We ask if bank supervisors’ efforts to combat climate change affect banks’ lending and their borrowers’ transition to the carbon-neutral economy. Combining information from the French supervisory agency’s climate pilot exercise with borrowers’ emission data, we first show that banks that participate in the exercise increase lending to high-carbon emitters but simultaneously charge higher interest rates. Second, participating banks collect new information about climate risks, and boost lending for green purposes. Third, receiving credit from a participating bank facilitates borrowers’ efforts to improve environmental performance. Our findings establish a hitherto undocumented link between banking supervision and the transition to net-zero.

Kann die Bankenaufsicht den Übergang zu einer kohlenstoffneutralen Wirtschaft unterstützen, indem sie die Kreditvergabe der Banken an Unternehmen beeinflusst? Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Kreditvergabe der Banken vor und nach dem weltweit ersten Klimastresstest in Frankreich und die Reaktion der kreditnehmenden Unternehmen. Die dem Stresstest unterworfenen Banken geben kohlenstoffintensiven Unternehmen mehr Kredite. Zugleich verlangen sie ihnen aber höhere Zinssätze ab. Die kohlenstoffintensiven Kreditnehmer, deren Banken sich dem Klimastresstest unterzogen haben, verpflichten sich eher zu ehrgeizigen Emissionszielen und integrieren eher Umweltaspekte in die Bewertung von Investitionsprojekten. Jedoch reduzieren sie weder direkt ihre Kohlenstoffemissionen noch beenden sie Beziehungen zu klimaschädlichen Lieferanten. Die Studie belegt somit einen kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen Klimastresstests der Banken und der Verringerung des Transitionsrisikos der Kreditnehmer.

Banks play a crucial role in the transition to a low-carbon economy, but they also expose themselves to climate transition risk. This column shows that banks use corporate loan securitisation to shift climate transition risk to less-regulated shadow banking entities. This behaviour affects carbon premia in loan contracts. When banks can use securitisation to manage transition risk, their climate policies that target only activities reflected in their books may not be as effective as bank regulators hope for.

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.

The drastic banking reform within Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union provides an ideal quasi-experimental design to examine the causal effects of institutional development on accounting quality (AQ). We find that banking reform spurs significant improvement in predictive power of earnings and reductions in earnings smoothing, earnings-inflating discretionary provisions, and avoidance of reporting losses. These effects hold under alternative model specifications and after considering concurrent institutional developments. In contrast, corporate reform shows no such effects, refuting the alternative explanation that unobserved factors affect both reform speed in general and the quality of financial reporting. We further identify four specific reformative actions that are integral to the drastic banking reform process where prudential regulation contributes the most to the observed AQ improvement. It supports the conjecture that banking reform improves AQ by reducing banks' risk-taking behaviors and, as a result, their motive behind accounting manipulation.