Monetary Policy and the Transaction Role of Money in the US
Alexander Kriwoluzky, Christian A. Stoltenberg
Economic Journal,
No. 587,
2015
Abstract
The declining importance of money in transactions can explain the well-known fact that US interest rate policy was passive in the pre-Volcker period and active after 1982. We generalise a standard cashless new Keynesian model (Woodford, 2003) by incorporating an explicit transaction role for money. In the pre-Volcker period, we estimate that money did play an important role and determinacy required a passive interest rate policy. However, after 1982, money no longer played an important role in facilitating transactions. Correspondingly, the conventional view prevails and an active policy ensured equilibrium determinacy.
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10.08.2015 • 30/2015
Germany Benefited Substantially from the Greek Crisis
The balanced budget in Germany is largely the result of lower interest payments due to the European debt crisis. Research from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association shows that the debt crisis resulted in a reduction in German bund rates of about 300 basis points (BP), yielding interest savings of more than EUR 100 billion (or more than 3% of gross domestic product, GDP) during the period 2010 to 2015. A significant part of this reduction is directly attributable to the Greek crisis. When discussing the costs to the German tax payer of saving Greece, these benefits should not be overlooked, as they tend to be larger than the expenses, even in a scenario where Greece does not repay any of its debts.
Reint E. Gropp
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Monetary Policy under the Microscope: Intra-bank Transmission of Asset Purchase Programs of the ECB
L. Cycon, Michael Koetter
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 9,
2015
Abstract
With a unique loan portfolio maintained by a top-20 universal bank in Germany, this study tests whether unconventional monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced corporate borrowing costs. We decompose corporate lending rates into refinancing costs, as determined by money markets, and markups that the bank is able to charge its customers in regional markets. This decomposition reveals how banks transmit monetary policy within their organizations. To identify policy effects on loan rate components, we exploit the co-existence of eurozone-wide security purchase programs and regional fiscal policies at the district level. ECB purchase programs reduced refinancing costs significantly, even in an economy not specifically targeted for sovereign debt stress relief, but not loan rates themselves. However, asset purchases mitigated those loan price hikes due to additional credit demand stimulated by regional tax policy and enabled the bank to realize larger economic margins.
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01.07.2015 • 25/2015
Ratingagenturen – Abwärtsspirale durch Herabstufungen unwahrscheinlich
Wissenschaftler und Wissenschaftlerinnen des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) haben die Wechselwirkungen von Länderratings und Zinsen auf Staatsanleihen untersucht und dabei keinerlei empirische Belege für eine Abwärtsspirale gefunden. Vielmehr stellten sie eine langsame Annäherung an ein langfristiges Gleichgewicht aus guten Ratings und niedrigen Zinsen fest. Eine negative Entwicklung wie zum Beispiel die Griechenlands in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 lässt sich nicht aus der Dynamik von Ratings und Zinsen erklären.
Gregor von Schweinitz
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Negative Bonitätsbewertungen und Zinsen auf Staatsanleihen – Gibt es einen Teufelskreis?
Makram El-Shagi, Gregor von Schweinitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
Kann es nach einer Herabstufung der Bonität eines Staates zu einer Dynamik von steigenden Zinsen auf Staatsanleihen und weiter fallenden Ratings kommen, die unausweichlich in einem Staatsbankrott endet? Die hohe Persistenz von Ratings sowie die Beobachtung, dass Zinsen häufig negativ auf eine Herabstufung reagieren, legen die Möglichkeit einer solchen Abwärtsspirale nahe. Empirisch ist diese Dynamik allerdings nicht zu sehen. In den Daten ist im Gegenteil ausschließlich eine sehr langsame Annäherung an ein langfristiges Gleichgewicht von guten Ratings und niedrigen Zinsen zu beobachten. Gleichzeitig ist die Persistenz von Ratings allerdings hoch genug, um nach einer Herabstufung auf ein hochspekulatives Niveau (Rating von B oder schlechter) massive und langandauernde Zinsaufschläge zu erzeugen. Da eine solche Herabstufung in der Realität allerdings äußerst selten erfolgt, ist die Existenz des oben beschriebenen Teufelskreises zu verneinen. Eine negative Entwicklung wie zum Beispiel in Griechenland in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 lässt sich nicht als Ergebnis der Wechselwirkung von Ratings und Zinsen erklären.
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Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit (“allocative efficiency”). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.
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Gemeinschaftsdiagnose: Kräftiger Aufschwung dank günstigem Öl und schwachem Euro
Oliver Holtemöller, Ferdinand Fichtner, Roland Döhrn, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 5,
2015
Abstract
In ihrem Frühjahrsgutachten prognostizieren die an der Gemeinschaftsdiagnose teilnehmenden Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute einen Anstieg des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) um 2,1% im Jahr 2015 und um 1,8% im Jahr 2016. Die Institute korrigieren damit ihre Prognose vom Herbst 2014 erheblich nach oben; vor einem halben Jahr war für 2015 noch eine Veränderungsrate von 1,2% erwartet worden. Ein großer Teil der Revision geht auf eine seit dem Herbst unerwartet deutliche Verbesserung der Rahmenbedingungen für die deutsche Konjunktur zurück. Vor allem der massive Rückgang des Ölpreises stimuliert die deutsche Wirtschaft, aber auch die deutliche Abwertung des Euro, die mit der Ausweitung der Anleiheankaufprogramme der Europäischen Zentralbank einherging.
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The Joint Dynamics of Sovereign Ratings and Government Bond Yields
Makram El-Shagi, Gregor von Schweinitz
Abstract
In the present paper, we build a bivariate semiparametric dynamic panel model to repro-duce the joint dynamics of sovereign ratings and government bond yields. While the individual equations resemble Pesaran-type cointegration models, we allow for different long-run relationships in both equations, nonlinearities in the level effect of ratings, and asymmetric effects in changes of ratings and yields. We find that the interest rate equation and the rating equation imply significantly different long-run relationships. While the high persistence in both interest rates and ratings might lead to the misconception that they follow a unit root process, the joint analysis reveals that they converge slowly to a joint equilibrium. While this indicates that there is no vicious cycle driving countries into default, the persistence of ratings is high enough that a rating shock can have substantial costs. Generally, the interest rate adjusts rather quickly to the risk premium that is in line with the rating. For most ratings, this risk premium is only marginal. However, it becomes substantial when ratings are downgraded to highly speculative (a rating of B) or lower. Rating shocks that drive the rating below this threshold can increase the interest rate sharply, and for a long time. Yet, simulation studies based on our estimations show that it is highly improbable that rating agencies can be made responsible for the most dramatic spikes in interest rates.
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