Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?
Reint E. Gropp, A. J. Richards
Economic Notes,
No. 3,
2001
Abstract
The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks’ assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks’ risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
Read article
Financial crisis and problems yet to solve - Conference proceedings
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 6,
2000
Abstract
Since the beginning of 1997, a currency and/or banking crisis broke out in several transition countries (Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, Russia, Ukraine). In 1995, Hungary avoided a financial crisis by adjusting properly her macroeconomic policies. Financial markets in transition countries are still small. They gain, however, more and more importance for the entire economy. Part of the countries mentioned are candidates for EU membership. They have to show their ability to stabilize their exchange rates and financial sectors. The fact that overcoming the financial crisis in Asia and Latin America required international assistance (e.g. IMF) underlines the political importance of strategies of preventing such crises in the EU's immediate neighborhood.
Read article
Die Region Halle-Leipzig im Wandel vom Industriestandort zum modernen Dienstleistungsstandort
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Wirtschaftsstandort Halle,
2000
Abstract
Read article
Foreign banks in economic development: Experiences from the regulated financial system of South Korea
Ralf Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 110,
2000
Abstract
Read article
The Polish national bank's tightrope walk between price level stabilization and securing strong economic growth
Thomas Linne
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 16,
1996
Abstract
Das relative starke Wirtschaftswachstum Polens wird von hartnäckigen Problemen bei der Stabilisierung des Preisniveaus begleitet. Der Zielkonflikt für die polnische Nationalbank besteht darin, die Zins- und Wechselkurspolitik so zu gestalten, dass sie einerseits eine moderatere Preissteigerungsrate erreicht, andererseits aber die Wachstumschancen nicht gefährdet.
Read article
EKO-Stahl GmbH: Der lange Weg zur Erneuerung eines Unternehmens und einer Region
Manfred Wilhelm
Herausforderung Ostdeutschland – Fünf Jahre Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion,
1995
Abstract
Read article
Phonebanking
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
European Economic Review,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first stage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market for deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is increased as transaction costs are lowered. Universal phonebanking prevails when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. Specialization can occur in that one bank offers the phone option while the other does not.
Read article
