Secrecy, Information Shocks, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from European Union Countries
Mohamad Mazboudi, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money,
2018
Abstract
This study examines how national culture affects corporate investment. We argue that national culture affects corporate investment efficiency through the level of secrecy that national culture exhibits. Using a sample of firms from eight culturally-diverse European Union countries, we find that the level of secrecy that national culture exhibits is negatively related to corporate investment efficiency after controlling for a number of firm- and country-level factors. We also find that the negative relation between national culture and corporate investment efficiency is mitigated by an exogenous shock to the information asymmetry problem between managers and investors. Our study highlights the importance of the cultural value of secrecy/transparency as a determinant of investment efficiency at the firm-level.
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Central Bank Transparency and the Volatility of Exchange Rates
Stefan Eichler, Helge Littke
Abstract
We analyze the effect of monetary policy transparency on bilateral exchange rate volatility. We test the theoretical predictions of a stylized model using panel data for 62 currencies from 1998 to 2010. We find strong empirical evidence that an increase in the availability of information about monetary policy objectives decreases exchange rate volatility. Using interaction models, we find that this effect is more pronounced for countries with a lower flexibility of goods prices, a lower level of central bank conservatism, and a higher interest rate sensitivity of money demand.
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Meaningless Work Threatens Job Performance
Adrian Chadi, Sabrina Jeworrek, Vanessa Mertins
LSE Business Review,
2017
Abstract
Open, transparent communication across the organisation is generally associated with improved employee motivation and organisational outcomes. For supervisors, the question arises how to deal with rather inconvenient information, such as in the case of a project failure. Informing employees after significant investments of time and effort might lead to negative effects on subsequent work motivation, one could argue. To identify a causal relationship between the meaning of previously completed work and workers’ subsequent work performance, we exploited a natural working environment in which the loss of the job’s meaning occurred as a matter of fact. At the same time, it was possible to credibly guide only part of the workforce to believe in the sudden loss of meaning by conducting a controlled experiment.
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06.07.2017 • 28/2017
Politicians share responsibility for the risk of their state defaulting
Investors assume higher risks of default when a country is politically unstable or governed by a party at the left or right end of the political spectrum. However, according to findings obtained by Stefan Eichler from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), the more democratic the country is and the more it is integrated into the global economy, the lower is the impact that such political factors have.
Stefan Eichler
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Central Bank Transparency and Cross-border Banking
Stefan Eichler, Helge Littke, Lena Tonzer
Journal of International Money and Finance,
2017
Abstract
We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent and operates in a stable economic environment. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad.
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Enabling the Wisdom of the Crowd: Transparency in Peer-to-Peer Finance
Oliver Rehbein, Michael Koetter
G20 Insights Policy Brief, Policy Area "Financial Resilience",
2017
Abstract
The rapid growth exhibited by peer-to-peer finance markets raises hopes that especially young ventures might obtain better access to funding. Yet, consumer protection concerns are looming as borrowers and projects requesting finance from the crowd are inherently opaque. We suggest clear rules to enable peer-to-peer lenders and investors to more effectively screen projects. We plea for strengthening self-responsibility of the investor crowd by clearly assigning, and limiting the responsibilities of regulatory authorities and recognizing the regulatory difference between new peer-to-peer, and traditional financial markets. As a result the peer-to-peer market can develop to more effectively complement traditional sources of finance, instead of turning into a funding source for bad investment projects looking to exploit uninformed lenders and investors.
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09.03.2017 • 12/2017
Comment: Keep cool and be prepared – IWH president Gropp on the ECB’s interest rates decision
”The European Central Bank (ECB) decided to keep interest rates unchanged today. No surprise here. But Mario Draghi unfortunately did not provide a signal to markets that the ECB may be moving on interest rates in the foreseeable future. “This is a reasonable decision, but also a missed opportunity”, Reint E. Gropp, president of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association, says. “An ECB increase interest rate move must be well prepared, and today’s press conference would have been an opportunity to prepare markets for the fact that interest rates cannot stay where they are forever.”
Reint E. Gropp
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On the Nonexclusivity of Loan Contracts: An Empirical Investigation
Hans Degryse, Vasso Ioannidou, Erik von Schedvin
Management Science,
No. 12,
2016
Abstract
We study how a bank's willingness to lend to a previously exclusive firm changes once the firm obtains a loan from another bank ("outside loan") and breaks an exclusive relationship. Using a difference-in-difference analysis and a setting where outside loans are observable, we document that an outside loan triggers a decrease in the initial bank's willingness to lend to the firm, i.e., outside loans are strategic substitutes. Consistent with concerns about coordination problems and higher indebtedness, we find that this reaction is more pronounced the larger the outside loan and it is muted if the initial bank's existing and future loans retain seniority and are protected with valuable collateral. Our results give a benevolent role to transparency enabling banks to mitigate adverse effects from outside loans. The resulting substitute behavior may also act as a stabilizing force in credit markets limiting positive comovements between lenders, decreasing the possibility of credit freezes and financial crises.
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The Forward-looking Disclosures of Corporate Managers: Theory and Evidence
Reint E. Gropp, Rasa Karapandza, Julian Opferkuch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2016
Abstract
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project’s potential for success. We find that if the manager’s disclosures are costly, she will never release forward-looking statements that do not convey information to external investors. Furthermore, managers of firms that are transparent and face significant disclosure-related costs will refrain from forward-looking disclosures. In contrast, managers of opaque and profitable firms will follow a policy of accurate disclosures. To test our findings empirically, we devise an index that captures the quantity of forward-looking disclosures in public firms’ 10-K reports, and relate it to multiple firm characteristics. For opaque firms, our index is positively correlated with a firm’s profitability and financing needs. For transparent firms, there is only a weak relation between our index and firm fundamentals. Furthermore, the overall level of forward-looking disclosures declined significantly between 2001 and 2009, possibly as a result of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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Central Bank Transparency and Cross-border Banking
Stefan Eichler, Helge Littke, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad.
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