direction of reforms. After all, most regulatory measures face not only the trade-off between financial resilience versus efficiency but also the fundamental choice between rule or discretion based interventions (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018).

The BCBS discussion paper on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures addresses a so far hardly touched topic as concerns capital regulation. While the regulatory framework has been changed substantially over recent years including the establishment of the European Banking Union, risk weights on sovereign exposures have remained mostly unchanged and sovereign exposures of banks benefit from a favourable capital treatment. This applies despite the fact that the recent European sovereign debt crisis has revealed the potential of a doom loop between bank and sovereign risk and demonstrated that sovereign exposures are by no means “risk-free”. The paper is thus an important proposal how to change the risk evaluation of banks’ sovereign exposures.

In this paper, we investigate to what extent sovereign stress and banking stress have contributed to the increase in the level and in the heterogeneity of nonfinancial firms’ refinancing costs in the Euro area during the European debt crisis and how they did affect the monetary transmission mechanism. We identify the increasing effect of government bond yield spreads (sovereign stress) and the share of non-performing loans (banking stress) on firms’ financing costs using an instrumental-variable approach. Moreover, we estimate both sources of stress to have significantly impaired the monetary transmission mechanism during the European debt crisis.

This paper examines the effects of bank alliance network on bonds issued by European banks during the period 1990–2009. We construct six measures capturing different dimensions of banks’ network characteristics. In opposition to the results obtained for non-financial firms, our findings indicate that being part of a network does not create value for bank’s bondholders, indicating a dark side effect of strategic alliances in the banking sector. While being part of a network is perceived as a risk-increasing event by market participants, this negative perception is significantly lower for the larger banks, and, to a lesser extent, for the more profitable banks. Moreover, during crisis times, the positive impact on bond spread of a bank’s higher centrality or of a bank’s higher connectedness in the network is stronger, indicating that market participants may fear spillover effects within the network during periods of banks’ heightened financial fragility.

Seit der globalen Finanzkrise 2007/2008 liegt aufgrund ihrer Schlüsselrolle für ein funktionierendes Finanzsystem ein besonderer Fokus auf den so genannten systemrelevanten Finanzinstitutionen (systemically important financial institutions, SIFIs). Neben der Größe von Finanzinstitutionen ist auch das Ausmaß ihrer Vernetzung im internationalen Finanzsystem entscheidend für die Klassifikation als systemrelevant. Obwohl die Vernetzung von Banken untereinander in der Regel schwer zu messen ist, kann sie aus der Entwicklung von Prämien von Kreditausfallversicherungen (den so genannten Credit Default Swap (CDS) Spreads) und Aktienrenditen abgeleitet werden. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit sich mit Hilfe der sich daraus ergebenden Co-Crash-Probability vor der Finanzkrise vorhersagen lässt, welche Finanzinstitutionen während der Krise Teil von staatlichen Rettungsprogrammen (bailout programmes) wurden.