We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms’ choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt financing. We utilize the passage of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R option-expensing regulation as an exogenous shock to management option compensation to account for potential endogeneity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the documented effect of vega is amplified among firms with higher growth opportunities and more opaque financial information; we also find vega's effect is mitigated in firms with limited abilities to tap into public debt market. Supplemental analyses suggest that firms with higher vega face more stringent bank loan covenants. We conclude that, by encouraging risk-taking, higher vega reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt financing in order to avoid more stringent bank monitoring.

The regulatory architecture of the financial system has significantly changed after the global financial crisis of 2008/09. In Europe, the introduction of the Single Rulebook has been a major change and provides the legal foundation for the European Banking Union (EBU). The Single Rulebook consists of a regulation, the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), and three main directives targeting capital regulation and compensation of managers, harmonization of deposit insurance schemes, as well as resolution and restructuring rules (Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD), Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)).

A safe and healthy banking system is a central pillar of financial stability and even political stability. Systemic banking crises lead to political instability and extremism while the same cannot be said of macroeconomic downturns unrelated to banking crises (see e.g. Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2016). Several factors have been identified as potential culprits for the recent financial crisis, among them insufficient bank liquidity, insufficient bank capitalization, risk-taking incentives induced by compensation struc- tures, and moral hazard emanating from government safety nets. My dissertation aims to enhance our understanding of two of these factors: capitalization and compensation, or put differently, (equity) capital and human capital.

We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a nonlinear compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the main activities that loan officers perform: loan prospecting, screening, and monitoring. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonuses, they increase prospecting and monitoring. We further show that loan officers adjust their behavior more toward the end of the month when bonus payments are approaching. These effects are more pronounced for loan officers with longer tenures at the bank.

This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms whose centrality in the network rises after the reform experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date and are better hedged against shocks. Information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. Firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, hence more susceptible to upstream shocks, when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, or when they have low profitability or low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher directors' compensation, due to rent sharing and improved executives' outside option, and more similar compensation policies between connected firms.

Using data on US public firms, I uncover a strong and positive correlation between executive compensationand labor expenses. On average, a 1% increase in the wage bill translates into a 0.3% raise in total executivepay. This association is driven by wages rather than by employment growth, is stronger for the incentive thanfor the salary component of executive compensation, and is particularly pronounced in the financial sector.

• Signs of a slowing world economy are piling up: Since the beginning of the year purchasing manager indices have been declining globally, in summer higher US interest rates led investors to withdraw capital from emerging markets, and as a consequence, capital costs rose and currencies depreciated in many emerging markets economies. In October stock prices decreased markedly worldwide including the US, despite the strong upswing in this country. • As a consequence of the turmoil on financial markets, monetary conditions in many emerging economies are no longer favorable. What ultimately counts for the prospects of the global economy, is, however, the performance of the US, the Euro area, China and Japan. The upswing in the US appears stable enough to continue well into 2019. While at present the rest of the group appears to lose momentum, there is a good chance that production in each of these economies will still expand at rates that are close to their potential growth. Further protectionist rounds are the most important risk to this scenario. • In the first half of the current year the euro area economy expanded at a markedly slower rate than in 2017, about 0.4% per quarter, but still substantial. Rising risk premia on Italian assets will probably force banks in this large country to tighten credit conditions, and a slowing world trade will dent export growth. All in all, we expect GDP growth in the euro area to go down from 2.4% in 2017 to 2.0% in 2018 and to 1.7% in 2019. • Employment continues to expand and vacancy rates are at present higher than in 2017. As a consequence, wages rise more quickly: nominal compensations per employee started accelerating early in 2017, and negotiated wages followed at the beginning of 2018. Wage inflation of slightly below 2.5% and healthy growth in employment raise real labor incomes markedly. • Our forecasts are based on the assumption that rating agencies will continue as-signing investment grade to the Italian government debt, and that the Italian government and the European Commission will find a compromise about the draft budget of the country in the coming weeks. Another assumption is that the UK will not exit the EU in an unorderly way in March 2019.

We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast majority of non-CEO executives and those at well performing banks. We fail to find evidence that banks with executives that are more affected by the bonus cap became less risky. In fact, numerous results indicate an increase of risk, even in its systemic dimension according to selected measures. The return component of bank performance appears to be unaffected by the bonus cap. Risk hikes are consistent with an insurance effect associated with raised the increase in fixed compensation of executives. The ability of the policy to enhance financial stability is therefore doubtful.

German Fiscal Federalism is characterized by a high degree of fiscal equalization which lowers the efficiency of local tax administration. Currently, a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme is on the political agenda. One option is to grant federal states the right to raise surtaxes on statutory tax rates set by the central government in order to reduce the equalization rate. In such an environment, especially those federal states with lower economic performance would have to raise comparatively high surtaxes. With capital mobility, this could further lower economic performance and thus tax revenues. Although statutory tax rates are so far identical across German federal states, corporate tax burden differs for several reasons. This paper tries to identify the impact of such differences on firm location. As can be shown, effective corporate taxation did seemingly not have a significant impact on firm location across German federal states.

In zahlreichen europäischen Städten gibt es Versuche, der lokalen Wirtschaftsentwicklung eine neue Richtung zu geben, u.a. durch die Ansiedlung von Nicht-Kommunalen Öffentlichen Einrichtungen (NKOE), z.B. Bundesagenturen, Gerichte, Rechnungshöfe, Landesmuseen oder Universitäten. Allerdings liegen die Kompetenzen für solche NKOE nicht bei den Kommunen, sondern zumeist bei den höheren staatlichen Ebenen. Deshalb haben die Kommunen keinen unmittelbaren Einfluss auf die Ansiedlung von NKOE. Sobald aber eine entsprechende Entscheidung gefallen ist, können die Kommunen die weitere Entwicklung von NKOE begünstigen. Im Beitrag wird zunächst eine Kategorisierung von NKOE durchgeführt, und zwar sowohl gemäß der Bedeutung von NKOE für die lokale Wirtschaftsentwicklung als auch hinsichtlich des Einflusses lokaler Maßnahmen auf die Leistungsfähigkeit von NKOE. Es wird gezeigt, dass Universitäten zu jener Kategorie von NKOE zählen, für die eine Koordination der eigenen Aktivitäten mit jenen der Kommunen besonders wichtig sein dürfte. Die Effekte von Universitäten für die lokale Wirtschaftsentwicklung wurden bereits vielfach diskutiert. Die Fähigkeit der Universitäten, das für ihre Effektivität erforderliche Humankapital zu attrahieren, hängt von verschiedenen lokalen Faktoren ab. Folglich gibt es eine reziproke Beziehung zwischen Kommunen und Universitäten. Eine Koordinierung der jeweiligen Aktivitäten wäre deshalb für beide Seiten von Vorteil. Dies gilt z.B. für den Bereich der Informationspolitik. Eine Kommune sollte nach innen wie nach außen die Vorzüge der örtlichen Universitäten kommunizieren; umgekehrt sollte auch eine Universität die Stärken des lokalen Umfelds deutlich machen. Da für den Bereich der Informationspolitik empirische Daten leicht zugänglich sind, konzentriert sich der empirische Teil des Beitrags auf eine empirische Untersuchung der Internetpräsentationen ausgewählter Städte und Universitäten. Es zeigt sich, dass in den meisten betrachteten Städten die Koordinierung zwischen Kommunen und Universitäten zu wünschen übrig lässt. Eine Verbesserung dieser Situation ließe sich z.B. durch die Einführung

finanzieller Anreizmechanismen erreichen.