Among the central tenets of globalization is the free migration of labor. Although much has been written about the benefits of globalization, little is known about its limitations and how antiglobalist sentiment can be strongly affected by high levels of immigration. Analyzing poll data from a group of EU countries affected by the recent migrant crisis, we find that over the last three years the percentage of right-wing (RW) populist voters in a given country depends on the prevalence of immigrants in this country’s population and the total immigration inflow into the entire EU. The latter is likely due to the perception that the EU functions as a supranational state in which a lack of inner borders means that “someone else’s problem” can easily become “my problem.” We find that the increase in the percentage of RW voters substantially surpasses the percentage of immigration inflow, implying that if this process continues, ongoing democratic processes will cause RW populism to prevail and globalization to rapidly decrease. We locate tipping points between the fraction of immigrants and the rise of RW populism, and we model our empirical findings using a complex network framework in which the success of globalization rests on a balance between immigration and immigrant integration.

We show that the speed and type of corporate deleveraging depends on the interaction between corporate and financial sector health. Based on granular bank-firm data pertaining to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) from five stressed and two non-stressed euro area economies, we show that “zombie” firms generally continued to lever up during the 2010–2014 period. Whereas relationships with stressed banks reduce SME leverage on average, we also show that zombie firms that are tied to weak banks in euro area periphery countries increase their indebtedness even further. Sustainable economic recovery therefore requires both: deleveraging of banks and firms.

In response to the financial crisis of 2007/2008, policymakers implemented comprehensive changes concerning the regulation and supervision of banks. Many of those changes, including Basel III or the directives pertaining to the Single Rulebook in the European Union (EU), are agreed upon at the supranational level, which constitutes a key step towards harmonized regulation and supervision in an integrated European financial market. However, the success of these reforms depends on the uniform and timely implementation at the national level. Avoiding strategic delays to implement EU regulation into national laws should thus constitute a main target of the G20.

We investigate drivers of Euro area inflation dynamics using a panel of regional Phillips curves and identify long-run inflation expectations by exploiting the crosssectional dimension of the data. Our approach simultaneously allows for the inclusion of country-specific inflation and unemployment-gaps, as well as time-varying parameters. Our preferred panel specification outperforms various aggregate, uni- and multivariate unobserved component models in terms of forecast accuracy. We find that declining long-run trend inflation expectations and rising inflation persistence indicate an altered risk of inflation expectations de-anchoring. Lower trend inflation, and persistently negative unemployment-gaps, a slightly increasing Phillips curve slope and the downward pressure of low oil prices mainly explain the low inflation rate during the recent years.

In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.

Global economic activity appears to be expanding rapidly during spring 2017. Confidence among managers is either strong or has improved in all major regions, and world trade and industrial production have, after two years of weakness, picked up markedly during last winter. For 2 ½ years, the euro area economy has now been constantly expanding at an annual rate of about 1.6%, slightly above potential. Employment has also been expanding steadily. Production and employment have been recently rising almost everywhere, including countries such as France and Italy where unemployment rates still do not appear to be on a downward trend. Official investment data for 2015 and 2016 appear to be distorted: big multinational firms relocated parts of their assets (intellectual property products in particular) or their registered business offices from countries outside the euro area to Ireland. As a consequence, reported gross fixed capital formation in Ireland expanded by 33% in 2015 and by 45% in 2016. Without this effect, investment growth in the euro area is about one percentage point lower in 2015 and 2016. Headline inflation hit 2% in February, but this was only the effect of higher world oil prices. The core rate is stubbornly at slightly below 1%, and wages rise annually by scarcely 1.5%. The revival of the economy will have to continue for considerably more time until inflation will come close to the ECB target zone. As monetary conditions continue to support growth, financial policies will be slightly expansive, and a certain external stimulus should come from the apparent recovery of world trade. Overall, we forecast euro area GDP to expand by 1.7% in both 2017 and 2018. However, policy uncertainty is substantial and could have a negative effect. In particular, elections in member states might give power to movements that aim at disintegrating Europe. Such a turn could rapidly undermine confidence, in particular in the financial strength of highly indebted member states.

We analyze pricing differences between U.S. and European syndicated loans over the 1992–2014 period. We explicitly distinguish credit lines from term loans. For credit lines, U.S. borrowers pay significantly higher spreads, but lower fees, resulting in similar total costs of borrowing in both markets. Credit line usage is more cyclical in the United States, which provides a rationale for the pricing structure difference. For term loans, we analyze the channels of the cross-country loan price differential and document the importance of: the composition of term loan borrowers and the loan supply by institutional investors and foreign banks.

Das Unternehmen IDT Europe GmbH mit Sitz in Dresden, das bis Dezember 2015 als Zentrum Mikroelektronik Dresden (ZMDI AG) firmierte, kann ein Beispiel auch für andere Industrieunternehmen in Deutschland sein: Fokus auf Forschung, Entwicklung und Design – ohne eigene Fertigung. Die IDT Europe GmbH war als Forschungseinrichtung für die mikroelektronische Industrie der DDR gestartet und konnte nach der Herstellung der Deutschen Einheit als ein wichtiger Bestandteil der Halbleiterindustrie und -forschung in der Region Dresden erhalten werden. Das Unternehmen befand sich bis 1998 faktisch im Eigentum des Freistaates Sachsen. Ende 1998 erfolgte die Privatisierung. In den 2000er Jahren spezialisierte sich das ZMDI vor allem auf Halbleiter-Erzeugnisse für energieeffiziente Lösungen insbesondere in Automobilen, der Medizintechnik, Industrieautomatisierung und Konsumelektronik. Im Jahr 2007 wurde die eigene Halbleiterfertigung aufgegeben, und es erfolgte eine Konzentration auf Forschung und Entwicklung. Das ZMDI profilierte sich als ein mittelständisches Headquarter-Unternehmen mit Sitz in Dresden. Im Dezember 2015 wurde die ZMDI AG vom US-Halbleiter-Unternehmen Integrated Device Technology, Inc. (IDT) erworben, bildet im neuen Unternehmensverbund das Exzellenzzentrum für Halbleiteranwendungen in Automobilen und entwickelt auch Produkte für industrielle Anwendungen und die Konsumelektronik.

Am 17. Juni 2015 nahmen die Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina und das Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) die 25. Jahrestage des Mauerfalls, der Einführung der Wirtschafts-, Währungs- und Sozialunion sowie der Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands zum Anlass für eine Podiumsdiskussion. In dieser Diskussion ging es nicht nur um die Retrospektive. Vielmehr wurde die deutsche Entwicklung in einen europäischen Kontext gesetzt. Vor 25 Jahren wurden Schlüsselentscheidungen für eine international wettbewerbsfähige ostdeutsche Wirtschaft getroffen. Ein Vierteljahrhundert später stellen sich Fragen, wie die damaligen wirtschaftspolitischen Entscheidungen zum Umbau der ostdeutschen Wirtschaft im Lichte der heutigen Situation mit einer sichtbaren Re-Industrialisierung, aber auch mit fortbestehenden strukturellen Defiziten zu bewerten sind, welche Lehren andere europäische Länder und Regionen daraus ziehen können, wenn es um die Stärkung der internationalen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der dortigen Ökonomien geht, und vor welchen künftigen Herausforderungen Wirtschaft und Politik in Ostdeutschland stehen, um auf den sich wandelnden internationalen Märkten noch besser Fuß zu fassen? Persönlichkeiten, die in den frühen 1990er Jahren in verantwortlichen Positionen die Weichen für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Ostdeutschlands stellten, diese Entwicklung durch strukturpolitische Unterstützungsmaßnahmen begleiteten oder heute Verantwortung in Wirtschaft und Politik beim ‚Aufbau Ost‘ tragen, gingen diesen Fragestellungen auf dem Podium nach. Die vorliegende Publikation dokumentiert die Eröffnungsreden, das Grußwort und die Redebeiträge der Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer an der Podiumsdiskussion.