Are financial markets efficient? One proposition that seems to contradict this is Shiller’s finding of excess volatility in asset prices and its resulting rejection of the discounted cash flow model. This paper replicates Shiller’s approach for a different data set and extends his analysis by testing for a long-run relationship by means of a cointegration analysis. Contrary to previous studies, monthly data for an integrated European stock market is being used, with special attention to equity style investment strategies. On the basis of this analysis’ results, Shiller’s findings seem questionable. While a long-run relationship between prices and dividends can be observed for all equity styles, a certain degree, but to a much smaller extent than in Shiller’s approach, of excess volatility cannot be rejected. But it seems that a further relaxation of Shiller’s assumptions would completely eliminate the finding of an overly strong reaction of prices to changes in dividends. Two interesting side results are, that all three investment styles seem to have equal performance when adjusting for risk, which by itself is an indication for efficiency and that market participants seem to use current dividend payments from one company as an indication for future dividend payments by other firms. Overall the results of this paper lead to the conclusion that efficiency cannot be rejected for an integrated European equity market.

The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.

Produktivitäts- und Effizienzanalysen gewinnen – vor allem unter dem Stichwort benchmarking – in akademischer Forschung, unternehmerischer Praxis und nicht zuletzt aktueller Wirtschaftspolitik zunehmend an Einfluß. So bildet beispielsweise der Effizienzvergleich deutscher Energieversorgungsunternehmen im jüngst vorgestellten Entwurf zur Anreizregulierung der Bundesnetzagentur ein zentrales Element der nationalen Energieregulierung. Aber auch in anderen Disziplinen der Wirtschaftswissenschaften haben diese Analysen Einzug gehalten. Das IWH hat daher gemeinsam mit dem Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa (IAMO) einen Workshop zu den Themen Effizienz- und Produktivitätsanalysen, den “1st Halle Efficiency and Productivity Analysis Workshop – HEPAW” veranstaltet. Ziel des Workshops war die Diskussion aktueller theoretischer und empirischer Forschungsergebnisse der Produktivitäts- und Effizienzmessung aus den Disziplinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, Agrarökonomik, Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Operations Research und verwandten Gebiete.

Die bislang bestehenden Förderkonzepte zur Gründung einer selbständigen Existenz aus der Arbeitslosigkeit – das Überbrückungsgeld und der Existenzgründungszuschuß – sollen zum 1. August 2006 zu einem einheitlichen Förderkonzept „Gründungszuschuß“ zusammengefaßt werden. Neben einer verbesserten Transparenz in den Förderinstrumenten erwartet die Regierung hiervon eine zielgerichtetere Förderung mit einer höheren Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit und nicht unerhebliche Einsparungen bei den Fördermitteln. Der Beitrag überprüft auf der Grundlage der bisher veröffentlichten Informationen über das neue Förderkonzept, ob mit den erwarteten Einsparungen zu rechnen ist und welche beschäftigungspolitischen Signale hiervon ausgehen können. Die Ergebnisse einer Überschlagsrechnung zeigen, daß es voraussichtlich nicht zu den erhofften Einsparungen kommen wird, wenn nicht die Zahl der geförderten Personen deutlich abgesenkt wird. Als eindeutige „Gewinner“ der Neuregelung gelten die Empfänger von Überbrückungsgeld; für die vorherigen Ich-AGs ergeben sich keine nennenswerten Einspareffekte pro geförderte Person. Somit stellt sich die Frage, ob dieser Effekt aus arbeitsmarktpolitischen Überlegungen heraus gewünscht ist.

The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.

In the course of railway reforms in the end of the last century, national European governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies – companies owning a network and providing transport services – argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realise economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology. Our findings are that in a majority of European Railway companies exist economies of scope.

The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia. Based on a model by HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees to act in favour of the company by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an innovation

(before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is

that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere.

Wir messen die Effizienz der regionalen Innovationssysteme (RIS) in Deutschland anhand einer Wissensproduktionsfunktion. Diese Funktion stellt einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Anzahl der von den Einwohnern einer Region angemeldeten Patente und der Anzahl der FuE-Beschäftigten im Privatsektor in der Region. Zwei alternative Methoden zur empirischen Berechnung der Wissensproduktionsfunktion werden vorgestellt. In einem ersten Ansatz nehmen wir an, dass sich Unterschiede der Produktivität der FuE-Beschäftigten in der Steigung der Wissensproduktionsfunktion und somit in der Grenzproduktivität der FuE-Aktivitäten niederschlagen. Ein zweiter Ansatz bestimmte die Durchschnittsproduktivität der FuE-Beschäftigten mittels einer stochastischen Frontier-Wissensproduktionsfunktion. Wir vergleichen die Resultate beider Ansätze und diskutieren kritische Fragen hinsichtlich der Verteilungscharakteristika der technischen Effizienz von Regionen, der adäquaten Größe regionaler Innovationssysteme sowie der Präsenz und der Effekte räumlicher Interdependenzen zwischen den Regionen (räumlicher Autokorrelation).