Die Weltwirtschaft verliert zum Ende des Jahres 2023 weiter an Schwung. Der durch den weltweiten Inflationsschub ausgelöste restriktive Schwenk der Geldpolitik drückt über höhere Finanzierungskosten vielerorts die Güternachfrage. Im nächsten Jahr dürfte die Weltwirtschaft wieder etwas anziehen. Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist nach Ende der Pandemie nicht wieder auf ihren alten Wachstumspfad zurückgekehrt. Das Verarbeitenden Gewerbe hat an Wettbewerbsfähigkeit eingebüßt, und die Weltnachfrage nach Industriegütern ist zurzeit schwach. Zudem ist die Inflation immer noch hoch, und die Realeinkommen sind längere Zeit über zurückgegangen. Die geldpolitische Straffung hat die Finanzierungsbedingungen verschlechtert, was besonders die Bauwirtschaft belastet. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird 2023 wohl um 0,3% sinken und im kommenden Jahr um 0,5% expandieren.

Using data from the European Central Bank's Survey of Professional Forecasters and ECB/Eurosystem staff projections, we analyze the role of ex-ante conditioning variables for macroeconomic forecasts. In particular, we test to which extent the updating and ex-post performance of predictions for inflation, real GDP growth and unemployment are related to beliefs about future oil prices, exchange rates, interest rates and wage growth. While oil price and exchange rate predictions are updated more frequently than macroeconomic forecasts, the opposite is true for interest rate and wage growth expectations. Beliefs about future inflation are closely associated with oil price expectations, whereas expected interest rates are related to predictions of output growth and unemployment. Exchange rate predictions also matter for macroeconomic forecasts, albeit less so than the other variables. With regard to forecast errors, wage growth and GDP growth closely comove, but only during the period when interest rates are at the effective zero lower bound.

Competition in the U.S. appears to have declined. One contributing factor may have been heterogeneity in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. I examine the impact of product market peer credit constraints on long-run competitive outcomes and behavior among non-financial firms. I use measures of lender exposure to the financial crisis to create a plausibly exogenous instrument for product market credit availability. I find that credit constraints of product market peers positively predict growth in sales, market share, profitability, and markups. This is consistent with the notion that firms gained at the expense of their credit constrained peers. The relationship is robust to accounting for other sources of inter-firm spillovers, namely credit access of technology network and supply chain peers. Further, I find evidence of strategic investment, i.e. the idea that firms increase investment in response to peer credit constraints to commit to deter entry mobility. This behavior may explain why temporary heterogeneity in the availability of credit appears to have resulted in a persistent redistribution of output across firms.

Die Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose prognostiziert für das Jahr 2023 einen Rückgang des Bruttoinlandsprodukts in Deutschland um 0,6 %. Damit wird die Prognose vom Frühjahr 2023 kräftig um 0,9 Prozentpunkte nach unten revidiert. Der wichtigste Grund dafür ist, dass sich die Industrie und der Konsum langsamer erholen als im Frühjahr erwartet wurde.

We study the firm-level and aggregate effects of government-imposed employment targets. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous productivity growth in which penalties for below-target hiring generate a polarization mechanism: low-productivity firms exit, while others expand employment beyond efficient levels, and firms invest in productivity to avoid future penalties. We test and confirm the model’s firm level predictions using unique contractual data on more than 18,000 employment commitments from the East German privatization, exploiting quasi-random variation in the assignment of privatizers to firms. Quantitatively, employment targets reduce unemployment in the short run, but these gains reverse over time as distorted labor allocations and weakened investment incentives slow aggregate productivity growth and reduce welfare. We also evaluate how alternative designs for employment-protection (e.g., the choice between mandates and subsidies, the structure of targets) impact misallocation and the resulting short- and long-run outcomes.