Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
Lammertjan Dam, Michael Koetter
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 8,
2012
Abstract
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995–2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant.
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Transfer Payments without Growth: Evidence for German Regions, 1992–2005
Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
After German reunification, interregional subsidies accounted for approximately 4% of gross fixed capital investment in the new federal states (i.e. those which were formerly part of the German Democratic Republic). We show that, between 1992 and 2005, infrastructure and corporate investment subsidies had a negative net impact on regional economic growth and convergence. This result is robust to both the specification of spatially weighted control variables and the use of instrumental variable techniques to control for the endogeneity of subsidies. Our results suggest that regional redistribution was ineffective, potentially due to a lack of spatial concentration to create growth poles.
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Der Konflikt zwischen tariflichen oder staatlichen Mindestlöhnen und dem Sozialhilfeniveau
Rüdiger Pohl
Externe Publikationen,
2000
Abstract
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Mittel- und Osteuropa in der Weltfinanzkrise: Simultanes Auftreten von Banken- und Währungskrisen?
Diemo Dietrich, Axel Lindner, Tobias Knedlik
A. F. Michler, H. D. Smeets (Hrsg.), Die aktuelle Finanzkrise: Bestandsaufnahme und Lehren für die Zukunft. Schriften zu Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft, Bd. 93,
2011
Abstract
Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich der Frage, ob in der Weltfinanzkrise die (Post-)transformationsländer Mittel- und Osteuropas durch Zwillingskrisen betroffen waren, ob also sowohl deren Währungen unter starken Abwertungsdruck gerieten als auch deren Bankensysteme nicht mehr in der Lage waren, ihre Intermediationsfunktionen wahrzunehmen. Hierbei wird den Besonderheiten dieser Länder insoweit Rechnung getragen, als dass die Struktur ihres Bankensektors und das Ausmaß ihrer internationalen Verschuldung berücksichtigt werden.
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The Impact of Preferences on Early Warning Systems - The Case of the European Commission's Scoreboard
Tobias Knedlik
European Journal of Political Economy,
2014
Abstract
The European Commission’s Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances is a rare case of a publicly released early warning system. It allows the preferences of the politicians involved to be analysed with regard to the two potential errors of an early warning system – missing a crisis and issuing a false alarm. These preferences might differ with the institutional setting. Such an analysis is done for the first time in this article for early warning systems in general by using a standard signals approach, including a preference-based optimisation approach, to set thresholds. It is shown that, in general, the thresholds of the Commission’s Scoreboard are set low (resulting in more alarm signals), as compared to a neutral stand. Based on political economy considerations the result could have been expected.
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Still Overbanked and Unprofitable? Two Decades of German Banking
Michael Koetter, Thorsten Nestmann, Stéphanie Stolz, Michael Wedow
Kredit und Kapital,
No. 4,
2006
Abstract
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Slippery Slopes of Stress: Ordered Failure Events in German Banking
Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
Outright bank failures without prior indication of financial instability are very rare. In fact, banks can be regarded as troubled to varying degrees before outright closure. But failure studies usually neglect the ordinal nature of bank distress. We distinguish four different kinds of increasingly severe events on the basis of the distress database of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Only the worst distress event entails a bank to exit the market. Since the four categories of hazard functions are not proportional, we specify a generalized ordered logit model to estimate respective probabilities of distress simultaneously. We find that the likelihood of ordered distress events changes differently in response to given changes in the financial profiles of banks. Consequently, bank failure studies should account more explicitly for the different shades of distress. This allows an assessment of the relative importance of financial profile components for different degrees of bank distress.
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Accounting for Distress in Bank Mergers
Michael Koetter, J. W. B. Bos, Frank Heid, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool, Daniel Porath
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.
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An Assessment of Bank Merger Success in Germany
Michael Koetter
German Economic Review,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
German banks have experienced a merger wave since the early 1990s. However, the success of bank mergers remains a continuous matter of debate.This paper suggests a taxonomy to evaluate post-merger performance on the basis of cost and profit efficiency (CE and PE). I identify successful mergers as those that fulfill simultaneously two criteria. First, merged institutes must exhibit efficiency levels above the average of non-merging banks. Second, banks must exhibit efficiency changes between merger and evaluation year above efficiency changes of non-merging banks. I assess the post-merger performance up to 11 years after the mergers and relate it to the transfer of skills, the adequacy to merge distressed banks and the role of geographical distance. Roughly every second merger is a success in terms of either CE or PE. The margin of success in terms of CE is narrow, as efficiency differentials between merging and non-merging banks are around 1 and 2 percentage points. PE performance is slightly larger. More importantly, mergers boost in particular the change in PE, thus indicating persistent improvements of merging banks to improve the ability to generate profits.
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