Previous studies report a robust positive relationship between cash endowments and asset prices in experimental asset markets. Higher cash endowments generally increase the proportion of riskless versus risky wealth at the individual and aggregate level as well as the capacity of market participants to seize investment opportunities, i.e., their transactional liquidity. In this study, we vary the size and composition of riskless endowments in order to analyze the impact of different types of “cash” on trading behavior in experimental asset markets with randomly fluctuating fundamental values. In all treatments except the baseline, we allow subjects to control the liquidity of their cash endowment endogenously by providing some proportion of their riskless endowment in a physical store of value, which can be converted into experimental currency for trading. We observe that most subjects retain a large proportion of their wealth in the physical store of value. Inconsistent with rational choice theory, average trading prices and trading volumes are lower when “cash” is provided in a convertible store of value rather than experimental currency. Surprisingly, the price effect manifests asymmetrically on the buy side but not the sell side. Moreover, we control for potential changes in risk appetite resulting from higher riskless endowments. Our results suggest that transactional liquidity not a risky demand shift drives the relationship between cash endowments and asset prices.

We show that negative policy rates affect the supply of bank credit in a novel way. Banks are reluctant to pass on negative rates to depositors, which increases the funding cost of high-deposit banks, and reduces their net worth, relative to low-deposit banks. As a consequence, the introduction of negative policy rates by the European Central Bank in mid-2014 leads to more risk-taking and less lending by euro-area banks with a greater reliance on deposit funding. Our results suggest that negative rates are less accommodative and could pose a risk to financial stability, if lending is done by high-deposit banks.

We develop an ethical preference-based model that reproduces the average return and volatility spread between sin and non-sin stocks. Our investors do not necessarily boycott sin companies. Rather, they are open to invest in any company while trading off dividends against ethicalness. When dividends and ethicalness are complementary goods and investors are sufficiently risk averse, the model predicts that the dividend share of sin companies exhibits a positive relation with the future return and volatility spreads. An empirical analysis supports the model’s predictions. Taken together, our results point to the importance of ethical preferences for investors’ portfolio choices and asset prices.

We study the transmission channels from central banks’ quantitative easing programs via the banking sector when central banks start purchasing corporate bonds. We find evidence consistent with a “capital structure channel” of monetary policy. The announcement of central bank purchases reduces the bond yields of firms whose bonds are eligible for central bank purchases. These firms substitute bank term loans with bond debt, thereby relaxing banks’ lending constraints: banks with low tier-1 ratios and high nonperforming loans increase lending to private (and profitable) firms, which experience a growth in investment. The credit reallocation increases banks’ risk-taking in corporate credit.

This paper uses loan application-level data from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform to study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. By employing a direct ex-ante measure of risk-taking and estimating the simultaneous equations of loan approval and loan amount, we are the first to provide quantitative evidence of the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking of nonbank financial institution. We find that the search-for-yield is the main workhorse of the risk-taking effect, while we do not observe consistent findings of risk-shifting from the liquidity change. Monetary policy easing is associated with a higher probability of granting loans to risky borrowers and a greater riskiness of credit allocation, but these changes do not necessarily relate to a larger loan amount on average.

This paper uses loan application-level data from a peer-to-peer lending platform to study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. By employing a direct ex-ante measure of risk-taking and estimating the simultaneous equations of loan approval and loan amount, we are the first to provide quantitative evidence of the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking of nonbank financial institution. We find that the search-for-yield is the main workhorse of the risk-taking effect, while we do not observe consistent findings of risk-shifting from the liquidity change. Monetary policy easing is associated with a higher probability of granting loans to risky borrowers and a greater riskiness of credit allocation, but these changes do not necessarily relate to a larger loan amount on average.

Die Konjunktur in Deutschland hat sich seit Mitte des Jahres 2018 merklich abgekühlt. Der langjährige Aufschwung ist damit offenbar zu einem Ende gekommen. Die schwächere Dynamik wurde sowohl vom internationalen Umfeld als auch von branchenspezifischen Ereignissen ausgelöst. Die weltwirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen haben sich — auch aufgrund politischer Risiken — eingetrübt, und das Verarbeitende Gewerbe hat mit Produktionshemmnissen zu kämpfen. Die deutsche Wirtschaft durchläuft nunmehr eine Abkühlungsphase, in der die gesamtwirtschaftliche Überauslastung zurückgeht.

We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement.

Die Konjunktur in Deutschland hat sich seit Mitte des Jahres 2018 merklich abgekühlt. Der langjährige Aufschwung ist damit offenbar zu einem Ende gekommen. Die schwächere Dynamik wurde sowohl vom internationalen Umfeld als auch von branchenspezifischen Ereignissen ausgelöst. Die weltwirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen haben sich – auch aufgrund politischer Risiken – eingetrübt, und das Verarbeitende Gewerbe hat mit Produktionshemmnissen zu kämpfen. Die deutsche Wirtschaft durchläuft nunmehr eine Abkühlungsphase, in der die gesamtwirtschaftliche Überauslastung zurückgeht. Die Institute erwarten für das Jahr 2019 nur noch ein Wirtschaftswachstum von 0,8% und damit mehr als einen Prozentpunkt weniger als noch im Herbst 2018. Die Gefahr einer ausgeprägten Rezession mit negativen Veränderungsraten des Bruttoinlandsprodukts über mehrere Quartale halten die Institute jedoch bislang für gering, jedenfalls solange sich die politischen Risiken nicht weiter zuspitzen. Für das Jahr 2020 bestätigen die Institute ihre Prognose aus dem vergangenen Herbst: Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt dürfte im Jahr 2020 um 1,8% zunehmen.