In this paper, I study the consequences of globalisation, as measured by the involvement of firms in GVC, on the business environment. In particular, I focus on concentration and productivity, firstly by estimating robust elasticities and then isolating the exogenous component of the variation in the participation in GVC. To this aim, I exploit the distance between industries in terms of upstreamness and downstreamness along the supply chain. The evidences suggest that involvement in international supply chains is positively related to concentration at the sector level and positively associated with aggregate productivity, an effect that is driven by the firms at the top of the productivity distribution. Finally, I relate these findings to the current pandemic, going beyond the lack of official statistics and estimating GVC participation for 2020 at the country-level through real time world-seaborne trade data, providing evidences on the re-absorption of the Covid shock in several European economies.

By adopting an identification strategy of difference‐in‐difference estimation combined with propensity score matching between liberalized and closed countries, this paper provides robust evidence that opening the capital account is associated with an increase in income inequality in developing countries. Specifically, capital account liberalization, in the long run, is associated with a reduction in the income share of the poorest half by 2.66–3.79% points and an increase in that of the richest 10% by 5.19–8.76% points. Moreover, directions and categories of capital account liberalization matter. The relationship is more pronounced when liberalizing inward and equity capital flows.

Climate change projections show that the average global temperature will very likely increase further. Policymakers need to implement suitable mitigation policy measures. This thesis uses dynamic general equilibrium models (DGEs) to analyse the potential economic effects of mitigation policy. Chapter 2 documents the forecasting performance of standardly estimated macroeconomic models and compare them to extended versions. It turns out that neither alternative expectation formation behaviour nor financial frictions can systematically increase the forecasting performance of macroeconomic models. Chapter 3 studies potential economic consequences of a coal phase-out in Germany, using a spatial dynamic general equilibrium model. A phase-out until 2035 is not worse in terms of welfare compared to a coal exit until 2040. Chapter 4 develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with risky capital and oil as production factors. The contribution of financial market frictions and oil market disturbances to the US business cycle are low. An oil tax increase, to reduce crude oil consumption by 10% can cause a contraction of GDP by 1 to 2%.

In Deutschland wurden Anfang März in einigen Bereichen Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung des Coronavirus gelockert; so wurde die Anzahl der Personen aus verschiedenen Haushalten, die sich treffen dürfen, vielerorts erhöht und Einzelhandelsgeschäfte können vermehrt wieder Kunden empfangen. Auf diese Weise kommt es zu einem gewollten Wiederanstieg der wirtschaftlichen Mobilität und der persönlichen Kontakte zwischen Menschen. Die Kontakthäufigkeit ist allerdings auch ein wesentlicher Einflussfaktor für die Ausbreitungsgeschwindigkeit des Coronavirus, zumal die Lockerungen bislang nicht mit einer systematischen Teststrategie einhergehen; und auch der Impffortschritt bleibt hinter den Erwartungen zurück. Schätzungen auf Basis eines Modells für den Zusammenhang zwischen Eindämmungsmaßnahmen (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, Stringency Index), wirtschaftlicher Mobilität (Google Mobility Data), Corona-Neuinfektionen und Todesfällen mit Daten aus 44 Ländern deuten darauf hin, dass die jüngsten Lockerungen die wirtschaftliche Mobilität um mehr als zehn Prozentpunkte ansteigen lassen und die Zahl der Neuinfektionen und der Todesfälle in Deutschland um 25% erhöhen. Da sowohl ein fortgesetzter Lockdown als auch Lockerungen erhebliche negative Konsequenzen mit sich bringen, ist es umso wichtiger, durch eine bessere Test- und Quarantänestrategie und durch eine höhere Geschwindigkeit beim Impfen weitere Lockerungen zu ermöglichen, ohne damit die Gesundheit der Menschen zu gefährden.

This paper uses loan application-level data from a peer-to-peer lending platform to study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. By employing a direct ex-ante measure of risk-taking and estimating the simultaneous equations of loan approval and loan amount, we provide evidence of monetary policy's impact on a nonbank financial institution's risk-taking. We find that the search-for-yield is the main driving force of the risk-taking effect, while we do not observe consistent findings of risk-shifting from the liquidity change. Monetary policy easing is associated with a higher probability of granting loans to risky borrowers and greater riskiness of credit allocation. However, these changes do not necessarily relate to a larger loan amount on average.

Savings rates among European households have reached record levels during the Corona recession. We investigate three possible explanations for the increase in household savings: precautionary motivations induced by increased economic uncertainty, reduced consumption opportunities due to lockdown measures, and Ricardian Equivalence, i.e. increases in the expected future tax-burden of households driven by increases in government debt. To test these explanations, we compile a monthly panel of euro area countries from January 2019 to August 2020. Our findings indicate that the chief driver of the increase in household savings is supply: As governments restrict households’ opportunities to spend, households spend less. We estimate that going from no lockdown measures to that of Italy’s in March, would have resulted in the growth of Germany’s deposit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio being 0.6 percentage points higher each month. This would be equivalent to the volume of deposits increasing by roughly 14.3 billion euros or 348 euros per house monthly. Demand effects, driven by either fears of unemployment or fear of infection from COVID-19, appear to only have a weak impact on household savings, whereas changes in government debt are unrelated or even negatively related to savings rates. The analysis suggests that there is some pent-up demand for consumption that may unravel after lockdown measures are abolished and may result in a significant increase in consumption in the late spring/early summer 2021.

Can a model with limited labor market insurance explain standard macro and labor market data jointly? We construct a monetary model in which: i) the unemployed are worse off than the employed, i.e. unemployment is involuntary and ii) the labor force participation rate varies with the business cycle. To illustrate key features of our model, we start with the simplest possible framework. We then integrate the model into a medium-sized DSGE model and show that the resulting model does as well as existing models at accounting for the response of standard macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks and two technology shocks. In addition, the model does well at accounting for the response of the labor force and unemployment rate to these three shocks.