We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.

The term structure of equity and its cyclicality are key to understand the risks drivingequilibrium asset prices. We propose a general equilibrium model that jointly  explainsfour important features of the term structure of equity: (i) a negative unconditionalterm premium, (ii) countercyclical term premia, (iii) procyclical equity yields, and (iv)premia to value and growth claims respectively increasing and decreasing with thehorizon. The economic mechanism hinges on the interaction between heteroskedasticlong-run growth — which helps price long-term cash flows and leads to countercyclicalrisk premia — and homoskedastic short-term shocks in the presence of limited marketparticipation — which produce sizeable risk premia to short-term cash flows. The slopedynamics hold irrespective of the sign of its unconditional average. We provide empirical support to our model assumptions and predictions.

This paper investigates the role of the fiscal and economic record of the incumbent government in shaping the price response of sovereign bonds and stocks to the election outcome in emerging markets and developed countries. For sovereign bonds in emerging markets, we find robust evidence for higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) if a government associated with a relatively low primary fiscal balance is voted out of office compared to elections where the fiscal balance was relatively high. This effect of the incumbent government's fiscal record is significantly more pronounced in the presence of high sovereign default risk and strong political veto players, whereas the quality of institutions does not explain differences in effects for different events. We do not find robust effects of the government's fiscal record for developed countries and stocks.

This paper examines the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives on corporate acquisition performance. Measuring tournament incentives as the compensation ratio between the CEO and other senior executives, we show that acquirers with greater tournament incentives experience lower announcement returns. Further analysis shows that the negative effect is driven by the risk-seeking behavior of senior executives induced by tournament incentives. Our results are robust to alternative identification strategies. Our evidence highlights that senior executives, in addition to the CEO, play an influential role in acquisition decisions.

Recent empirical research generally finds evidence of positive economic effects for works councils, for example with regard to productivity and – with some limitations – to profits. This makes it necessary to explain why employers’ associations have reservations about works councils. On the basis of an in-depth literature analysis, this article shows that beyond the generally positive findings, there are important heterogeneities in the impact of works councils. The authors argue that those groups of employers that tend to benefit little from employee participation in terms of productivity and profits may well be important enough to shape the agenda of their employers’ organization and have even gained in importance within their organizations in recent years. The authors also discuss the role of deviations from profit-maximizing behavior like risk aversion, short-term profit-maximization and other non-pecuniary motives, as possible reasons for employer resistance.

Die Transformation der Planwirtschaften Osteuropas in markwirtschaftliche Systeme, die Integration Ost- und Westeuropas und die deutsche Wiedervereinigung waren recht einmalige politische und gesellschaftliche Prozesse. Es gab keine „Evidenz“ aus früheren Zeiten, an denen sich die handelnden Akteure orientieren konnten. Zeigt dies die Grenzen evidenzbasierter Politik auf? Einer Politik, die Maßnahmen vorab evaluiert, deren Wirkungen beobachtet und aus diesen empirischen Beobachtungen systematisch Schlüsse für zukünftiges politisches Handeln zieht? In einem eng definierten Sinn evidenzbasierter Politik muss die Antwort auf diese Frage sicherlich „Ja“ lauten. Es gibt Grenzen evidenzbasierter Politik in Zeiten großer gesellschaftlicher Umwälzungen und wenn (wirtschafts-)politische Maßnahmen so weit aus dem Rahmen des bisher Bekannten heraustreten, dass Verhaltensmuster der Vergangenheit kaum Rückschlüsse auf zukünftiges Verhalten zulassen. In solchen Phasen sind alle sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen gefordert, politische Prozesse aus einem breiten Fundus an Wissen und Erfahrungen heraus zu begleiten. Empirisch messbare Effekte einzelner Maßnahmen sind in solchen Umbruchzeiten nicht verfügbar. So verstanden könnten Überlegungen zur Rolle evidenzbasierter Politik generell und speziell zur Frage, wie Finanzmärkte zur Transformation von wirtschaftlichen Systemen beitragen, schnell enden.