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09.06.2016 • 22/2016

The German Economy Benefits from Strong Domestic Demand

In 2016, the moderate upswing of the German economy continues. Incomes grow due to the steady expansion in employment, and the fall in energy prices has propped up the purchasing power of private households. As a consequence, private consumption expands healthily; investment in housing is additionally stimulated by very low interest rates. Exports, however, expand only moderately, as the world economy is rather weak. All in all, the IWH forecasts the German GDP to expand by 1.8% in this year and by 1.6% in 2017.

Oliver Holtemöller
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Identifying the Effects of Place-based Policies – Causal Evidence from Germany

Matthias Brachert, Eva Dettmann, Mirko Titze
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 18, 2016
Abstract
The German government provides discretionary investment grants to structurally weak regions to reduce regional disparities. We use a regression discontinuity design that exploits an exogenous discrete jump in the probability of receiving investment grants to identify the causal effects of the investment grant on regional outcomes. We find positive effects for regional gross value-added and productivity growth, but no effects for employment and gross wage growth.
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EFN Report Winter 2015/16: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2016 and 2017

EFN Reports, No. 1, 2016
Abstract
At present, growth in manufacturing and investment activity are weak, particularly in China but, to a lesser extent, in advanced economies as well. World activity in many service sectors, however, proves resilient. Worldwide demand is primarily backed by low interest rates and low prices for energy and commodities. However, the latter also cause serious risks for the stability of economies that are dependent on commodity export revenues. Since the sovereign debt crisis began to recede during 2013, fiscal policies have become ever less restrictive in most member states of the currency union. In 2016, fiscal policy in the euro area will even become a bit expansive. However, we expect only a moderate acceleration of the recovery in the euro area, because foreign demand will not expand by much due to the weakness of emerging market economies, and internal demand will still be dragged down by high debt levels of firms and households in many member countries. In particular, according to our forecasts, the euro area GDP will grow by 1.8% in 2016 and 2017, and this will be accompanied by a decline in the unemployment rate below 10%. Our inflation forecast for 2016 is 1.1%. For 2017, we expect inflation to increase up to 1.5% as during next year the dampening effects of decreasing energy prices will slowly fade off.
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EFN Report Winter 2014/15: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2015 and 2016

EFN Reports, No. 1, 2015
Abstract
At the beginning of the year 2015 crude oil is, with little more than 50 dollars per barrel (Brent), about 50% cheaper than in the summer 2014. The oil price hike is a stimulus for the whole world economy, even though the gains of energy users are matched by losses of the suppliers: oil producing countries frequently run high current account surpluses vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It is therefore plausible to assume that, reacting to the redistribution of incomes, the oil user countries will increase their spending by more than what will be lost in spending by producers. Investment activity in the euro area has recently been particularly weak. Remarkably, investment in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, i.e. in countries that had to accept international support during the euro crisis, has strengthened. The setback took place in the so-called core countries, including Germany. Consumption growth was also subdued. Lower oil prices, by increasing real incomes of consumers and lowering production costs for firms, should increase private consumption and, in particular, investment. Moreover, the depreciation of the euro will favour exports. Overall, according to our forecasts, the euro area GDP will grow by 1.3% in 2015 and by 1.6% in 2016. GDP growth is about 0.3 percentage points higher due to the impact of lower oil prices in 2015. However, these forecasts are subject to substantial uncertainty, and we do not see any significant reduction of the unemployment rate during the forecasting horizon. Our inflation forecast for 2015 is 0.3%, with the possibility of a mild deflation not excluded. In 2016 inflation will increase up to 1.1%, still clearly below the 2% ECB’s target. This calls for further monetary expansion, though its effects could be limited in the absence of a complementary fiscal stimulus. The expansionary cyclical policies should be combined with more structural reforms to enhance the competitiveness of the euro area and its growth potential, which in our forecasts remains quite limited. In fact, we expect potential output to grow by only 0.4% both in 2015 and 2016.
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EFN Report Summer 2014: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2014 and 2015

, 2014
Abstract
World growth disappointed at the beginning of the year, when in the US extremely cold weather caused production to contract, the recovery in the euro area stumbled and the slowdown of the Chinese economy continued. At present, however, confidence indicators and order books point to a moderate pickup of growth in most regions. Prices on markets for energy, real and financial assets have reacted little to recent bad news about rising geopolitical risks in the Middle East and Eastern Europe up to now. A sudden increase of risk aversion or a change of believes among investors could trigger a swift deterioration of financial conditions for the world economy. In the euro area, strong stimuli from abroad are not to be expected and private households continue to keep their real spending about constant. Investment has been expanding since summer 2013, but at a very moderate rate. In this context, our forecast for GDP growth is 1.1% in 2014 and 1.6% in 2015. For 2014 and 2015, we do not see any significant reduction of the unemployment rate, because employment dynamics will stay weak due to subdued growth and the still rising participation rate in the euro area. Our inflation forecast for 2014 is 0.6%. In 2015 inflation will also remain subdued, at about 1.0%. In this context of very low price dynamics, monetary policy keeps the recovery alive: official interest rates around zero and the search for yields on financial markets have depressed yields for government bonds; the fall in financing costs allows euro area governments to conduct fiscal policies that are much less restrictive than in the years before, with tax cuts in Italy, France, and Spain starting this year. Nonfinancial firms benefit from a shrinking burden of interest payments, and the availability of bank loans for small and medium enterprises has improved since 2012 in most countries.
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Toward a Taylor Rule for Fiscal Policy

Martin Kliem, Alexander Kriwoluzky
Review of Economic Dynamics, No. 2, 2014
Abstract
In DSGE models, fiscal policy is typically described by simple rules in which tax rates respond to the level of output. We show that there is only weak empirical evidence in favor of such specifications in US data. Instead, the cyclical movements of labor and capital income tax rates are better described by a contemporaneous response to hours worked and investment, respectively. We show that conditioning on these variables is also desirable from a normative perspective as it significantly improves welfare relative to output-based rules.
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Social Capital and Migration Preferences - An Empirical Analysis for the Case of the Reunified Germany

Peter Bönisch, Lutz Schneider, Walter Hyll
Grincoh Working Papers July 2013, 2013
Abstract
We focus on the relevance of different types of social capital on migration intentions in the context of shrinking regions. On the one hand, formal social capital characterised by weak ties without local roots is supposed to drive selectivity and outmigration. On the other hand, informal social capital stressing strong ties to friends, relatives or neighbours might hinder migration. In our regression results we do not find an effect of shrinking regions on mobility intentions. Thus, living in a shrinking area is by itself not a reason to move away or to invest less in social capital. However, if an individual considers to move away she reduces her participation in informal and formal networks. Individuals characterised by strong informal ties, i.e. strong relationships to friends, relatives or neighbours show a significantly lower probability of moving away. And, more qualified types of social capital as participation in local politics or initiatives seem to encourage spatial mobility.
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EFN Report Winter 2011/12: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2012 and 2013

, 2011
Abstract
At the end of 2011, prospects for the world are clouded. The main cause for concern is that the euro area crisis of confidence has not reached its peak yet. It is doubtful whether Italian and Spanish debt service would be sustainable if yields stay at these levels for long. Even more critical are the financing conditions for European banks whose standing crucially depends on the valuation of the sovereign bonds they own. This uncertainty will continue inducing firms and households to postpone decisions on spending and investment, and fiscal policy will dampen demand further. Besides, financial conditions are also bound to deteriorate in most member countries. Moreover, weak demand from advanced economies is dampening the expansion in exportoriented emerging markets countries (in East-Asia, but also in Latin America). As a consequence, both our forecasts for the euro area exports and industrial production have been revised downwards.
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What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Funding

Claus Michelsen, Dominik Weiß
Post-Communist Economies, 2010
Abstract
The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.
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What Happened to the East German Housing Market? – A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Funding –

Claus Michelsen, Dominik Weiß
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 20, 2009
Abstract
The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.
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