We study the firm-level and aggregate effects of government-imposed employment targets. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous productivity growth in which penalties for below-target hiring generate a polarization mechanism: low-productivity firms exit, while others expand employment beyond efficient levels, and firms invest in productivity to avoid future penalties. We test and confirm the model’s firm level predictions using unique contractual data on more than 18,000 employment commitments from the East German privatization, exploiting quasi-random variation in the assignment of privatizers to firms. Quantitatively, employment targets reduce unemployment in the short run, but these gains reverse over time as distorted labor allocations and weakened investment incentives slow aggregate productivity growth and reduce welfare. We also evaluate how alternative designs for employment-protection (e.g., the choice between mandates and subsidies, the structure of targets) impact misallocation and the resulting short- and long-run outcomes.

Using data from China’s public debt markets, we study the value of corporate reputation and how it interacts with legal and cultural forces to assure accountability. Exploring lawsuits that change corporate reputation, we find that firms involved in lawsuits experience a decrease in bond values and a tightening of borrowing terms. Using the heterogeneities in legal and social capital environments across Chinese provinces, we find the effects are more pronounced for private firms, firms headquartered in provinces with low legal protections, and firms headquartered in provinces with high social capital. The results show that lawsuits that allege misconduct are associated with reputational penalties and that such penalties serve as substitutes for legal protections and as complements to cultural forces to provide ex post accountability and motivate ex ante trust.

In this study we investigate whether and to what extent social capital may affect regional innovation by focusing on private firms in the United States. We document that regional social capital is positively associated with the quantity, quality and novelty of county-level innovation by private firms. In addition, we find that the positive relation between social capital and regional innovation is more prominent in counties with a lower supply of financial capital. We also report that social capital is complementary to investments in research and development to produce inventive outcomes in local areas. Using a spatial Durbin model, we provide evidence that regional social capital has significant spillover effects in boosting the innovation activities of neighbouring counties.

In this article, I review the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of public and private equity markets on firm behavior, emphasizing the consequences that emerge from disclosure requirements, ownership concentration, and degree of firm standardization. While publicly listed firms benefit from a lower cost of capital, enabling increased focus on commercialization and profitability, they are less suited to pursue long-term risky investments. Privately held firms are better equipped to pursue innovative projects but face a higher cost of capital, which limits their growth. Complementarities between public and private equity markets can mitigate their respective limitations. Innovation in private equity markets supplements commercialization efforts of public firms, and demand for innovation by public firms accelerates entrepreneurial activity in private equity markets. I conclude by discussing directions for future research.