Im Frühsommer 2017 ist die konjunkturelle Dynamik in der Welt recht kräftig. Wichtige Rahmenbedingungen für die Weltwirtschaft dürften günstig bleiben: Die Zinsen werden weiterhin fast überall niedrig sein, und das im Allgemeinen ruhige Preisklima deutet darauf hin, dass von der Angebotsseite insgesamt bislang kaum Spannungen ausgehen.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich bereits seit Frühjahr 2013 in einem langgezogenen Aufschwung; sie wird im Sommerhalbjahr wohl weiter deutlich expandieren. Die Binnennachfrage und wegen der günstigen Arbeitsmarktlage insbesondere der private Konsum dürften kräftig bleiben. Die privaten Haushalte werden bei anhaltend günstigen Finanzierungsbedingungen auch ihre Bauaktivitäten weiter ausweiten, ebenso die Gebietskörperschaften, zumal die Steuereinnahmen hoch sind. Die Zuwachsrate des Bruttoinlandsprodukts ist allerdings wegen der geringeren Zahl an Arbeitstagen in diesem Jahr mit 1,6% niedriger als im Jahr 2016. Im kommenden Jahr dürfte der Zuwachs 1,8% betragen. Mit jeweils 1,7% in diesem und im nächsten Jahr fällt der Anstieg der Verbraucherpreise moderat aus, aber deutlich stärker als in den drei Jahren zuvor. Die Arbeitslosigkeit nimmt zunächst weiter ab. Die öffentlichen Haushalte erzielen weiterhin deutliche Überschüsse, auch in konjunkturbereinigter Rechnung. Die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft dürfte im Jahr 2017 wie bereits im Jahr zuvor um zwei Zehntel Prozentpunkte stärker zulegen als in Deutschland insgesamt.

Risiken für die deutsche Wirtschaft resultieren vor allem aus den globalen wirtschaftspolitischen Rahmenbedingungen.

This paper argues that outward direct investment (ODI) is replacing international trade as the new way China integrates into the world. Based on two complementary datasets, we document the pattern of Chinese ODI. We argue that the rapid growth of China’s ODI is the result of strong economic development, increasing domestic constraints, and supportive government policies. Compared with trade integration, investment integration involves China more deeply in global business. As a new global investor, China’s ODI in the future is full of opportunities, risks, and challenges. The Chinese government should improve bureaucracy coordination and participate more in designing and maintaining international rules to protect ODI interests.

Global economic activity appears to be expanding rapidly during spring 2017. Confidence among managers is either strong or has improved in all major regions, and world trade and industrial production have, after two years of weakness, picked up markedly during last winter. For 2 ½ years, the euro area economy has now been constantly expanding at an annual rate of about 1.6%, slightly above potential. Employment has also been expanding steadily. Production and employment have been recently rising almost everywhere, including countries such as France and Italy where unemployment rates still do not appear to be on a downward trend. Official investment data for 2015 and 2016 appear to be distorted: big multinational firms relocated parts of their assets (intellectual property products in particular) or their registered business offices from countries outside the euro area to Ireland. As a consequence, reported gross fixed capital formation in Ireland expanded by 33% in 2015 and by 45% in 2016. Without this effect, investment growth in the euro area is about one percentage point lower in 2015 and 2016. Headline inflation hit 2% in February, but this was only the effect of higher world oil prices. The core rate is stubbornly at slightly below 1%, and wages rise annually by scarcely 1.5%. The revival of the economy will have to continue for considerably more time until inflation will come close to the ECB target zone. As monetary conditions continue to support growth, financial policies will be slightly expansive, and a certain external stimulus should come from the apparent recovery of world trade. Overall, we forecast euro area GDP to expand by 1.7% in both 2017 and 2018. However, policy uncertainty is substantial and could have a negative effect. In particular, elections in member states might give power to movements that aim at disintegrating Europe. Such a turn could rapidly undermine confidence, in particular in the financial strength of highly indebted member states.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist in recht guter Verfassung. So hält der Beschäftigungsaufbau an, und der private Konsum legt aufgrund steigender Realeinkommen robust zu. Die Ausrüstungsinvestitionen werden allerdings weiterhin nur verhalten ausgeweitet. Insgesamt expandiert die Nachfrage in etwa so schnell wie das Produktionspotenzial, und die Auslastung ist normal. Im Jahr 2017 dürfte die Zuwachsrate des Bruttoinlandsprodukts mit 1,3% nicht aufgrund einer schwächeren Konjunktur, sondern vor allem wegen einer geringeren Anzahl an Arbeitstagen niedriger als im Vorjahr ausfallen.

We analyze the inward and outward transmission of regulatory changes through German banks’ (international) loan portfolio. Overall, our results provide evidence for international spillovers of prudential instruments. These spillovers are, however, quite heterogeneous between types of banks and can only be observed for some instruments. For instance, domestic affiliates of foreign-owned global banks reduce their loan growth to the German economy in response to a tightening of sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements, and loan-to-value ratios in their home country. Furthermore, from the point of view of foreign countries, tightening reserve requirements is effective in reducing lending inflows from German banks. Finally, we find that business and financial cycles matter for lending decisions.

Global economic activity has revived since autumn, and equity markets have rallied at the end of the year. Apparently, some of the measures proposed during the US election campaign by the president elect, such as financial market deregulation, economic stimulus, tax cuts and infrastructure are expected to support the economy in the US and beyond. However, this stimulus bears considerable risks already for the near future: other economies could face considerable problems due to a further appreciation of the dollar, rising financing costs and the withdrawal of capital towards the US. In the euro area, as monetary policy continues its expansive course, financing costs will stay very low in 2017, and fiscal policy will be mildly expansive, although a bit less so than in 2016. Confidence of firms and private households has strengthened in recent months, as has the mood on financial markets. We expect that the recovery will continue at about the pace of 2016. GDP will, according to our forecast, increase by 1.6% in 2017 and by 1.7% in 2018. However, the crisis in the Italian banking sector has intensified. It might also trigger another crisis of confidence in European institutional arrangements: according to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, banks may only be saved with public money if owners and creditors of these banks have contributed to the rescue. At present it seems doubtful whether it would be politically feasible to respect this rule. Regarding inflation, our forecast for 2017 is 1.2%. Although energy prices have risen significantly, price pressures are still low.

Die deutsche Konjunktur bleibt aufgrund der starken Binnennachfrage recht kräftig. Im Jahr 2017 wird die Zuwachsrate des Bruttoinlandsprodukts nach der neuen IWH-Prognose 1,3% betragen. Sie fällt damit etwa einen halben Prozentpunkt geringer aus als im Jahr 2016, dies liegt an einer geringeren Anzahl an Arbeitstagen und an einem negativen Wachstumsbeitrag des Außenhandels. Die Verbraucherpreisinflation bleibt mit 1,3% mäßig. Die Arbeitslosigkeit nimmt wohl etwas zu, dazu trägt bei, dass die Integration Geflüchteter in den Arbeitsmarkt langwierig ist.

Das wirtschaftspolitische Programm des künftigen US-Präsidenten Donald Trump ist schemenhaft und widersprüchlich. Zwei Punkte stechen bis jetzt heraus: Protektionismus und eine expansive Fiskalpolitik. Protektionismus würde einen langsameren Wachstumspfad für die US-amerikanische Wirtschaft implizieren, eine expansive Fiskalpolitik mit Steuersenkungen und einer starken Erhöhung der Infrastrukturausgaben würde, allerdings nur kurzfristig, das Gegenteil bedeuten.

This paper investigates a perception in the political debates as to what extent poor countries are affected by price movements in the global commodity markets. To test this perception, we use the case of India to establish in a standard SVAR model that global food prices influence aggregate prices and food prices in India. To further analyze these empirical results, we specify a small open economy New-Keynesian model including oil and food prices and estimate it using observed data over the period 1996Q2 to 2013Q2 by applying Bayesian estimation techniques. The results suggest that a big part of the variation in inflation in India is due to cost-push shocks and, mainly during the years 2008 and 2010, also to global food price shocks, after having controlled for exogenous rainfall shocks. We conclude that the inflationary supply shocks (cost-push, oil price, domestic food price and global food price shocks) are important contributors to inflation in India. Since the monetary authority responds to these supply shocks with a higher interest rate which tends to slow growth, this raises concerns about how such output losses can be prevented by reducing exposure to commodity price shocks.