This study investigates extreme tail risks in financial markets of the euro-candidate countries and their implications for monetary policies. Our empirical tests show the prevalence of extreme risks in the conditional volatility series of selected financial variables, that is, interbank rates, equity market indexes and exchange rates. We argue that excessive instability of key target and instrument variables should be mitigated by monetary policies. Central banks in these countries will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy while steering their economies out of the financial crisis and through the euro-convergence process.

We argue that monetary policies in euro-candidate countries should also aim at mitigating excessive instability of the key target and instrument variables of monetary policy during turbulent market periods. Our empirical tests show a significant degree of leptokurtosis, thus prevalence of tail-risks, in the conditional volatility series of such variables in the euro-candidate countries. Their central banks will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy to mitigate such extreme risks while steering their economies out of the crisis and through the euroconvergence process. Such policies provide flexibility that is not embedded in the Taylor-type instrument rules, or in the Maastricht convergence criteria.

We advocate a dynamic approach to monetary convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001 untill January 22, 2009 sample period. Our results show a varied degree of bond yield co-movements, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. However, since the EU accession, we find some divergence of relative bond yields. We argue that a ‘static’ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not fully conducive for advancing stability of financial systems in the euro-candidate countries.

During the last two decades, the degree of openness of national financial systems has increased substantially. At the same time, asymmetries in information and other financial market frictions have remained prevalent. We study the implications of the opening up of national financial systems in the presence of financial market frictions for business cycle volatility. In our empirical analysis, we show that countries with more developed financial systems have lower business cycle volatility. Financial openness has no strong impact on business cycle volatility, in contrast. In our theoretical analysis, we study the implications of the opening up of national financial markets and of financial market frictions for business cycle volatility using a dynamic macroeconomic model of an open economy. We find that the implications of opening up national financial markets for business cycle volatility are largely unaffected by the presence of financial market frictions.