Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Theon van Dijk
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2013
Abstract
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
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Has the Euro Increased International Price Elasticities?
Oliver Holtemöller, Götz Zeddies
Empirica,
No. 1,
2013
Abstract
The introduction of the Euro has been accompanied by the hope that international competition between EMU member states would increase due to higher price transparency. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing price elasticities in international trade flows between Germany and France and between Germany and the United Kingdom before and after the introduction of the Euro. Using disaggregated Eurostat trade statistics, we adopt a heterogeneous dynamic panel framework for the estimation of price elasticities. We suggest a Kalman-filter approach to control for unobservable quality changes which otherwise would bias estimates of price elasticities. We divide the complete sample, which ranges from 1995 to 2008, into two sub-samples and show that price elasticities in trade between EMU members did not change substantially after the introduction of the Euro. Hence, we do not find evidence for an increase in international price competition resulting from EMU.
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Vertical Grants and Local Public Efficiency
Ivo Bischoff, Peter Bönisch, Peter Haug, Annette Illy
Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of vertical grants on local public sector efficiency. First, we develop a theoretical model in which the bureaucrat sets the tax price while voters choose the quantity of public services. In this model, grants reduce efficiency if voters do not misinterpret the amount of vertical grants the local bureaucrats receive. If voters suffer from fiscal illusion, i.e. overestimate the amount of grants, our model yields an ambiguous effect of grants on efficiency. Second, we use the model to launch a note of caution concerning the inference that can be drawn from the existing cross-sectional studies in this field: Taking into account vertical financial equalization systems that reduce differences in fiscal capacity, empirical studies based on cross-sectional data may yield a positive relationship between grants and efficiency even when the underlying causal effect is negative. Third, we perform an empirical analysis for the German state of Saxony-Anhalt, which has implemented such a fiscal equalization system. We find a positive relationship between grants and efficiency. Our analysis shows that a careful reassessment of existing empirical evidence with regard to this issue seems necessary.
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The Effects of Building Energy Codes in Rental Housing: The German Experience
Claus Michelsen, Sebastian Rosenschon
Economics Bulletin,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of building energy codes on housings' real energy consumption. We argue that building codes should have a twofold effect: lower levels of energy consumption after its implementation and decreasing energy requirements over time, because tighter building codes induce technical progress in the construction sector. We find evidence for both aspects. Based on a large and unique sample of energy certificates from Germany, this study is the first that deals with the empirical effects of energy efficiency standards in apartment/rental housing. Moreover, it is the first, which includes different stages of regulation.
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Efficiency in the UK Commercial Property Market: A Long-run Perspective
Steven Devaney, Oliver Holtemöller, R. Schulz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2012
Abstract
Informationally efficient prices are a necessary requirement for optimal resource allocation in the real estate market. Prices are informationally efficient if they reflect buildings’ benefit to marginal buyers, thereby taking account of all available information on future market development. Prices that do not reflect available information may lead to over- or undersupply if developers react to these inefficient prices. In this study, we examine the efficiency of the UK commercial property market and the interaction between prices, construction costs, and new supply. We collated a unique data set covering the years 1920 onwards, which we employ in our study. First, we assess if real estate prices were in accordance with present values, thereby testing for informational efficiency. By comparing prices and estimated present values, we can measure informational inefficiency. Second, we assess if developers reacted correctly to price signals. Development (or the lack thereof) should be triggered by deviations between present values and cost; if prices do not reflect present values, then they should have no impact on development decisions.
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Competitive Distortions of Bank Bailouts
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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Corporate Boards and Bank Loan Contracting
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Qiang Wu
Journal of Financial Research,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.
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Verordnet und gleich umgesetzt? Was die energetische Regulierung von Immobilien bisher tatsächlich gebracht hat - Ergebnisse auf Grundlage des ista-IWH-Energieeffizienzindex -
Claus Michelsen, Sebastian Rosenschon
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2012
Abstract
Der Beitrag untersucht den Effekt staatlich vorgegebener Obergrenzen des Energieverbrauches von Immobilien auf den tatsächlichen Energieverbrauch der Gebäude. Bauliche Richtlinien, so die These, wirken auf zweierlei Weise: Nach Inkrafttreten senken sie zunächst das Niveau des Energieverbrauches, dynamisch führen sie zu einem abnehmenden Energiebedarf, da sich unter dem Druck strengerer Energierichtlinien der technische Fortschritt im Bausektor beschleunigt. Für beide Aspekte finden sich empirische Belege. Basierend auf einem einzigartigen Datensatz deutscher Energiezertifikate befasst sich die vorliegende Untersuchung als erste empirisch mit den Wirkungen rechtlicher Regelungen zur Energieeffizienz und bezieht explizit verschiedene Regulierungsstufen ein. Im Ergebnis können beide Effekte nachgewiesen werden. Jüngere Gebäude weisen ausnahmslos geringere Energiekennwerte auf als ältere, was als fortlaufender technischer Fortschritt im Bausektor interpretiert wird. Der Niveaueffekt nach Einführung einer neuen Regulierung zeigt sich allerdings lediglich in einem Fall: der Fortschreibung der Wärmeschutzverordnung im Jahr 1995.
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Von „grünen Investitionen“ und „glühenden Landschaften“: Was sind die Treiber des Heizenergieverbrauchs in Mehrfamilienhäusern? – Ergebnisse auf Grundlage des ista-IWH-Energieeffizienzindex
Claus Michelsen, Timo Zumbro, Marius Claudy
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2012
Abstract
Investitionen in die Energieeffizienz von Mehrfamilienhäusern müssen sich langfristig für ihre Eigentümer lohnen. Dies ist die notwendige Voraussetzung für höhere Neubau- und Sanierungsaufwendungen, die gewünscht sind, um die von der Europäischen Union und der Bundesregierung aufgerufenen Klimaziele zu erreichen. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Determinanten der Kapitalintensität im Wohnungsbau, als Näherungsgröße für die hergestellte (energetische) Qualität, und daran anschließend die Frage, wie sich diese auf den durchschnittlichen regionalen Energieverbrauch auswirkt. Die Analyse bezieht sich dabei bewusst auf Mehrfamilienhäuser, Immobilien, die nicht nur den Charakter eines Konsumguts besitzen, sondern darüber hinaus weitgehend als Renditeobjekte unterhalten werden. Dies hat Implikationen für „grüne Investitionen“ zur Verbesserung der Energieeffizienz: Geringere Energiekosten kommen nicht unmittelbar dem Investor zugute – sein Gewinn liegt vielmehr in der Veränderung der erwarteten Kaltmiete, die – neben regionalen Unterschieden in ihrer absoluten Höhe – auch unterschiedlich stark mit Risiko behaftet sein kann. Untersucht wurden diese Zusammenhänge im Rahmen der Energieeffizienzdebatte bisher jedoch noch nicht. Tatsächlich zeigt die durchgeführte empirische Untersuchung, dass Investoren Standorte mit geringerem erwartetem Risiko sowie größeren Mieterträgen bevorzugen und dort entsprechend höhere Mittel für den Geschosswohnungsbau aufwenden.
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Evidence on the Effects of Inflation on Price Dispersion under Indexation
Juliane Scharff, S. Schreiber
Empirical Economics,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
Distortionary effects of inflation on relative prices are the main argument for inflation stabilization in macro models with sticky prices. Under indexation of non-optimized prices, those models imply a nonlinear and dynamic impact of inflation on the cross-sectional price dispersion (relative price or inflation variability, RPV). Using US sectoral price data, we estimate such a relationship between inflation and RPV, also taking into account the endogeneity of inflation by using two- and three-stage least-squares and GMM techniques, which turns out to be relevant. We find an effect of (expected) inflation on RPV, and our results indicate that average (“trend”) inflation is important for the RPV-inflation relationship. Lagged inflation matters for indexation in the CPI data, but is not important empirically in the PPI data.
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